

Test of Strength:

The United States, Germany, and de Gaulle's "No" to Britain in Europe, 1958 - 1963

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The scenario and the issues-at-stake

On the surface, Britain's approach to 'Europe', the Free Trade Area and the Brussels negotiations, concerned the economic terms for building a bridge between the 'inner Six' (EEC) and the 'outer Seven' (EFTA). The legacy of past disputes about European integration affected Britain's chances of being admitted on her own terms. In the view from outside, particularly from Washington or Ottawa,¹ Britain had not only lost too much ground in past negotiations, but was also too concerned about her own interests; therefore claims that the United Kingdom would make the Common Market more outward-looking, did not sound convincing. The British were making their difficult bargaining position even more cumbersome, as they expected the Six to absorb a world-wide bloc of the 800 million people of the Commonwealth and to revise their financial regulations.² The economic prefiguration, too, was at most ambivalent: Germany and Britain, - with the balance shifting to Germany's favour -, had strong foreign trade (import and export) links with both the EEC and EFTA countries, but France, holding the key to the successful conclusion of entry negotiations, was advancing to become No. 4 in world trade.

The central issue, however, was political. London, Paris and Bonn had their own distinctive views on European integration and NATO's performance on the one hand and on influencing the conduct of East-West relations on the other. In reaction to the shifts in the balance of power within the Atlantic Community and between the two superpowers, many Europeans articulated the quest for Europe's resurgence and for equality with the U.S. For the first time in American history, the U.S. economy in the years ahead had to face a mass

¹ Gustav Schmidt, 'Kanada, Großbritannien und die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1955-1958', und 'Kanada und die britische Beitrittspolitik zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1958-1963,' in: J.Becker, R.O.Schultze, eds., *Im Spannungsfeld des Atlantischen Dreiecks: Kanadas Außenpolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Bochum 1989: Kanada-Studien, Bd.2), pp. 167-261.

² Robert Kleiman, *Atlantic Crisis. American Diplomacy Confronts a Resurgent Europe* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1965), pp. 90, 100 ff.; the Paris-based correspondent of *US News & World Report* was a trusted informant on French 'high politics'.

market comparable in size and purchasing power to her own, thriving on the revived industrial vigor and ingenuity of Germany and France; the U.S. was also experiencing "*the pressures that come when a nation's currency is the key item in the savings and trading accounts of other nations.*"³ Claiming that the substantial net deficit in America's balance of payments was the result of performing a financial function and a disproportionate role in military affairs and in aid on behalf of the Alliance, the U.S. pressed for a different type of transatlantic relationships, based on a multilateral pattern of military and financial arrangements within the Atlantic security partnership.⁴

But would Western Europe now dispense with the protection of the U.S. rather than agree to a different pattern of burden-sharing and division of labour within the Atlantic Community, which would permit the U.S. to furnish the 'nuclear umbrella' and require the European allies to provide the minimum conventional forces requirements of NATO? British and American officials and diplomats⁵ suggested that Europe's self-reliance was the *motif* behind de Gaulle's objective of getting the Americans out of Europe.⁶ The Americans, British and Germans thought, however, that Western Europe neither had the *morale* nor the means for counteracting the overwhelming superiority in conventional and strategic forces possessed by the USSR.⁷ To make Europe aware of the risks involved in de Gaulle's "irresponsible" calculations, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations as well as Macmillan wanted to propel Britain into Europe. The essential for London was that Britain would not be excluded from political cooperation between the Six, who were Britain's partners in the WEU. "... *Why should the British people be expected to make such a heavy contribution across the exchanges to European defence ... (if they were excluded from the discussions of the Six, G.S.)?*"⁸ The British government,

³ Draft speech (to Pennsylvania Bankers) "The Dollar and the Trade Debate", June/July 1962, JFK, White House Staff Files: Peterson, Box 1.

⁴ W.W. Rostow, "Negotiating Posture: Balance of Payments", 26 March 1963, JFK, POF, Box 88a. - Arthur M. Schlesinger - in: *The First Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the White House* (New York: Fawcett Premier, 1965), p. 771, reflecting the views of one 'party' within the Kennedy Administration - argues that *economics was prescribing a transatlantic partnership between two separate and equal partners, whereas defence strategy called for a unified military community based on the American nuclear deterrent.*

⁵ Ambassador Pierson Dixon (Paris) to FO, 20 January 1963, PREM 11 - 4523.

⁶ De Gaulle mentioned this to Adenauer during the Rambouillet meeting in late July 1960; he went public in his press conference in September 1960.

⁷ "... *but when it comes to doing anything to develop Western European unity or any real cohesion with respect to policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, then there is very marked evasiveness ...*", Dulles to Eisenhower, 5 May 1956, FRUS, ser. 1955-57, vol. IV, p. 75.

⁸ Lord Home in conversation with the French Ambassador Chauvel, 9 August 1962,

too, was in a quandary as a result of its defence policy: London feared the effect which its views on strategy and forces postures might have on the difficult negotiations with the Six, at first on the Free Trade Area initiative (1956-8) and then on the entry negotiations.⁹

De Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan wanted to develop Europe's ability to stand on an equal footing with the great power groupings of the world; at a time when neither Britain's nor France's, and even less divided Germany's strength was self-sufficient to shape their nation's environment, only an effort to pool Western Europe's resources could restore the Europeans' claim to be an actor in their own right. The reasoning sounded similar, but the language employed cloaked specific grand designs: De Gaulle's aspirations provoked Britain to announce its bid for leadership, while the U.S. stimulated Britain to accept the "inevitable",¹⁰ i.e. sink their identity in Europe, hoping that a British-inspired European Community would mean that Europe's efforts would be directed towards reconciling the policy of transatlantic interdependence with maintaining Europe's independent voice in East-West relations as well as in international economic affairs.

The stage was set for a struggle for leadership in Western Europe between France and Britain¹¹ and on how to take account of Germany's power,¹² which rested on becoming and being indispensable (*unentbehrlich*) for any movement in European affairs;¹³ but it was also about the potential of

WG 10317/22, PREM 11-3777; the conversation related to the Adenauer-de Gaulle meeting at Rambouillet on 29/30 July 1962 concerning the reorganisation of political control of the Common Market and the coordination of the foreign policies of the Six.

⁹ Dana Wilgress, "The present position of NATO", 15 Oct.1957, Tel. 4206, DEA file 50030-AG-1-40.

¹⁰ Kleiman, *Atlantis*, p. 65.

¹¹ Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, 29 January 1963, PREM 11 - 4524 : "... we should try to conduct (the struggle for leadership in Europe) as a struggle for a broad concept of Europe against a narrow ... Nassau Agreement and our willingness to contribute Bomber Command to a NATO nuclear force are the really important cards which we have in our hands for taking the leadership in Europe."

¹² German diplomacy was determined not to link the Franco-German Treaty with the problem of UK entry into the EEC; they wanted to deal separately with the Ratification of the Adenauer-de Gaulle accord and hoped that entrusting the Commission of the EEC with the task of assessing and reporting on the progress and not-yet-settled problems of the negotiations would help to alleviate the tensions. But the Germans could not avoid issue-linkage!

¹³ In their campaign to stiffen the Germans against de Gaulle's tales of American or the 'Anglo-Saxons' unreliability, the British - see compiled list (unsigned), 21 January 1963, PREM 11 - 4523 - and the Americans (President Kennedy talking to Ambassador Knapp-

Western Europe to regulate East-West relations and to search for coming to terms with the USSR and Eastern Europe. British officials suspected that de Gaulle's ultimate objective was a deal with Russia;¹⁴ they were convinced that de Gaulle's determination to block Britain's entry into the Common Market had to do with the General's ambition to represent continental western Europe vis-à-vis Russia.¹⁵ This was also the view prevailing in Washington.

"The President (Kennedy), commenting on de Gaulle's long term policy, said that its final objective (which was evidently designed to put Western Europe in a position to defend itself without the need of American forces stationed on the continent while at the same time the Russians withdrew from Eastern Europe, agreed to the reunification of Germany and adopted a pacific attitude towards the West) in no way shocked him. But the question arose as to how so favourable a deal, if it were a genuine one, could be extracted from the Russians by a small combination of European states with virtually no nuclear power when it could not be brought about by the far more powerful combination which included both the U.S. and the UK. The danger was obvious that in the absence of any real balance of power the terms of any such deal would in fact constitute a sell-out to the Russians."¹⁶

stein and to Secretary of State Karl Carstens) informed the Germans about de Gaulle's "true" views on the Germans, European unity etc.; recalling de Gaulle's remarks to the Germans would open their eyes on the man and his policy.

¹⁴ Ambassador P. Dixon - report to FO, 20 January 1963, PREM 11-4523 - indicated that de Gaulle would try to persuade Adenauer to repudiate the recent agreement with the U.S. (George Ball) over the MLF project. *"De Gaulle will probably argue that in view of Chinese pressures on Russia, it will be possible once the Americans have got out of Europe to make a deal under which Germany could be reunified and France and Germany could live in friendly relations, if not allied with Russia. ... I continue to think that de Gaulle will not propose Franco-German nuclear cooperation ..."*

¹⁵ Ambassador Blankenhorn (Paris) told his British colleague that he had warned his Government for some time that de Gaulle's real intentions were to drive the Americans out of Europe and keep the UK - as America's trojan horse - out of the EEC; he confirmed that Adenauer would not endorse the French view that the Brussels negotiations should be suspended; Dixon to FO, 20 January 1963, PREM 11-4523.

¹⁶ Ambassador Sir David Ormsby-Gore, reporting Kennedy's views, to FO, Washington Tel. No. 294, 26 January 1963, PREM 11-4523.

The more Washington came to believe that the issue it faced - e.g. the danger of war through miscalculation over Berlin - was whether or not to negotiate with the Kremlin (on Berlin, arms control, non-aggression pact, non-proliferation etc.), the more Adenauer and de Gaulle felt obliged to unite in their suspicion that Washington might seek détente with Russia worldwide at the expense of Europe and Germany.¹⁷ American-Soviet talks solidified the Franco-German 'axis'. De Gaulle and Couve de Murville argued Bonn's case consistently in the ministerial consultations on Berlin, starting from the premise that 'Berlin' was really crucial for the West's relations with Germany and the future of the Atlantic Partnership. The French not only defended Bonn's resistance to British and American deliberations on finding ways and means to get Moscow's consent to an agreement, which would govern the status of (West) Berlin, but also pointed out more clearly than the West Germans themselves would be able to do that it was utterly wrong to adapt the West's policy to the Kremlin's perspectives on 'realities'. For the French - and the Germans - the fact that the West could not enforce reunification now or in due course did in no way make it necessary for the West to consider a deal which would exchange uncertain guarantees of 'good will' in the future from the USSR and GDR for a definitive elimination of West German tenets; why should the Bonn Republic be treated like a culprit, even though Krushchev and Ulbricht violated the rights of the Western allies?

"It was essentially a test of strength between the Soviet Union and the U.S. He (Couve de Murville) did not see how, if this were

¹⁷ The incidences are legend; the suspicions did not simply rest on hear-say, but were based on direct warnings. Krushchev, with a view to the Camp David meeting with Eisenhower in mid-September 1959, hinted in a letter to Adenauer - 18 August 1959 - that the *German question could be solved behind Adenauer's back*, quoted in Vladislav M. Zubok, *Krushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)* (Woodrow Wilson Center, Cold War History Project, Working Paper No. 6, Washington D.C., May 1993), p. 11. In a Soviet Embassy Profile of J.F.Kennedy (August 1960), the authors note that Kennedy's position on the Berlin question "*is outright bellicose: he openly announces that the US should sooner start a nuclear war than leave Berlin, since being squeezed out of Germany, and being squeezed out of Europe, which means being squeezed out of Asia and Africa, and then we (the US) are next. He sees the possibility of involving the UN in some capacity in the Berlin question only as a means of strengthening the position of the Western powers, not as a way of replacing them,*" quoted in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, issue 4 (Fall 1994), p. 66. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy complained - in conversations with Macmillan - that the Germans blamed the US of 'softness' in the Berlin crisis, whereas they ignored that de Gaulle had retreated from the contingency planning exercises. The record (on the Berlin question) supports Kennedy's assessment. Nevertheless Adenauer sought reassurance in the Franco-German partnership.

*the case, you could impress the Soviets by taking the same line on negotiations as the Soviets. ... If the present situation is a trial of strength, it is essential to show no weakness. ... Krushchev says this is an issue on which the West will not fight and that we will finally accept his position. ... it would certainly be wrong to give him the immediate impression that he is right."*¹⁸

The crux of the matter, however, are the unspoken assumptions. For the Americans and the British, the direct way towards détente was via disarmament, arms control and inspection zones embracing the so-called central front. There were obvious attractions in this - reducing the growing costs of defence which placed a heavy burden on the American and British balances of payments, etc. But for Adenauer, - and he knew what he was talking about -, the aspect to worry about was that the Americans might, in their disappointment about the West Europeans' lack of effort and *morale*, prefer to negotiate limitations of armaments with the Kremlin and neglect their duties as custodians of European security.¹⁹ The dark secret of this is that the "*continental countries, excluding Germany, were fearful of any nuclear disarmament because it might have left them dominated by Soviet ground forces and dependent upon German (ground) forces for their security.*"²⁰ The dilemma then was that the U.S. and Britain had to be persuaded by their European partners not to do what they wanted to do in the first instance in order to reassure Germany's partners that they would not be confronted some day with the choice between a deal or a duel between the USSR and Germany, whereas the U.S. and Britain had to convince the Federal Republic to do more for NATO as a means of helping the 'Anglo-Saxons' to keep open the option of cutting back their forces stationed in Europe - hopefully in the context of agreed terms with the USSR or at least as a means of helping the U.S. and Britain to meet the local support costs of their forces in Germany. De Gaulle's France suggested a way out of this dilemma -

¹⁸ Couve de Murville, 5 August 1961, (Tripartite) Ministerial Consultations on Berlin, in: *FRUS*, series 1961-1963, vol. XIV, p. 272.

¹⁹ Adenauer mentioned his fears in a conversation with President Heuß, 9 January 1958, cf. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer. Der Staatsmann, 1952-1967* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), p. 385. The recently published volumes on the Berlin Crisis and on the Kennedy-Krushchev correspondence in the *FRUS* series 1958-1960 and 1961-1963 abound of evidence of suspicions, but also misapprehensions.

²⁰ Dulles to Eisenhower, 4 May 1957, report on NAC meeting, Bonn, 2nd - 4th May 1957, in: *FRUS*, ser. 1955-57, vol. IV, pp. 168 f.; cf. below, note 153.

European self-reliance -, but even Adenauer did not consider exchanging the Anglo-American commitment to NATO for a French-centred European security system.

The changed position of France and the French-German partnership were significant in the changed attitude of the U.K. toward EEC-Europe, which was more political than economic. The British Cabinet's decision in July 1961 to approach the Six on the terms of Britain's entry into the Common Market was a rehearsal of decisions taken in the first half of 1957.²¹ Then, by deciding in favour of reinvigorating both the Anglo-American special relationship and the £-area/ Commonwealth, the U.K. had pushed aside the problem of becoming and being a 'European power'; the idea was that the UK, having first restored its position as a global power, could regain - at her pleasure - the leadership of Western Europe. Ignoring the warnings of Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, the Macmillan Cabinet had resolved to exploit the opportunity offered by the Eisenhower Administration, namely to retain the Anglo-American duopoly within NATO, which was progressing toward the nuclearisation of its strategy and forces structure. By hosting American MRBM as a stop-gap in the interval (1956-63) before ICBM (MINUTEMAN and POLARIS) could be introduced in the American strategic arsenal,²² Britain hoped to reinforce the singular position of the 'Anglo-Saxons' in the defence of the West and to prevent SACEUR, the balancer of U.S. and continental-West European views, from attaining an autonomous status as controller and commander of strategic forces.

The facts (1) that London concluded this special (THOR missile) deal and claimed that this agreement was an extension of the bomber force-deal, and (2) that this special relationship pre-dated any planning for a NATO-MRBM resp. Multilateral (Integrated) Force (MLF), were the basis for Macmillan's assertion that Britain had a right to be exempted from the multilateral approach. The White House was told that it had entered a moral-political obligation to help sustain an independent nuclear force; any interdependent (multilateral) and Europe-centred strategic deterrent force could only be an extra: suitable for the other members of NATO and for what Britain voluntarily wished to assign to a 'Europeanized' nuclear force.²³

²¹ Gustav Schmidt, 'Vom Anglo-Amerikanischen Duopol zum Trilateralismus: Großbritannien-USA-Bundesrepublik, 1955-1967', in: *Amerika-Studien*, Bd. 39/1 (1994), pp. 73-109; id., 'Die sicherheitspolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Dimensionen der britisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen 1955-1967', in: *MGM*, 1991/part 2, pp. 107-142; cf. Selwyn Lloyd's review of events, 15 February 1960, PM/60/12, PREM 11-2998.

²² Gustav Schmidt, '*Duopol*', and '*Sicherheitspolitische Dimensionen...*'

²³ Richard E. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau. American Policy-Making and Anglo-

Although Selwyn Lloyd had warned his colleagues in January and again in May 1957 that Britain should not add a third 'NO' to Europe - following on (1) the rejection of EEC- and EURATOM- memberships and (2) the inescapable reduction of land- and air forces assigned to WEU/NATO, - the Cabinet seized the opportunity to leap - with American support - into the missile age. This was at the expense of a WEU nuclear effort, based on a joint Anglo-French effort open to others, as advocated by Lloyd, as well as by Europeans like Adenauer or Spaak. It was a double hazard: The Cabinet were told that the U.S. - in contrast to Britain - would be capable at any time, if they so desired, of supplying the European allies with nuclear warheads;²⁴ secondly, the U.S., due to a realignment of forces in the American bureaucracy, might reverse course and return to the policy of treating Britain as an ordinary European power.²⁵

"When (Defence Minister) Sandys went to Washington he was advised by the American Chiefs of Staff to leave the nuclear role chiefly to the U.S. and to maintain their conventional forces with the financial savings that could thereby ensue. This the U.K. refused to do ... their position as a great power was more assured by being one of the nuclear powers than by having forces capable of policing large areas of the globe. ... they cloaked their case with a strategic doctrine that was a thin disguise of the tripwire concept. ...

American Relations" (*Neustadt Report*), pp. 13, 42 ff.; the report to the President is dated: 15 Nov. 1963, JFK, NSF, Box 322; although declassified in April 1992, parts of the Report are still withheld. The evidence from British sources is presented in my previous articles.

²⁴ The U.S. government submitted at the NAC meeting in Dec. 1956 a proposal to establish a stockpile of atomic weapons under SACEUR's command; in response to French pressure and accelerated by the impact of the Sputnik shock, the U.S. entered negotiations within NATO and bilaterally about the deployment of MRBM in "continental Europe". The relationship between these American efforts and Washington's support for the Franco-German-Italian tripartite projects in 1957/8 is not yet fully studied.

²⁵ Duncan Sandys, the Minister of Defence in charge of the 1957 White Paper on Defence, experienced American resistance to Britain's attempt to duplicate the U.S. nuclear role within NATO during his visit to Washington in January 1957; the Acheson report, which became the basis of the so-called Green Book (21 April 1961), the NSC Policy Directive on defence policy, stated that the British deterrent was not warranted for western security, except for some type of joint arrangement; on the 'phasing-out' idea see below. 'Neustadt Report', pp. 23, 26, 30 ff., 77 f.

The countries on the Continent are wedded to the forward strategy and are most sensitive to any moves that seem to represent a return to the peripheral strategy"²⁶

The ease with which Britain nevertheless obtained privileged treatment (in 1957/8, 1960, 1962) - and the obstinacy (*Hartnäckigkeit*) with which the Macmillan governments resisted occasional American pressure to surrender the so-called independent nuclear force and take part instead in an integrated European nuclear force²⁷ - indicated that London was determined to resist attempts to replace the Anglo-American special relationship with a partnership between the U.S. and 'new Europe',²⁸ unless Britain was at the helm of the European pillar in the transatlantic partnership. London wanted to subordinate all other issues, including the NATO-MRBM- / MLF- projects, to the dominating Common Market issue,²⁹ and urged the U.S. to be as helpful on this as they could possibly be.

For their part, the Americans defended mortgaging U.S. policy on NATO reform (including the MLF projects) to London's ideosyncrasies and dilatory methods with the argument that Washington needed a mature alliance. "*We can't break with Britain. We have to be able to discuss world problems with someone. We can't discuss them with de Gaulle ... We and the British don't always agree. But we discuss.*"³⁰ Britain's eagerness to be consulted by

²⁶ D. Wilgress, "The Present Position of NATO", Tel. 4206, 15 Oct. 1957, DEA, file 50030-AG-1-40.

²⁷ Macmillan informed the Canadian Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, - 22 Dec. 1962, PREM 11-4099 -, that the UK (and the U.S.) offer to assign the strategic bomber force to NATO was not conditional on NATO reaching agreement on a scheme for a NATO MLF. The *Neustadt Report* records the conflicts within the U.S. government and between Washington and London. Kennedy had approved the posture that the U.S. should not assist the build-up of national (independent) strategic deterrent forces; Thorneycroft in his discussions with McNamara and Macmillan in the formal meetings at Nassau with Kennedy insisted that the U.S. must publicly acknowledge the British independent nuclear force, i.e. that Britain's was different from the French, not to speak of the German position; *Neustadt Report*, pp. 66, 72, 77.

²⁸ This was the view of the so-called Europeanists, the 'theologists' of the MLF concept; see *Neustadt Report*, pp. 23 ff., 30 ff., 73.

²⁹ "*There is only one issue now which dominates everything for the next few months. Shall we or shall we not be able to bring off our entry into the Common Market? ... in all these other matters you will be able so to guide affairs that we have this main purpose resolutely in view*", Macmillan to Lord Home, 15 April 1962, PREM 11-3778.

³⁰ Secretary of State Dean Rusk, *Neustadt Report*, p. 71; the statement has been published in 1965 in: Kleiman, *Atlantis Crisis*, p. 55.

Washington first and then join Washington in winning NATO consent to new strategic guidelines provoked French suspicions that Britain acted as an agent of America's policy of maintaining U.S. hegemony, in the hope of retaining the Anglo-Saxon's nuclear duopoly in the Alliance. While Macmillan was resolved to prevent NATO (and indirectly Germany) from becoming the 4th nuclear power,³¹ he liked to promote the idea of assisting French aspirations in the nuclear field. However, he stopped short in his efforts to establish tripartite policy-making with France. Although he advocated the thesis that de Gaulle would be more cooperative with NATO after he got his own nuclear force and urged - from time to time - the U.S. to assist France in this effort, he forced Kennedy at the crucial Nassau to provide POLARIS to Britain first. Confronted with his Defence Minister's threat to go it alone, Macmillan echoed Thorneycroft's definition of the special relationship: *the heart of (Britain's) problem was (American) generosity; the (Americans) are generous only if they back (Britain's) independence.*³² Confronted by Macmillan with the threat that letting him down on the issue of prolonging the life of the independent deterrent would spark Anti-Americanism in the British people³³ (and not just the return of Labour into power at the next election), Kennedy rescinded the advice of the "Europeanists" (George Ball) to use the opportunity for phasing-out the meagre British appendage to the U.S. deterrent and to try for a multilateral, proto-Euromissile force within the context of NATO;³⁴ the "Europeanists",

³¹ *"The British Government was quite clear that in their view NATO should not become a strategic nuclear power,"* statement by Defence Minister Watkinson in a restricted meeting with McNamara and Nitze, 23 March 1961, PREM 11-3779.

³² The quote is Neustadt's brilliant paraphrase of the gist of Thorneycroft's and Macmillan's statements; Neustadt Report, pp. 72, 66, 90.

³³ The 'Talking Points' for Macmillan's meeting with Kennedy - PREM 11-4229 - clearly demonstrate that the British Government was resolved to put the *Gretchen question* to the U.S. Government. *"If in fact the U.S. now abandons SKYBOLT and offers nothing comparable in exchange then the very Europeans who might attack an POLARIS agreement would be the first to claim that the U.S. had proved herself an untrustworthy ally and unworthy of confidence ..."* Thorneycroft was resolved to go it alone if the U.S. did not accommodate the UK on a national/independent nuclear force; Macmillan had to take account of this sentiment among Cabinet ministers; Neustadt presents a highly accurate picture of the internal balance on this issue in the British Cabinet, Neustadt Report, pp. 46 ff.

³⁴ The 'Europeanists' - George Ball; Robert Schaezel; Henry Owen; Robert Bowie - envisaged a United Europe, founded on an enlarged EEC. In this process, any provision of a substitute for SKYBOLT might help the Conservatives to survive, but would cause the Six to doubt Britain's will to become 'Europeans'. *"After failing to help France ... we dare not signal Europe that we would discriminate afresh in London's favour - especially not now with Britain still outside the EEC, and especially not POLARIS with submarines more glamorous than Smith-Lee surface ships"*, Neustadt Report, p. 73; Ball made this statement

who thought they had entrenched the multilateral pattern in various directives,³⁵ recovered the lost ground, since Kennedy's re-affirmation of the multilateral pattern in the post-Nassau campaign provided the platform for a comeback.³⁶ Since Macmillan failed - at the Rambouillet meeting in mid-December 1962 - to live up to his promise to de Gaulle - at their Château de Champs meeting in early June 1962 - to unite the French and British nuclear forces into a European force, de Gaulle could rightly charge Macmillan with bad faith; Thorneycroft, however, could wait for his chance to come to renew the *entente nucléaire*-project.³⁷

The British decision in July 1961 to move towards EEC-Europe was not only the consequence of the shift in economic fortunes in favour of the EEC, but also necessarily implied a reappraisal of Britain's relations with the *Bonn(e) Entente*. This was definitely the French and the German point of view, as we will see in a moment. But for Macmillan, it was not only Britain which had to redress her balance of interests and loyalties; Germany and France were also expected to have regard to Britain's position and role in European structures. Asserting that NATO, albeit a reformed NATO, must remain the primary concern of all, Macmillan on more than one occasion warned Adenauer and de

in a meeting with State and Defence representatives before Nassau. From the perspective of the 'Europeanists', Britain's insistence on extending the life of Britain's nuclear deterrent was divisive. Therefore the U.S. had to avoid any action to renew the special relationship; negotiations on rescuing SKYBOLT could go on in order to wait for the outcome of the Brussels negotiations. As to tactics, the Europeanists favoured to keep the EEC- and MLF- negotiations separate; so did Macmillan. They were furious that McNamara and his advisers - for budgetary reasonings - forced a solution of the SKYBOLT problem, since this was bound to merge the two negotiations. Cf. Neustadt Report, pp. 23, 26, 30 ff., 73.

³⁵ NSC, Records of Action, 477th meeting, 29 March 1961, JFK, NSF, Box 313; Acheson-Report "A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future", March 1961, JFK, NSF, Box 220; Rusk to McNamara, 8 Sept. 1962, cf. Neustadt Report, p. 23, 26, 30 ff. Cf. Gustav Schmidt, 'Die politischen und sicherheitspolitischen Dimensionen der britischen Europa-Politik, 1955/6 - 1963/4', in: ders., *Großbritannien und Europa - Großbritannien in Europa* (Bochum: Arbeitskreis Deutsche England-Forschung, Bd.10, 1989), pp. 169-252.

³⁶ On the Lee-Smith- and Merchant missions see my 'Sicherheitspolitische Dimensionen...', and below chapters 6,7 & 10.

³⁷ On the renewal of the talks between British Defence Ministers (Watkinson in 1961/2 and Thorneycroft in 1962/3) see below, ch. 10. There were many excuses for Macmillan's 'failure': Before 'Nassau' he did not know whether (a) Kennedy would help him out of his dilemma, and (b) if so, what kind of compromise he would get, a multinational or a multilateral 'joint' deterrent. The questions whether the U.S. government blundered in not making it clear to de Gaulle that a multinational solution was one of the options (and not only the MLF-schemes), or whether de Gaulle could be influenced at all to adhere to a NATO-nuclear force, are still difficult to answer.

Gaulle that it might be difficult for his government to participate fully in Europe in military and defence matters if the continental West Europeans indulged in trade warfare and subdivided 'free' Europe into two hostile camps. Hence Germany and France were expected to satisfy the U.K.'s requirements, - and Washington was asked to do everything it could to persuade the Six to make the necessary concessions³⁸ -, before Britain, in exchange, could be expected to move towards a "European" defence posture.³⁹ Even before the Suez crisis in 1956, Bonn and Paris expatiated on the need for Europeans to start thinking about reorganising and revitalising NATO-Europe's political and defence postures.⁴⁰ Adenauer and de Gaulle had different views on the scope and level of 'Europeanizing Europe', but for them it was a waiting-game as to whether Macmillan's initiative was clearly 'Europe-minded', giving priority to the strengthening of Western Europe's voice in the up-coming American-Soviet bargaining for supremacy and to rebalancing the power within the western camp between the inescapable leadership of the U.S. and the supportive actors in Western Europe.

For the Germans and the French it was vital to redefine *nukleare Mitwirkung* in the Alliance and at the same time to face up to the political problem of meeting the Soviet threat on Berlin.⁴¹ The two issues were interrelated: Krushchev argued that any agreement on Germany with the West - over Germany's head - would be easier to reach before the Federal Republic became a nuclear power;⁴² in order to foreclose such a return to 'Potsdam'-diplomacy,

³⁸ Lord Home to Macmillan, 16 April 1962, PREM 11-3783.

³⁹ Britain was willing to transform itself into a European power in 1967/8; in 1958-63, Britain sought to prolong the life of the special Anglo-American relationship, based on the independent nuclear force and conventional strength outside the European theatre; cf. below.

⁴⁰ Gustav Schmidt, 'Tying' (West)Germany into the West - But to what? NATO? WEU? The European Community?', in: Clemens A. Wurm, ed., *Western Europe and Germany. The Beginnings of European Integration*, (Oxford/Washington: Berg Publishers, German Historical Perspectives, vol.IX, 1995), pp. 137-174.

⁴¹ The 'nuclear rearmament' of the Federal Republic is a key explanation of the motives for Krushchev's policy on Berlin. Ch. Herter, No. 2 in the Department of State and Dulles' successor, noted on 20 Nov. 1958 "*the question of preventing German possession of nuclear weapons was a key to the present Soviet attitude*", record of conversation Herter-Joxe, 20 Nov. 1959, NA Wash., RG 59, file 762.00/11-2058, quoted in William Burr, Comment, University of Essen/CWIHP Conference, 30 June 1994, p. 2. Cf. Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Berlin Crisis', in: id., *History and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 169-234; Jack Schick, *The Berlin Crisis: 1958-1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).

⁴² Krushchev statement in conversation with Walter Lippmann, 10 April 1961, quoted in Zubok, 'Berlin Crisis', p. 19; Mikoyan presented a similar offer to Eisenhower on 17

Adenauer and Strauß had to demand *nukleare Mitwirkung* as a safeguard that Bonn could not be kept out of talks on Berlin or on 'ending the cold war'.⁴³

*"De Gaulle and Adenauer seemed primarily interested in political as distinct from economic matters; the chief political problem in their minds was that of the leadership required in NATO to meet Soviet threats during American electoral period..."*⁴⁴

De Gaulle did not expect the Kremlin to go to war over Berlin, provided the Allies showed their resolve not to budge on their rights. Adenauer sympathized with de Gaulle's position, but he could not refute the U.S. and British view that there was a danger of war through miscalculation over Berlin, in which case the onus of having to act first would be put on the Western allies. Therefore he was persuaded by Washington that talks might reduce tensions. However, to "keep talking" must not involve granting the Soviets their quest for recognition of the GDR in exchange for 'new' guarantees for (West)Berlin. In addition, the Germans argued, the need to negotiate with Moscow should never be allowed to push the settlement of urgent intra-west tensions aside; for the Kremlin could always stir up a crisis either directly (in relation to Berlin or the supposed 'nuclear' rearmament of the Federal Republic) or indirectly (Cuba-Berlin) and thus prevent the western allies from focusing on their own agenda, i.e. to "multilateralize" NATO's executive and management functions.

Since the prospect of a nuclear-armed *Bundeswehr* was presumed to have played a significant role in Krushchev's initiating and instrumentalising the Berlin crisis, the Soviets were trying to do all they could to impede the intra-West reform process through diplomatic notes. Krushchev had predicated his reign on a policy of strength, centred on the strategic deterrent;⁴⁵ if he could

January 1959, id. p. 9. According to Hope M. Harrison, Erich Mielke, Head of the *Staatssicherheitsdienst*, told his officials on 7 July 1961: "*The securing of peace demands that we must force the Bonn leaders to the negotiating table before Strauß is done with his atomic arming,*" Hope M. Harrison, *Ulbricht and the Concrete "Rose": New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961* (CWIHP, Working Paper No.5, May 1993), p. 44.

⁴³ See below, chapters 6 and 10.

⁴⁴ Canadian High Commission, London, to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Tel. 2375, 4 August 1960, reporting Steel's (British Ambassador in Bonn) assessment of Adenauer-de Gaulle meeting; the report indicated the points that might come up during Macmillan's visit to Bonn; PAC, RG 25, Box 90-91/001, vol. 314, file 12447 - 40, part 22.

⁴⁵ James Richter, *Krushchev, Domestic Politics, and the Origins of the Berlin Crisis*,

not succeed in preventing the 'nuclear rearmament' of West Germany (or countervail the economic dependance of the GDR on deliveries from West Germany), he would be accused of failure. The Kremlin had to demonstrate that 'time' did not work in Bonn's favour; how better do this than assure the GDR that it was a copingstone in the *Ostblock* and at the same time stir up status conflicts within NATO, in consequence of which Adenauer's Germany would either become isolated or had to come around and subscribe to the compromises which London and Washington advocated, e.g. securing a guaranteed access to West Berlin in exchange for recognising the Oder-Neiße border? If the West were to act on the view that a nuclear West Germany "*would shake NATO to its foundations*", as Kennedy put it to Macmillan in May 1961,⁴⁶ than the interest in a non-proliferation agreement between the nuclear powers as a measure of external control over Germany might have preference over taking the key role of the Federal Republic in the western systems fully into account.

This line constitutes one component of American foreign policy, but it is not the full story. Kennedy announced publicly that negotiations on Germany and Berlin would have to start from scratch, i.e. Moscow could not expect to take the concessions at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers (Herter Plan) for granted and ask for more;⁴⁷ this standpoint corresponded to Adenauer's position. Kennedy also answered Krushchev's tactic to undermine the West's holding firm on Berlin through a combination of threats and offers for a reasonable settlement⁴⁸ with a show of force in (West!)Berlin. In general, Washington reminded the Kremlin that the U.S. supported, together with Britain and France, the position of the Federal Republic as a vital partner of the 'free' world system. As leader of an alliance, which Washington regarded as indispensable, the U.S. government willingly accepted the constraints which prevented it from meeting Krushchev's lures to make a package deal at the expense of Bonn's legitimate demands. Rather, Washington considered how to meet the Germans at least halfway in order to reaffirm the ties that anchored

1958 (University of Essen/CWHIP Conference Paper, 1994), p. 27: "If Bonn acquired control over nuclear weapons, however, Adenauer and his successors need not acquiesce to pressure from the United States. The prospect of a nuclear Bundeswehr, therefore, endangered (Krushchev's) assurances that "sooner or later" the West would recognize East Germany..."

⁴⁶ Kennedy to Macmillan, 6 May 1961, document in custody of National Security Archives, Washington.

⁴⁷ Harrison, 'Concrete "Rose"', p. 33.

⁴⁸ Zubok, *Berlin Crisis*, pp. 14 ff.

the Federal Republic firmly to NATO. The pursuit of '*nukleare Mitwirkung*' might be suspended for the moment - as in May 1961 -, but the need to bring the Germans around to cooperating with the U.S. re-installed the issue as a matter of priority.

Washington realized that if Krushchev should succeed in stopping the internal NATO-debate on *nukleare Mitwirkung*, the Soviets would gain an influence on the direction in which NATO strategy and forces structures would be shaped; should the Kremlin, under pressure from Ulbricht,⁴⁹ "put the screws on Berlin", the West might be forced to offer the Soviets a price both on the status of Berlin, i.e. East Berlin as the capital of the GDR and GDR authority on the access routes to West Berlin, and on a non-nuclear West Germany within a nuclearised western security partnership. Setting a deadline, the East Germans - imitating Peking's device - admonished Krushchev, made sense only if you were resolved to make sure that the ultimatum must be observed; this had worked in the Suez crisis, when the Soviet ultimatum had scared the 'imperialists' and forced them to stop their 'aggressive' designs. Taking this lesson of history to heart, the conclusion was that it might have been tempting for Krushchev to take advantage of the missile gap before the U.S. called his bluff⁵⁰ or to stir up a crisis somewhere else in the world with a view to causing divisions between the western allies and making the U.S. nervous about its European commitments.

Whether Washington and London were fully aware of the intricacies of the Soviet-East German relationships or not, is an open question. What is beyond dispute is that Eisenhower and Kennedy as well as Macmillan and Lord Home proceeded on the assumption that (1) Krushchev looked for a negotiated settlement; in the words of Zubok, Krushchev preferred "*a tactic of gradually crowding out the Western powers from West Berlin, but without war*";⁵¹ this could be facilitated by Western willingness to make concessions; Adenauer and de Gaulle warned that the 'West' had already made too many concessions and should therefore insist on adequate returns from Moscow. (2) The *rationale* behind London's and Washington's quest for how to accommodate Krushchev was the view that the Soviet leader was willing to stop Ulbricht

⁴⁹ This is the thesis of H.M. Harrison, *Concrete "Rose"*.

⁵⁰ Deputy Defence Minister Gilpatric revealed publicly on 21 October 1961, just before the Soviet Congress convened, that the gap existed, but in the U.S.'s favour. McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 359-364, reports his assessment that Krushchev was emboldened by changes in the nuclear balance in favour of the Soviet Union to risk crisis diplomacy (or brinkmanship).

⁵¹ Zubok, *Berlin Crisis*, p. 14; Krushchev to Ulbricht, 30 Nov. 1961.

from provocative actions, e.g. annexing West Berlin. However, in order to hold this line, Krushchev must receive signals from the West that his political strategy worked.

From Macmillan's perspective, there was no alternative to détente: For him, it had become increasingly unlikely that the USSR would embark on an aggressive war in Europe; anyhow, for the great powers, nuclear diplomacy was inescapable, in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and escalation of conflicts; talks on either missile and atomic weapons 'free zones' or on thinning-out the concentration of armed forces in the border areas of the two military blocs should be given a chance. The focus of East-West tensions had now shifted from the "central front" to NATO's periphery and the non-aligned third world; only the U.S. and the U.K. were willing and able to enter this global contest with the USSR; the Allies, especially the Federal Republic, were obliged to support Washington and London substantially to improve America's and Britain's balances of trade and payments.⁵²

The view from Bonn was less confident: Whilst West Germany had moved into the pivotal position in the Western European economy as a result of the '*harte DM*' and the expanding trade network around the globe, the Bonn Republic was losing ground politically within the East-West conflict. The more the U.S., Britain and France were engaged in defending their economic and defence postures in the Near, Middle and Far East, the less the Allies were concerned about actively supporting Bonn in keeping the "German question open". As a result of the shift of emphasis in the global contest from Central Europe to the periphery, which was welcomed by London, the West Germans felt that they had lost the years 1957/8, which the GDR had used to advantage.⁵³ Pankow wished that Bonn be denied the chance to improve West Germany's position vis-à-vis the East, e.g. through extending economic ties to the GDR or Poland. The Ulbricht regime made an effort to convince the Kremlin that the Soviets had to do more to obtain wide recognition of the SED-regime, if they did not wish to lose the Cold War in Europe on the economic and ideological fronts. The Berlin ultimatum of 27 November 1958, which resulted from this

⁵² Record of Meeting at the Palais Schaumburg, 11 August 1960, PREM 11-2966. Macmillan stated: "*Now Germany in her turn was rich and she, too, must put her reserves back into circulation; otherwise there was a real danger that the US would not be able to adopt the Keynesian solution of spending herself out of a deep recession.*" Cf. Briefing Papers by the Treasury, "General Economic Relations with the United States", 23 March 1961, P.M.(W) (61) 6, and "World Liquidity and the Problem of Imbalance", 28 March 1961, and the records of the meeting in preparation of Macmillan's visit to Washington, 5 April 1961, in: CAB. 133-244 and 245.

⁵³ Ambassador Smirnow, 5 Oct. 1958, quoted in Hope M. Harrison, *Concrete "Rose"*, p. 15.

assessment, had made Moscow - to a certain degree at least - the prisoner of its policy to improve the status of the GDR. The Soviets defined recognition of the *status quo* to mean two things: 1) the 'West' must commit itself never to intervene should the USSR once again resolve to stop a member of the socialist bloc,⁵⁴ e.g. the economically non-viable GDR, from following the Austrian, Yugoslav or Finnish path towards neutrality. The Kremlin's terms involved keeping all of Eastern Europe under Soviet control, and the GDR was the linchpin in this control system. 2) The USSR, in the name of securing Europe and the world against the danger of German militarism or revanchism, claimed a voice in how the West was to account for West Germany in its strategy and force requirements. As Adenauer discovered - e.g. in October/November 1961 - to his dismay, the Soviet views sounded convincing to influential advisers in Washington.

Objectively, the Bonn Republic attained, around 1957, the power status that it has held ever since - a power in its own right, resting on the *Unentbehrlichkeit* in regulating EEC- and NATO-European affairs. But because of the vulnerability of West Berlin and of the legacies of Germany's past, West Germany was threatened with "*Singularisierung*". Britain, France, and to some extent the U.S. elaborated plans combining arms control zones, German-German commissions, nuclear arms reductions, etc. in order to induce the USSR not to challenge the *status quo* in Berlin. In view of this, the *Auswärtiges Amt* from time to time⁵⁵ felt it wise to present a set of German proposals. The Chancellor expected that plans envisaging the thinning-out of forces in a zone covering parts of Germany would create a situation where European countries might feel forced to bargain with the USSR and ignore the interests of Germany. Unable to defend German interests in the special German-Russian conflict within the overall East-West conflict, the Bonn government had to harness the support of the western powers responsible for Germany as a whole and especially for Berlin. The Bonn Republic was not entering the competition of who offered the best *grand design* for a resurgent, albeit peaceful Europe, but - out of necessity - West Germany became a severe judge with respect to the compatibility between the postures, objectives, strategies and tactical methods of her western allies on the one hand and Bonn's claim for a position as an equal and first-class partner in the West's regional and international organisations on the other hand.

⁵⁴ U.S. Embassy Moscow to Department of State, Tel. 359, 13 January 1958, NAWash., RG 59, file 661.00/1-1358.

⁵⁵ The efforts in late 1958/early 1959 made Adenauer furious, cf. Cabalo's and Lee's contributions to this volume. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Ära Adenauer: Epochenwechsel*, in: *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), vol.3, p.88.

The central theme of this article is a review of the asymmetrical postures and conflicting objectives of the four western powers, both at the level of the actors and their partnerships and at the level of the interests at stake in the various policy arenas.

- PART I : 1958/1960 -

In the period 1958/60, fundamental shifts took place:

First and most important, an era of **America's European policy had come to an end.**⁵⁶ Until 1959/60, America's European policy had rested on the compatibility between the French and American concept of controlling Germany's reliability through integration. The danger that France might instrumentalise *Kontrolle durch Integration* for purposes of harnessing German resources to underpin France's own role as the West's third global actor had been minimal. But when the U.S., preoccupied with the 1958 recession - which undermined the credibility of America's "benevolent hegemony" in the international economy - and with redesigning America's role vis-à-vis the Kremlin's claim for superpower-parity, temporarily neglected to provide leadership, de Gaulle stepped in to offer his European partners the option of constituting a more self-sufficient unit within the Atlantic Alliance if Washington and London accommodated to a French-led Western European political organisation. The Eisenhower Administration became aware that NATO - due to the divisiveness of nuclear diplomacy and West Germany's disenchantment resulting from the difficulties of keeping at least the German question open through non-recognition of the GDR - could no longer by itself vouchsafe West Germany's firm anchoring into the 'West'. This impression induced Washington to re-emphasize European integration: Integration with equality (for Germany) had to be a continuing process of peaceful change and could serve at the same time as a means to tame the nationalism of the other European powers.

But within Europe, the priorities were reversed: On the one hand, de Gaulle's insistence on the importance of national integrity made Adenauer-Germany's vision of 'Uniting Western Europe' as a substitute for the 'fatherland'

⁵⁶ Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States. The Cold Alliance since World War II* (New York: Twayne, 1992), chapter 4; Eckhard Conze, 'Washington, Paris und Bonn. Die USA und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen, 1958-1963', in: Gustav Schmidt, ed., *Ost-West-Beziehungen: Konfrontation und Détente, 1945-1989* (Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr.N.Brockmeyer, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 235-252; id., *Die gaullistische Herausforderung. Deutsch-französische Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik 1958-1963* (München: Oldenbourg, 1995); Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1993), chapters 5-11.

(*Europa als Ersatzvaterland*) look impractical; but on the other hand, the policy of the late Dulles, then of Herter and then of the Kennedy Administration and Britain's policy of stabilizing the status quo in Berlin⁵⁷ and in Germany (through de facto recognition of the GDR) and unilaterally opening discussions with the Kremlin⁵⁸ irritated the Bonn government and thus enhanced de Gaulle's chances of influencing West German foreign relations in the struggle with the U.S. over the future of Western Europe.

Adenauer's Germany emphasized, after 1956 in reaction to the Radford plan and to 'Suez', the need for Western Europe to organize itself as a power which the U.S. and the USSR had to respect. But this inclination towards de Gaulle's ideas was not allowed to subordinate German foreign policy to de Gaulle's Anti-Americanism.⁵⁹ Bonn was conscious, as was de Gaulle, that the nuclearisation of the defence of the West depended on America's Strategic Air Command over which NATO had no control,⁶⁰ but instead of sulking about becoming mere satellites of the U.S., as de Gaulle did, the Federal government urged the principle "*gleiche Sicherheit bei gleichem Risiko bedeutet gleichberechtigte Teilhabe an der Nuklearstrategie*".⁶¹ The U.S. acknowledged that these views were politically justified and launched a series of projects for establishing NATO as a 4th nuclear power; however, the U.S., due to inter-

⁵⁷ The "*Agententheorie*" (J.F. Dulles, 26 Nov. 1958) is one example; cf. Sabine Lee's contribution to this volume. The Permanent Under-Secretary in the FO, Sir Frederic Hoyer Millar (formerly Ambassador in Bonn), suggested that time had come to consider whether some arrangement could be not worked out, if necessary to have *de facto* dealings with GDR authorities; 14 November 1958, FO 371-137335. Another example is the willingness to consider some formula about the neutralisation (and demilitarisation) of West Berlin; this seemed acceptable, in contrast to the neutralisation of West Germany, to which London and Washington remained hostile. Krushchev had demanded the neutralisation of West Berlin within 6 months. Mikojan repeated the claim in his conversation with Dulles, 16 January 1959, Merchant Papers, Box 5, file Mikojan, Visit to Washington, Mudd Library, Princeton; cf. S.Lee's contribution in this volume on the policy review process in Britain in November 1958/February 1959.

⁵⁸ Macmillan's visit to Moscow in February/March 1959 and the Camp David meeting between Eisenhower and Krushchev are the best known examples.

⁵⁹ Gustav Schmidt, 'Divided Europe - Divided Germany (1950-1963)', in: id., guest-editor, *Divided Germany in a Divided Europe*, CEH, III/2 (1994), pp. 155-192; id., Introduction, in: id., ed., *Ost-West-Beziehungen*, vol. I, V-XXIV.

⁶⁰ W.Grewe statement in conversation with Hoyer Millar, 19/20 July 1956, on Radford plan; Ritchie to DEA, 26 July 1956, DEA file 50030-AG-1-40.

⁶¹ W.Grewe, *Rückblenden*, pp. 291 ff.; report on Working Group of the 3 Allies and the FRG on security policy, established in February 1957; the members were Beam (U.S.), Hancock (UK), Laloy (France) and Grewe.

and intra-departmental conflicts, had no consistent policy and did not pursue the multilateral approach to NATO reform consistently.

In the competition between de Gaulle's⁶² and the American 'grand designs',⁶³ Washington insisted that it must have a voice and play a central role in European affairs.

*"(The U.S. is not prepared) to accept the notion that we should stay out of all of Europe's affairs while remaining ready to defend her if war should come. ... General European policy ... relates directly and sharply to the problem of Germany. We cannot and will not stand apart from these questions as long as our strength and will are committed to the defence of Europe against any Soviet attack. ..."*⁶⁴

In order to inhibit de Gaulle's efforts, but without endangering France's place in NATO or blocking progress towards European political cooperation, the U.S. wanted to break the vicious circle between European weakness and U.S. predominance; at the same time Washington also urged the re-evaluation of Bonn's political status as first-class power, equal to France and Britain, within the Alliance. Should de Gaulle's France become a disruptive force in the transatlantic relationship, then Washington intended to ensure in advance that Bonn remained loyal to NATO, European integration, and to Britain's position in European counsels. Adenauer's senior advisers⁶⁵ and at times (September 1960) Adenauer himself were disposed to proceed without de Gaulle, because

⁶² De Gaulle presented his plan for restructuring Europe without the U.S. and for re-organizing the cooperation between the Six - at the expense of the EEC Commission - to Adenauer at the Rambouillet meeting, 29/30 July 1960; cf. Schwarz, *Geschichte*, vol.3, pp. 110 ff.; Henning Köhler, *Adenauer. Eine politische Biographie* (Propyläen, 1994), pp. 1071 ff. - De Gaulle's initiative was a reaction to Norstad's and Gates' proposals (March-April 1960) for a NATO-MRBM; France had tested her atomic bomb in February 1960.

⁶³ NSC 6017, "NATO in the 1960s", October 1960; President Kennedy's Philadelphia address, 4 July 1962; cf. Schmidt, 'Politische Dimension', pp. 221 ff.; William C. Cromwell, *The United States and the European Pillar. The Strained Alliance* (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 20 f.

⁶⁴ Kennedy, Press Conference, 17 May 1962, cf. Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy*, p. 241.

⁶⁵ Von Brentano, Blankenhorn, Krone, Globke opposed de Gaulle's ideas for NATO reform; since the Bonn Republic depended on U.S. guarantees and since the U.S. were willing to enhance Europe's position in the Alliance, they were against pushing the U.S. out of Western Europe's counsels; cf. H.P. Schwarz, *Geschichte*, vol. 3, pp. 115, 119 ff.

they thought that the American proposals would promote the 'Europeanisation' of Europe's defence.⁶⁶

However, the projects chosen for implementing this design - NATO as a fourth nuclear power/ MLF - were rejected by de Gaulle as devices that sought to retain American hegemony; nor did these projects, based on a multilateral pattern of cooperation, enjoy Britain's support. Rather the proposals induced Macmillan to try for an *entente nucléaire* with France, whilst at the same time urging the U.S. to preserve unity of command and control over the West's strategic deterrent and to test the Kremlin's willingness to agree on a nuclear test ban and then on non-proliferation arrangements. The common denominator of Britain's and France's objections to the projects emanating from Washington's corridors of power was the desire to foreclose SACEUR's⁶⁷ and the Europeanists' argument that the credibility of NATO's security guarantee - and hence the survival of the Alliance - depended on the introduction of Euro-strategic missiles into NATO's arsenal and on restructuring NATO's nuclear planning and decision-making process.⁶⁸

Secondly, at first implicitly and then explicitly, **Britain** reacted hostile to the temptation on the part of the U.S. to treat Germany as the senior and most

⁶⁶ The Norstad-, Gates-, Bowie (Sept.1960) plans were designed to close the 'Euromissile gap'. The plans differed with respect to the relationship between the future role of the 3 nuclear powers and SACEUR's authority.

⁶⁷ SACEUR Norstad asked at the NAC meeting in December 1956 for atomic delivery capacity as a counterweight to the USSR's SS-4 and SS-5; cf. J.P.G.Freeman, *Britain's Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957-1968* (London:Macmillan, 1986), pp. 157 ff. - NSC 5810/1 (Sept.1958) authorised the Department of State and the EAC (McCone) to plan for the establishment of a NATO authority to lay down the rules for the use of nuclear weapons at the disposal of that authority, and in accordance with NATO's principles and defence planning guidelines.

⁶⁸ Steve Weber, 'Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO', in: IO, vol. 46/3 (1992), pp. 633-680; "(Dulles ... acknowledged that) *from a political perspective the European doubt was rational and that the crisis in the alliance was real. ... If the U.S. did not provide (a surer strategic concept), the consequence would probably be a move by the allies to try to develop their own nuclear stocks so as to create nuclear war, if they wished without the U.S.; the other possibility was a turn to neutralism and a withdrawal from NATO to cut separate deals for peace with the Soviet Union. ...*" In an article in *Foreign Affairs* - vol. 36 (1957), pp. 25-43, - Dulles argued that the West could no longer rely on the threat of massive retaliation to deter local attacks; the U.S. had to devise a more flexible military strategy for dealing with limited aggression without inviting all-out war; the development of small-yield nuclear weapons offered a way-out; NATO forces, equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, would then make it virtually impossible for the Soviet Union to invade Western Europe. Dulles had offered Adenauer - in May 1957 - a similar perspective.

reliable continental partner in the Alliance. From London's point of view, the U.S. was already supporting the Six; Washington would focus on Bonn the more it perceived "Atlanticism" as a partnership between the U.S. and 'new Europe', and the more the FRG moved into the centre of EEC and NATO-European affairs. The idea of developing the Bonn-Washington relationship into a mature partnership, British officials thought, hinged upon the weaknesses and flaws in the policies of America's 'old' allies, e.g. the preoccupation of France with Algeria and the unilateralism of de Gaulle and the relative decline of Britain's power. The latter forced London to ask for Washington's support for a series of British defence cuts and for her unilateral decisions on the nature of the forces to be affected by these cuts.⁶⁹ Already in May 1957 Dulles confessed to Adenauer that West Germany might have to step in sooner rather than later as a replacement for the British.⁷⁰ In 1962, the British thought that the Germans were presenting the Six and indirectly themselves to Washington as the principal partners of the U.S. in Europe.⁷¹ British officials anticipated that in return Washington would have to pay a higher price diplomatically for German support in the defence of the two bases of American hegemony, the strength of the \$ and the infrastructure for projecting U.S. military power abroad.⁷² Whenever Washington had to find tough allies⁷³ in the contest with

⁶⁹ US Secretary of State for Defence (Wilson) in a letter to J.F.Dulles asserted that the cuts reduced Britain's value as an ally, 22 June 1956, NA Wash., RG 59, Lot file 58 D 209.

⁷⁰ Record of conversation Dulles-Adenauer, 1 May 1957. Presenting what he called his 'political testament', Dulles told Herter, Dillon and Merchant - before they left for the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in May 1959 - that the "*British no longer can be one of the foundation stones of our alliance. ... We must now accept the fact that something has happened, not just to British politicians of both parties, but to the British people...*" Merchant records that Dulles did not state the alternative policies which his (Dulles') analysis would compel his successors to follow; Merchant surmised that the alternative which Dulles had in mind was "*whether this would have led (us) to conclude that we must draw closer to Germany and rely more heavily on Germany, or whether we should return more to a continental policy of neo-isolation, retaining some world responsibilities, but no longer feeling we had powerful, reliable traditional allies...*", Livingston Merchant Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton, Box 12, file 1965, J.F.Dulles, Oral History Project, pp. 51-56. In his policy and diplomacy, however, Dulles supported Eisenhower's efforts to repair the 'special relationship' (Bermuda Conference, March 1957; Washington 'summit', October 1957).

⁷¹ Record of Conversation between Edward Heath and Howard Green, Canadian Foreign Minister, 3 January 1962, PREM 11-4016; Heath referred to F.J.Strauss' speech, assuming that Strauss would not have spoken in this way without some encouragement from Washington.

⁷² R.A.D. Ford, "A re-examination of the balance of power", 18 Oct.1957, PAC, RG 25, Box 298, file 50128- 40, pt. 3.

the USSR (and 'Red China'), the Federal Republic might qualify more easily than Britain or France; consequently, Bonn might be able to impose its views on the U.S. Government concerning the timing and the conditions for an approach to East-West negotiations. In other words: Bonn would have the power to link progress toward détente, e.g. talks on disarmament, with America's support for the Germans in their special conflicts with Pankow and the Kremlin, e.g. non-recognition of the GDR and defence of the status quo in Berlin. In fact, however, the Western allies began to drive home the point that they were no longer willing to underwrite Bonn's maximum objectives if that meant they had to minimize their freedom to search for a *modus vivendi* with Moscow.⁷⁴

The British⁷⁵ were proud of having developed some new thinking on East-West relations, and therefore wanted to carry the U.S. with them. Resolved to preserve its key position as a strategic power, Britain regarded other issues as negotiable, particularly what it regarded as untenable postures such as Germany's views on the Oder-Neiße border and the 'reality' of a second German state. The *rationale* behind this was the need to obtain some compensation from the Russians for what Britain and the U.S. might have to do anyway, namely to cut back their land and air forces in Germany, and to disguise this force reduction in some kind of zone of limitation of armed forces.⁷⁶ Since there were no substantial NATO forces east of the Weser line anyway, proposals for a zone of inspection or forces limitation could do no damage to NATO's dispositions. Why not take advantage of this situation if the USSR might be willing to offer the West some equivalent?⁷⁷ It was this willingness to

⁷³ Selwyn Lloyd to Macmillan, PM/60/12, 15 Febr. 1960, PREM 11 - 2998.

⁷⁴ Josef Joffe, 'The view from Bonn', in: Lincoln Gordon, ed., *Eroding Empire. Western Relations with Eastern Europe* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1989), pp. 139 ff.

⁷⁵ 'The British' refers to the ministerial level and to Macmillan (and his *entourage*); the official and working levels, i.e. Britain's representatives in inter-allied committees studying the Rapacki plan, etc., opposed disengagement, missile free zone proposals, that might weaken Western deterrence or encourage Soviet 'probing actions'; U.S. Embassy Paris to Department of State, Tel. 3711, 15 Febr. 1958, NA Wash., RG 59, file 641.51/2 - 1558. They regarded Moscow's campaign for the West's recognition of two Germanys as a ploy to detach 'Germany' from the West.

⁷⁶ Ph. de Zulueta for Macmillan, with a view to Macmillan's meetings with de Gaulle and Eisenhower in Paris, 14 Dec. 1959, PREM 11 - 2987.

⁷⁷ Selwyn Lloyd to J.F. Dulles, 13 March 1958, meeting at SEATO Conference in Manila, Tel. 122, PREM 11-2347. Another case concerns rocket/MRBM-free zones: "we do not wish to place rocket sites in Germany itself and we should therefore try and take advantage of this by making an agreement with the Russians," Selwyn Lloyd statement,

accept some compromise on Soviet ideas for stabilizing the status quo in exchange for the Kremlin's agreement to soft-pedal on Berlin which made Adenauer suspicious of Britain's loyalty⁷⁸ and turned him into a firm believer in the Franco-German alignment as the coping-stone of Bonn's *Selbstbehauptung* in the special German-Soviet conflict within the general East-West conflict.

Thirdly, as Krushchev called the West's bluff in the "policy of strength" theory and eroded - through calling the tune during the Berlin crisis - the trust of West Germans in NATO as a safeguard of vital German interests, the **Federal Republic** was bound to reinforce her claim for *integration with equality*. At a time when the "Anglo-Saxons" repudiated in practise the *Alleinvertretungsanspruch* of the West German government⁷⁹ and consulted the Russians about a *modus vivendi* concerning the status of West Berlin, with the not-too-unlikely result that the city would become "external" to the Federal Republic,⁸⁰ Bonn had to remind the allies of Germany's central position. Chancellor Adenauer and Defence Minister Strauß asserted that the Bonn Republic had conclusively proved that she had permanently thrown in her lot with the West; therefore the Adenauer government deserved a loyal, collective western response to the Kremlin's and Pankow's challenge to West Germany's exposed position in the Berlin crisis.⁸¹ Conflicting national strategies among the major

record of conversation Macmillan/Lloyd- Adenauer, N.A.(57) Del. 5, 15 dec. 1957, PREM 11-1839. Adenauer agreed to negotiations with the USSR, but expected these to address the 'German question'.

⁷⁸ Occasionally - e.g. August 1960 - Adenauer was reassured; Macmillan was advised that he had to do something to dispel Adenauer's mistrust of Britain's policy towards Moscow. Cf. Köhler, *Adenauer*, pp. 1075 ff.; Schwarz, *Der Staatsmann*, pp. 564 f., 575 ff.

⁷⁹ Acknowledging GDR officials as agents of the USSR in regulating the transit traffic through East German territory was the first step; including the GDR as a signatory of a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was another one. Assuming that the western powers were unwilling to sacrifice their security for the sake of West Berlin and West Germany, Krushchev calculated that Kennedy, with some Soviet prodding and 'brinkmanship', would "*extend his realism to accepting the Soviet view of realities on West Berlin*", Vladislav M. Zubok, *Krushchev's Motives and Soviet Diplomacy in the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962* (CWIHP/ Essen Conference Paper, 28-30 June 1994), p. 21. In late September / October 1961, London and Washington tended toward *de facto* recognition in order to avoid a return to the confrontation; see below.

⁸⁰ According to Yuli Kwitzinsky - *Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten* (Berlin: Siedler, 1993); S.116 - Krushchev's design (originally) was to transform West Berlin into a free city; West Berlin would be cut off (legally, politically and morally) from the Federal Republic, but assimilated to the GDR.

⁸¹ Sir Pierson Dixon, Report on what Soutou told him about de Gaulle-Adenauer

western powers would only provide a pressure point for the Kremlin in any East-West crisis; acknowledging Bonn's *droit de regard* was a means to stop the Americans, British or French from offering concessions to the Russians which would break new ground in directions favourable to the USSR.

Fourthly, Britain's claim for leadership in NATO-Europe rested on the assumption that **France** could not get along with Germany without Britain's participation to balance the German contribution to the 'western systems'. However, as early as February/March 1957, Macmillan for the first time discerned that France was confident about creating a community with Germany.⁸² In spite of the inherent weaknesses of France compared to Germany's rise to European power status, the powers-that-be in France even before de Gaulle's return to office thought Western Europe could do without Britain; they felt that they could rely on the willing cooperation of Germany and Italy. At the same time Britain was warned that France would object to a division of labour within the Euro-Atlantic network between the nuclear 'Anglo-Saxons' and the non-nuclear continental Europeans; Bonn and Paris feared that Britain's projected reductions of conventional forces would be followed by a rearrangement of tasks which would lead to the U.S. and the UK being solely responsible for the West's strategic deterrent.

To Britain's annoyance, these Franco-German-Italian considerations were reflected in the field of defence production. There was not only the secret Franco-Italian-German, U.S.-backed initiative concerning research, development and joint procurement in rocketry, nuclear propulsion, and possibly weaponry;⁸³ there were many other ventures where Britain felt out in the cold.

"The Common Market countries prefer ... to deal with each other. ... the French government have made it clear that they will not buy British equipment themselves and will do their utmost to dissuade other countries from doing so, unless we are prepared to place orders of similar size with their industry and particularly their aircraft industry. ... The prospects of our European allies

meeting, Embassy Paris tel. No. 334 to FO, 12 July 1962, PREM 11 - 3377. On the early stages of the second Berlin crisis see Sabine Lee's article in this volume.

⁸² Record of Meeting between Macmillan/ S.Lloyd and Mollet, Pineau, Faure, 9 March 1957, ZG 2436, FO 371 - 129 327.

⁸³ H.P. Schwarz, *Geschichte*, vol. III, p.97; Maurice Vaisse, 'Un dialogue de sourds. Les relations nucléaires franco-américains de 1957 à 1960', in: *Relations Internationales*, No. 68 (1991), pp. 407-423.

wishing to co-operate with us on acceptable terms have in fact deteriorated: and NATO and WEU activities are operating against our economic interests..."⁸⁴

It became increasingly clear that Bonn would not use its economic clout as a lever for putting pressure on France to meet Britain on either the Free Trade Area project or entry into the Common Market. On the contrary, as Macmillan discerned, Bonn was prepared to pay an economic price for French support on Berlin and their continued non-recognition of the Pankow government. Conversely, Macmillan placed a premium upon exacting an economic price from de Gaulle in exchange for yielding to (some of) de Gaulle's political objectives.

"My purpose now must be to support de Gaulle on the political front. ... In return he must give to me the greatest practical accommodation that he can on the economic front. The future of British trade in Europe is far more important than whether a few French fighters are or are not to be put under the command of SACEUR. ... As we do not believe there will be a global war, what is really important is British trade interests. ... we should not allow it to be whittled away by the Americans."⁸⁵

Since the response from Paris and Bonn was cool, Macmillan threatened to leave Germany and France alone to face Soviet power; since Bonn and Paris engaged in a trade war against the U.K., Macmillan had a pretext for threatening to dilute the 'nuclear umbrella', the real protection of Europe's security. Other incidents seemed even more outrageous,⁸⁶ and inadvertently gave Bonn the impression that the Macmillan Governments did not intend to honour its moral and legal commitments to assist Bonn in keeping the 'German question' open. Such impressions prompted Adenauer to reaffirm the existing Franco-German rapprochement.

⁸⁴ Duncan Sandys, "Interdependence in Research and Production", D (59) 16, 20 March 1959, CAB. 131 - 21.

⁸⁵ Macmillan to Selwyn Lloyd, 22 Dec.1959, PREM 11-2991.

⁸⁶ Macmillan used German defaults on offset payments as an excuse for neglecting German interests in East-West relations; "every time they mention East Germany, we ought to remind them of the intolerable financial position" (i.e.the default in buying weapons from the UK rather than the U.S. and France), Macmillan to Lord Home, 21 August 1963, M 295/63, PREM 11-4529.

It is obvious that Macmillan's efforts before and after the 'Brussels breakdown' were directed to promote cooperation between France and Britain. He gave no attention to the possibility of Britain acceding as the third party to the existing *Bonn(e) Entente*. It would, of course, have been difficult to transform the Adenauer-de Gaulle accord in such a way as to enable Britain to participate. But it was clear that London preferred either to lure de Gaulle with offers of an *entente nucléaire* or to admonish Bonn that Germany had to help Britain get into Europe, if the Germans wanted to hold the 'Continent' steady. Although it was recognised how lucrative joint ventures between Britain and Germany could be,⁸⁷ this did not initiate action to expand Britain's political commitments to the Federal Republic.

- PART II: 1960-1963 -

The shifts in the balance of power induced Britain, France, and West Germany to jockey for position within the western systems of cooperation and integration. The shifts not only affected the Brussels negotiations, but were also reflected in NATO, GATT, IMF/World Bank, OEEC/OECD. Adenauer and de Gaulle set the stage by promoting schemes for political 'unison' between the Six which would provide Bonn and Paris with an additional basis of power to support their claim for greater influence within the Alliance; in that process, Adenauer and de Gaulle were reluctant to press the U.K. one millimetre on the problem of choosing between reliance on the special relationship with the U.S. or 'pooling' forces and resources with Western Europe.

1. The United States, Britain and Germany's quest for security.

The Berlin crisis made the Bonn Republic acutely conscious of her exposed position in Europe. The Germans knew they could not defend themselves; the strength to deter and eventually defend vital interests depended on the will and ability of the Allies to protect them in an emergency. Even though all endorsed the view that it would be impossible to defend Berlin militarily, except at an incalculable risk, it was distressing to Bonn that contingency

⁸⁷ "... our efforts to promote shared schemes (:tanks) should be directed particularly at the Germans, who are likely to be efficient partners; who are large customers; and whose association with us would turn the French flank", Duncan Sandys, "Interdependence in Research and Production", D(59)16, 20 March 1959, CAB. 131-21. In 1962, British officials thought that instead of amending the WEU-Treaty restrictions on submarine construction, the Germans should be induced to order submarines from the UK, as a way to offset the local costs of the BAOR; Macmillan was angry when he was told that British dockyards were not capable of coping with such an order; de Zulueta note for the Prime Minister, 29 July 1962, PREM 11-4154.

planning was - at first exclusively - reserved to the Allies, in fact to the U.S. in consultation with the British and with SACEUR. The Federal Republic was neither allowed nor able to defend its airspace; the Soviet Union used low-level bomber flights to terrorize the population of West Berlin throughout the 1960s. For Bonn, integrated air defence and reliance on neighbouring countries for war reserves storage were important.

The key fear, however, was not of a military conflict, as no one seriously wanted to probe the other side's preparedness for war, but the possibility of being blackmailed into surrendering what were considered Berlin's live-lines by the threat of the Soviet Union to use the superior forces at her disposal in the locality. If the USSR threatened 'local' conventional assaults, or used force in East Germany to quell an uprising,⁸⁸ or if the Kremlin was unable to prevent Ulbricht from taking offending measures, and if such a crisis escalated, would the western Allies then call upon their forces to resist the pressure or would they stop short of any action?⁸⁹ This would imply that the next step had to be the resort to tactical atomic weapons, because of the very nature of NATO's forces deployment? It was one thing for German politicians to assert that security guarantees had to include assurance against nuclear blackmail. *"Whoever either lacks the determination or the means to fight a nuclear conflict is vul-*

⁸⁸ When the Federal Republic joined for the first time a NAC meeting - in Dec. 1956 -, Foreign Minister von Brentano raised the question what WEU and/or NATO considered to do in case there was trouble in East Germany and the USSR used force to suppress a turmoil; it would be a civil war-situation which could not be dealt with by nuclear weapons. Brentano disputed the views presented by Selwyn Lloyd, who tried to direct attention to other factors. The debate - on 18 Dec. 1956 - reflected the situation after 'Hungary' and 'Suez'; DEA file 50030 - AG - 1 - 40. Both London and Washington were anxious to avoid a situation in which 'June 1953' could reoccur; as to Britain's position cf. footnote 199); as to American views see record of conversation Dulles-Mikojan, 16 January 1959, Merchant Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton, Box 5, file Mikojan, Visit to Washington 1959. This feeling was shared by Adenauer. The difference was about the policy which this analysis compelled the governments to follow; Britain wanted to see the GDR stabilized, Adenauer insisted that the 'West' must exercise its influence to improve not only the economic situation, but also the political 'standard of living' in the GDR.

⁸⁹ As a Senator and candidate for the Presidency, J.F. Kennedy had threatened the use of nuclear weapons as a means to prevent the U.S. from being squeezed out of Berlin and Germany; his thinking reflects the domino theory. It is curious that the arguments employed by Kennedy, which were reported in a portrait of the Soviet Embassy in Washington to Moscow (August 1960), correspond to a list of special measures which Shelepin, former KGB chairman, submitted on 29 July 1961 in response to Krushchev's request for a plan of strategic deception; Zubok, *Krushchev's Motives*, p. 25. Both Krushchev and Kennedy - after the meeting in Vienna on 3-4 June 1961- ordered an increase of conventional strength. Secret Service Information probably induced Kennedy and Krushchev to think that neither side would escalate the crisis; 'brinkmanship' seems to be limited to a 'war of nerves'.

nerable to such political blackmail."⁹⁰ It was quite another matter to agree in advance that the use of atomic weapons should be incorporated in the contingency plans. When asked by Dulles in February 1959, during his last visit to Bonn, whether he (Adenauer) wished to retain the nuclear option in the planning exercises with respect to the Krushchev ultimatum, the German Chancellor categorically refuted the employment of nuclear weapons in the defence of Berlin.⁹¹ Dulles had to acknowledge that it was an illusion to think that miniaturized (tactical) atomic weapons made it feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence through vast retaliatory power; in an article for *Foreign Affairs* (October 1957) he had explained that it might be possible "to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt."

Nevertheless, Bonn had always wanted, and still insisted, on being reassured that NATO's guarantee (Art. 5) would be 'nuclearised' - parallel to the nuclearisation of strategy and force postures -, and that the Federal Republic would be backed-up diplomatically and militarily by NATO's balanced collective forces. In view of the principle of balanced collective forces, Adenauer had in September 1954 voluntarily disowned ABC-weapons, which in turn had helped to solve the nuclear dilemma for WEU/NATO!⁹² The fear that the process of NATO integration was in danger of being abandoned by de Gaulle's aspirations, but also by Britain's attempts to preserve the dichotomy between the strategic nuclear powers and the non-nuclear continental European members within NATO, induced Bonn to press strongly for the continued expansion of the integration process, both within NATO through extending the authority of SACEUR and within the European Community through joint production efforts and coordinating military forces.⁹³ Heralding the cause of multilateral

⁹⁰ F.J. Strauß, 25 May 1959, "Views on Federal Republic's Military Role", Despatch No. 1757, NA Wash., RG 59, Box 3561, file 762 A.5/ 5-2559.

⁹¹ Henning Köhler, *Adenauer. Eine politische Biographie* (Stuttgart: Propyläen, 1994), pp. 1019 ff. As candidate for the Presidency, Senator John F. Kennedy had openly announced "that the USA should sooner start a nuclear war than leave Berlin...", Soviet Embassy, Washington, portrait of Kennedy, August 1960, quoted in CWIHP Bulletin, issue 4 (Fall 1994), p. 66.

⁹² Gustav Schmidt, 'Tying' (West) Germany.

⁹³ Report on "Strauß' views on FRG's military role," 25 May 1959, Desp.No. 1757, NA Wash.), Box 3561, file 762 A.5/ 5 - 2559. On similar efforts in October/December 1961 see below. Cf. Johannes Steinhoff/Reiner Pommerin, *Strategiewechsel: Bundesrepublik und Nuklearstrategie in der Ära Adenauer-Kennedy* (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1992; Nuclear History Program), pp. 111-119; Christian Tuschhoff, *Die MC 70 und die Einführung Nuklearer Trägersysteme in die Bundeswehr 1956-1959* (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Nuclear History Program, Arbeitspapier, 1990).

production schemes, of course, was also a means of stressing German industry's capabilities and to ask WEU partners to agree to the revision or even elimination of restrictions on Germany's arms production; in this the U.S. and France were natural partners of German industry, whereas Britain had to be content with being admitted as a partner in defence production sharing.⁹⁴

Bonn's standpoint that any air defence system in Europe which is not fully integrated made no sense,⁹⁵ was instrumental in testing British and French commitment to integration. Both of them were, for the time being (and until the mid-1960s), basing their status as independent nuclear powers upon bomber forces; both were reluctant to provide for fighter aircraft. Britain's and France's objections to a NATO-integrated air defence⁹⁶ - that this was a means to sustain the role and authority of SACEUR in European defence - were seen as a clear sign that they would also resist proposals to introduce sea- or land-based 'Euromissiles', the next step in the move towards strengthening the European pillar in NATO.

Rather, Britain intended to use the considerable leverage afforded by her nuclear-capable aircraft to increase her bargaining power in the forthcoming negotiations about the enlargement of the Common Market. By holding back on the deterrent, Britain hoped to facilitate closer defence cooperation with

⁹⁴ D. Sandys - in conversation with McElroy, 23 Sept. 1958, DEFE 13-180 - suspected "*that one reason for the tendency of certain European countries to exclude Britain from a common European development programme (e.g. developing the HAWK missile as a NATO production project) might be because they (regarded a European IRBM programme as method of sharing commercial benefits).*" The U.S. and continental European NATO members wanted an effective weapon against the low level threat, especially in Germany; Britain was less concerned with that threat. Sandys insisted that "*before Britain abandoned projects of her own which were intended to meet her requirements, she would want to be convinced that any alternative was militarily sound*"; if the U.S. did not think so about the European project, it must state this. Having dropped the idea of using the WEU framework for cooperation in deference to U.S. wishes, the U.K. now expected the U.S. to back-up Britain concerning NATO projects.

⁹⁵ Strauß in conversation with Robert Murphy, 16 April 1959, NA Wash., file 762 A.5/ 4 - 1659. The U.S. and Canada had concentrated on the North American SAGE system and were anxious that NATO moved ahead with the creation of an integrated air defence system. Steinhoff - *Nuklearstrategie*, pp. 69 ff.- discusses the problems involved in integrated air defence for the *Bundeswehr*.

⁹⁶ Anticipating SHAPE's requirements, the UK and France formed an Anglo-French Consortium on Air Defence (AFCAD) to design an electronic ground environment system for the Central Region, and then insisted - against U.S. questioning the validity of some of the main features of the AFCAD system - on the deployment of their system; Ministry of Defence Briefing Paper for the Washington Talks (Macmillan-Kennedy), April 1962, "U.S.-UK Interdependence in Military R&D", CAB. 133-246.

France by means of joint production and procurement⁹⁷ and perhaps joint targeting arrangements, while, at the same time, maintaining the special relationship with the U.S. in the field of strategic deterrence;⁹⁸ these views corresponded to the thinking of Paul Nitze and - to a lesser extent - McNamara.⁹⁹ With these offers, Britain wanted to meet de Gaulle's interest in tripartite decision-making, on the explicit understanding that all of them - the U.S., UK and France - had, or should have, a genuine interest in preserving the distance between the 'Three' and the Federal Republic. Britain's willingness to support de Gaulle's suggestions for instituting an organized concert on foreign policy and military strategy¹⁰⁰ reflected the aversion against the American and German doctrine of "integration with equality". Sponsoring the distinguished position of France as a nuclear power and urging the U.S. to assist the French in their effort to become the fourth nuclear power - on the doubtful assumption that de Gaulle would be more cooperative with NATO after he got his own nuclear force - was a diplomatic way of saying 'No' to SACEUR and American projects to grant Bonn *nukleare Mitwirkung* via the route to a multilateral NATO strategic force.¹⁰¹

"The military requirements of the continental countries concerned could be met more cheaply and quickly by buying an American or British missile (BLUE STREAK) already under development. The most important objection to the (European rocket) project...(is that) it would involve amendment of the Brussels Treaty to enable the Germans to take part in the development of long-range offensive missiles. It would therefore be best if the project were abandoned. ... In our approach to the Americans we should draw their attention to the political dangers of the present proposal..."¹⁰²

⁹⁷ Britain and France cooperated on air-defence equipment, but also on prestige objects, such as the supersonic *Concorde* civil aircraft.

⁹⁸ C.J. Marshall, Defence Liaison (1) Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 2 August 1962, "Implications for NATO of Negotiations between Britain and the Members of the EEC", PAC.RG 25, Interim 135, vol.320, file 12444-40, pt.58; also: file 50085-K- 40. - Macmillan/ Watkinson, Washington talks, 28 April 1962, CAB. 133-246.

⁹⁹ Neustadt Report, p. 24, 103 f.

¹⁰⁰ De Gaulle proposed tripartite political and strategic cooperation within common organisations to prepare decisions for the three chiefs of governments in letters to Eisenhower (Sept. 1958, and June 1960) and to Kennedy (in August 1961, January 1962).

¹⁰¹ Record of conversation between Macmillan and Kennedy, 28 April 1962, CAB. 133-246.

¹⁰² Ministry of Defence, Briefing Note, D(59) 8, "European Rocket Project", 1 July

2. London's response to de Gaulle's claim to tripartite cooperation.

Of course, Macmillan aimed at meeting de Gaulle's interest in tripartite political and strategic cooperation as a means of raising France's status and placing her in a different category from Germany, but not, however, at the expense of the special Anglo-American relationship. On the contrary: winning de Gaulle back to cooperation with NATO on the basis of multinationalism, would demonstrate how indispensable Britain was as America's ally.

"... de Gaulle realizes that he cannot have his empire on a world scale without Britain and he wants us to choose Europe. This is perhaps an acceptable way of telling the Americans that we are still important. ... In all this the French are the key and Britain is the lynch pin. De Gaulle's Europe is not strong enough to be a third force without Britain. ... Until we find a way to convince him, we must never give him bits of what he wants. It must be the whole (Macmillan's) Grand Design or nothing."¹⁰³

The thrust of Macmillan's move towards Europe was to attain British - French agreement on issues which mattered in European defence and commercial relationships. It seemed worthwhile to try to come terms with de Gaulle, since this would buy the entrée-billet to exercise leadership in European affairs. Having succeeded in 1957 to relaunch Britain's world power status through arrangements with the U.S.,¹⁰⁴ Macmillan thought he could also come to terms with de Gaulle and consolidate Britain's position as a 'European' power; "Britain in Europe" was seen as a reassurance¹⁰⁵ that Washington

1959, CAB. 131- 21; cf. Record of meeting between Minister of Defence Watkinson and the Chairman, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, 12 Febr. 1960, MM 8/60, DEFE 13-211; Department of State Tel. to U.S. Embassy London, TOPOL 1859, 21 March 1960, summary of major points of second round of talks with UK representatives on 18 March, in: Norstad Papers, DDE, Box 89, file IRBM General (1).

¹⁰³ Ph. de Zulueta to Macmillan, "Short Version of the Grand Design", 8 April 1961, PREM 11-3311. Macmillan minuted that he like the notion.

¹⁰⁴ Selwyn Lloyd to Macmillan, PM/60/12, 15 Febr. 1960, PREM 11 - 2998.

¹⁰⁵ Economically, Britain wanted to protect itself against dependence on the U.S.; complementarity in arms production was a hazard, since the U.S. government seemed not very successful in standing up to the pressures from American industry. "We should cooperate (but) with a very wary eye on American attempts to force us out of the European market and perhaps to anticipate our closer association with Europe in the defence as well as

would not by-pass Britain in the process of restructuring the transatlantic network and the political-strategic balance of power in Europe.

"Isolated from the political leadership of Europe, our value to the Americans would also diminish and they might, despite interdependence, prefer to deal with Europe over our heads. ... In short, our influence with the Americans will depend on the extent of our influence elsewhere, and we can avoid the appearance of becoming a Satellite only by putting ourselves in a position to lead and represent our European friends. We have, therefore, to convince the Europeans, particularly the French, that we are not deserting their interests in order to consolidate our position as America's junior partner. ... There may well be a future occasion where the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance will be better preserved if the UK behaves as an European rather than as an 'Anglo-Saxon' member."¹⁰⁶

But when put to the test, the device of having regard to Britain's "European role" and to de Gaulle's sensitivities did not prevail. When in February 1960 a decision had to be taken about cancelling the further development of BLUE STREAK, the debate centred around the range of choices offered by American authorities and Britain's residual powers. The debate concentrated on preventing Britain's position as a nuclear power from becoming dependent on weapons systems which would provide the U.S. with a lever to force the U.K. into an integrated multilateral NATO force; this perspective led the Cabinet to opt in favour of SKYBOLT rather than POLARIS. The U.S. had stipulated that the POLARIS offer remained tied to its NATO-MRBM project; the Cabinet was furious about the 'strings attached' to the POLARIS option and rejected the linkage between prolonging the survival of Britain's independent force and Washington's favourite NATO-Europe scheme.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the choice of

the economic sphere", Watkinson (Minister of Defence) to Macmillan, 12 April 1962, PREM 11-3779.

¹⁰⁶ Ramsbotham minute, 10 January 1958, comment on Jebb report to FO, WF/023/2, 6 Dec. 1957, in: FO 371 - 130 636.

¹⁰⁷ The issue was debated in the Cabinet Defence Committee, in meetings between Watkinson and the Chiefs of Staff, and in meetings between U.S. and UK representatives; see especially the records in DEFE 13-211 and CAB. 131-22.

the yet unproved air-launched SKYBOLT¹⁰⁸ reaffirmed the privileged relationship with the U.S.

As an afterthought, the Defence Committee and the Cabinet resolved that the U.K. should discuss with the European allies the project for a NATO mid-range solid-fuel missile, "*which might afford us opportunities, not only for co-operation with European continental countries in development and production, but over the whole field of relations with the EEC.*"¹⁰⁹ Perhaps, the investment in BLUE STREAK could be exploited for the design and development of a NATO-missile. In this context, it was thought desirable to interest Germany in the possibilities presented by British Research and Development invested in BLUE STREAK as a platform for European space-craft. "*If we can make collaboration with the Germans work, there is every chance that other Continental countries will follow the German example.*"¹¹⁰ But on the central issue of nuclear diplomacy, the Cabinet was in favour firstly of maintaining the Anglo-American duopoly over strategic weapons systems and secondly aiming at an *entente nucléaire* with France as an *entrée-billet* into the EEC.¹¹¹

*"The U.K. has got much further than France in the rocket age. Could we do a deal with France, and through her with the Six, for joint production of BLUE STREAK or its successors? We might run into difficulties with the Americans, but much less so than if we tried to share the nuclear weapons itself. Such an arrangement might lead to a European deployment of the deterrent with certain missiles belonging in common to all European countries (or a revised NATO...) under a key of the cupboard arrangement."*¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Acquisition of SKYBOLT - which would be possible on very favorable terms (!) - should help to prolong the effective life of the existing V-bomber force for another 3 or 4 years after 1966; this option implied that the Government could postpone a decision on the NATO-MRBM project, centred on POLARIS.

¹⁰⁹ Record of Meeting, Defence Committee debate on Foreign Policy Report, statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 20 Febr. 1960, CAB. 131 - 23.

¹¹⁰ Duncan Sandys, "Interdependence in Defence Research and Production", 16 June 1959, D (59) 16, CAB.131-21. For the further development of the BLUE STREAK project - as a platform for European spacecraft etc. - cf. DEFE 13-211, and CAB. 131-22.

¹¹¹ Macmillan advocated an *entente nucléaire* in December 1960, and throughout 1962; see below.

¹¹² Macmillan to Selwyn Lloyd, 22 Oct 1959, "European Questions", PREM 11-2679; this was written with a view to the Chequers weekend (Nov. 1959), PREM 11-2679.

3. Understandings and discords in the Anglo-American relationship.

For Britain, European policy was a function of her aspirations to remain a global power. The European allies therefore had to accept Britain's request for free entry of, or at least built-in preferential treatment of, Commonwealth products into an enlarged European market, as well as paying tribute to Britain's military role in the Middle East and in South East Asia (Malaysia). Whereas the Macmillan government considered these policy directives as the best way to buttress the U.K.'s position as a foremost ally of the U.S., Washington clearly indicated that some of Britain's claims on the Six clashed with American interests. This accounts for Britain's demand that the EEC had to acknowledge the commercial interests of Britain's partners in EFTA, including neutral Sweden and Switzerland; the warning was directed in particular against any deal between Britain and France which might bring their territories and colonies into the preferential treatment area of the Common Market at the expense of Latin America. The depressing effect which an enlarged, but discriminating Common Market would have on Latin America was bound to adversely affect America's efforts to restore its balance of trade and payments. Besides, Canadian wheat should not be admitted to a great European market on conditions that were denied to American wheat; "*American agriculture (is our) best money earner abroad.*"¹¹³ Whitehall was angry that Washington thought of using Britain's application for membership in the Common Market as the occasion to renew its demand for a dilution of preferential treatments all around. Macmillan countered Kennedy's warning that his promise to help him (Macmillan) solve the problems which entry would pose for Britain was subject to Britain's effort at striking a proper balance between the political advantages of a united 'free' Europe and the economic impact on third parties, with his favorite thesis: if Britain - through lack of support by the U.S. - was excluded from the *Empire of Charlemagne*, the Cabinet would have to reconsider the United Kingdom's whole policy. "Europe" would have to provide her own defence against the Soviet Union. It was a hollow threat - since it had made no impression on the French or the Germans on earlier occasions, why, then, should it compel Kennedy to act on Britain's behalf?

However, the threat put the U.S. on notice that if Britain could not expect benign intervention then Washington had better remain quiet on the issues affecting the trials of strength between Britain, France, and Germany. Of course, this did not work either, for the simple reason that the U.S. and the UK

¹¹³ Record of conversation between President Kennedy and Macmillan, 28 April 1962, PREM 11-3783, and CAB. 133-246.

were rivals in their claims on Germany¹¹⁴ and for the cooperation of the Six in international monetary matters. The vulnerability of both the \$ and the £Sterling¹¹⁵ induced London and Washington to put pressure on the surplus countries (1) to take some of the load off \$ and £ or else they would have to cut off their military and economic aid, and (2) to help the U.S. and the United Kingdom - through placing orders for defence contracts and through non-discriminatory access to the Common Market - to earn a commercial trade surplus. The U.S. calculated that it needed a \$ 3 billion surplus to bolster the currency reserves and pay its way in the global contest with the USSR and China. Concerning some aspects of the international monetary situation, the United Kingdom talked the same language as France and Germany: preserve 'your' gold or begin to deflate, raise the price of gold or devalue the dollar or guarantee the stability of the \$ if 'you' desire to prevent others converting dollars into gold. Alarmed by the fact that bad news about the dollar emanated from London, Kennedy warned the British that "*the Americans always have it in their power to reduce their foreign commitments both in the military and aid field ... (he) would do this rather than devalue.*"¹¹⁶

Viewing the opportunities for détente as well as the need for accommodating the Kremlin's quest for security differently from the Adenauer government and France (in public statements), the Macmillan government regarded the preservation of Britain's influence in Washington as its first priority.¹¹⁷ The results of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration's

¹¹⁴ On Offset- and arms procurement see W. Kaiser in this volume. The U.S. military spending in the UK brought in about £ 60 mill. (in 1962); a cut in America's overseas expenditures could therefore hurt Britain.

¹¹⁵ The £ was more vulnerable than the \$, partly because the international trade done in £ was running on smaller reserve holdings than the U.S. margin. America's measures in July 1963 for attaining a satisfactory balance of payments - i.e. reducing the outflow of dollars through restricting foreign borrowing on the U.S. capital markets (*Investment Tax*)- affected the UK less than Japan or some Commonwealth countries; Canada was granted an exemption; Chancellor of the Exchequer to Prime Minister, 30 July 1963, PREM 11-4588; W.W. Rostow, "Negotiating Posture: Balance of Payments", 26 March 1963, JFK, POF, Box 88a.

¹¹⁶ Ormsby-Gore to Lord Home, 24 July 1962, PREM 11-4166.- On the underlying problem of eliminating the U.S. payments deficit and create greater world monetary reserves to supplement the borrowing arrangements of the IMF and the Group of Ten, and to generate world liquidity see Dillon address, Monetary Conference, 18 May 1962, JFK, NSF, Box 289, Treasury, General 1-5/62; cf. Thomas L. Ilgen, *Autonomy and Interdependence - U.S. - Western European Monetary and Trade Relations, 1958-1984* (London: Rowman/ Allanheld, 1985), pp. 70 ff.

¹¹⁷ Lloyd to Macmillan, 13 Dec. 1959, PREM 11 - 2987: "*our special relationship with the U.S....means preferential treatment for us in discussion and in certain types of*

reappraisal of America's position in world affairs affected Britain most. Therefore, Whitehall wished to remind the incumbents of the White House that the hegemony of the West needed 'supportive actors' and that thanks to her impeccable record Britain qualified for this role more than any other ally. The Pentagon (McNamara, Paul Nitze) considered the British defence effort creditable; "there was a gap East of Suez which only Britain could fill."¹¹⁸ The State Department (G.Ball) shared the view that Britain's military strength in other (non-European) theatres should not be reduced in order to increase her contribution in Europe.¹¹⁹ Although these statements should have reassured the British government, London could not ignore the possibility that the asymmetries in the Anglo-American special relationship could induce the U.S., who valued and respected 'strength', to replace the British link by a relationship with the whole of Western Europe.¹²⁰ Therefore the best way of retaining Britain's influence on the U.S. was to exercise it through Europe rather than more directly. "If only we can get into Europe, we shall ... have a much stronger position."¹²¹

Aspiring to teach the Europeans that they must think more of the world as a whole and that they were bound to reimburse Britain and the U.S. for maintaining their global responsibilities, Macmillan contrasted Britain's services for the common good of the West to German and French preoccupation with their parochial 'local' interests. Bonn and Paris were blamed for pursuing an *Ostpolitik* which seemed obsolete. "Another 'Hungary'... (or a breakdown in East Germany) would lead to a very difficult situation in which our hearts and our

knowledge... It gives us considerable influence on U.S. policy...But, even if this is so, we must prevent the Six supplanting us as the principal influence on U.S. policy...it is a British interest to try to hold NATO together. Without it, WEU and the Six would collapse..."

¹¹⁸ Report of the Minister of Defence (Thorneycroft) to Macmillan on his Washington talks, 12 Sept. 1962, PREM 11 - 3779.

¹¹⁹ Ball statement, record of meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan, 28 April 1962, PREM 11 - 3783.

¹²⁰ The United Kingdom wanted the U.S. to show understanding and support on three problems - (1) defence, (2) Common Market, and (3) China. As to defence, the U.S. granted one half - i.e. acknowledging that Britain's responsibilities outside Europe meant that this country could not redeploy forces "so as to increase our strength in Europe" -, but London was uncertain on the other half, i.e. whether Washington shared the view that Britain's possession of an independent "contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent made military and political sense"; Lord Home to Macmillan, 16 April 1962, PREM 11-3783. Lord Home and Macmillan thought that giving the independent nuclear force up would seriously affect Britain's influence on the U.S.

¹²¹ "Foreign Policy", September 1962, PREM 11 - 3779.

heads would counsel opposite policies.¹²² It would be wrong to be deflected by opposition from General de Gaulle and Dr. Adenauer"¹²³ from pursuing a negotiated settlement with the USSR.

The British government was aware that - from the political point of view - a policy of détente offered an alternative to reaching a closer link between the U.K. and the EEC;¹²⁴ should Britain be denied access to the Common Market, approaching Russia was an option, although not a promising one.¹²⁵ For the same reason, however, negotiations with the Six would get stuck if London at the same time engaged in actively promoting East-West negotiations. The British - in spring 1962 - quietly made their choice: London withdrew from the British-Soviet talks that had paralleled the Rusk/Thompson efforts (in their talks with Gromyko) to reduce tensions, with a view of not compromising the chances of getting into the Common Market. Macmillan was glad to note: "Fortunately, it does not look as though the Russians are likely to make a serious crisis in the immediate future while the situation in East Germany remains so unsatisfactory."¹²⁶

The leakage of the American plan for a *modus vivendi*, which Rusk handed to Gromyko in Geneva,¹²⁷ provided Britain with the opportunity to warn the Americans of the need to try for a more even balance of concessions. The leading official's *critique* of the American paper was severe:

¹²² Macmillan told Kennedy that he - as well as the Europeans - could not accept the implication of the McNamara strategy that hostilities, if confined to conventional forces, might be acceptable; Europe had enough of conventional wars, and conventional deterrence would not work anyway. On the other hand, Macmillan asserted that the Alliance's conventional strength was sufficient and that it was important to keep up the concept "of a violent retort to any aggression however small." This was similar to French and German views. Record of Conversation between Macmillan and Kennedy, 28 April 1962, PREM 11 -3783.

¹²³ Macmillan statement, record of conversation with Kennedy, 28 April 1962, PREM 11 - 3783. On the review of NATO's strategy in 1961/2 cf. Beatrice Heuser, 'The Development of NATO's Strategy', *CEH*, vol. IV/1 (1995), pp. 58-63.

¹²⁴ "Europe and NATO", 16 April 1962, PREM 11 - 3783. This is one of the briefing papers for Macmillan's meeting with Kennedy about how to handle de Gaulle and East-West relations.

¹²⁵ Record of meeting between Macmillan, Lord Home and Heath, 19 May 1962; they were deliberating the possible talking points for Macmillan's meeting with de Gaulle; PREM 11 - 4017.

¹²⁶ Macmillan to Lord Home, 24 June 1962, M/68/62, PREM 11-4583.

¹²⁷ On the leakage as well as on the proposals themselves cf. H.P. Schwarz, *Der Staatsmann*, pp. 743 ff.; Adrian W. Schertz, *Die Deutschlandpolitik Kennedys und Johnsons. Unterschiedliche Ansätze innerhalb der amerikanischen Regierung* (Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau, 1992), pp. 148 f.; H. Köhler, *Adenauer*, pp. 1149 ff.

"The provision for the renouncing of force to change boundaries amounts to the surrender of East Berlin and a guarantee of the Berlin Wall. It would also debar us from using force in support of any armed uprising in East Germany. Altogether the American paper gives the Russians a pretty firm assurance that, if they will leave West Berlin alone, the Western powers will not interfere with East Germany."¹²⁸

The *critique* did not propel the British government into action on the Berlin and German question; the setback for the U.S. was rather welcome as an opportunity to urge Washington to concentrate its efforts on first helping Britain into the EEC and then to see what to do about the East-West conflict.

Knowing that Bonn would not and could not challenge de Gaulle over the terms of entry for Britain, the only chance rested on changing de Gaulle's mind. This, however, implied that Britain was willing and able to make some arrangement with France in the defence-arena, designed to create some form of European deterrent inside NATO;¹²⁹ but Macmillan cautioned that it would be a mistake to come to an agreement with France 'now' (spring 1962), because de Gaulle "*would merely take, and pay nothing for it.*"¹³⁰ In turn, only the U.S. (Kennedy) could convince de Gaulle that an *entente nucléaire* within NATO could be something real. The U.S. rejected Macmillan's proposition.¹³¹ Rusk questioned Macmillan whether his government was expecting the French to ask

¹²⁸ Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, 13 April 1962, PREM 11 - 3783.

¹²⁹ "Europe and NATO", briefing paper for Macmillan- Kennedy meeting, 16 April 1962, PREM 11 - 3783.

¹³⁰ Record of conversation between Macmillan and Kennedy, 28 April 1962; PREM 11 -3783; Macmillan conditioned his deliberations on de Gaulle's willingness to concede reasonable terms for Britain's entry into the Common Market.

¹³¹ The Kennedy Administration, after a thorough reappraisal of nuclear policy toward France, reaffirmed in April 1962 the policy directive of 21 April 1961; on the latter see Neustadt Report, pp. 23, 26, 30 ff. Dean Rusk's view, supported by McGeorge Bundy and SACEUR Norstad, prevailed; their argument was that de Gaulle's disputes with NATO and the U.S. were political; therefore, de Gaulle would not become cooperative once he had attained nuclear power status for France. Macmillan's position was closer to the views of the 'losing side' in the debate: The American Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon (formerly Ambassador to France and Under-Secretary of State in the State Department), Maxwell Taylor (Kennedy's military advisor), McCone (CIA) and the American ambassadors in Paris, General Gavin and Finletter (NATO), had based their advice to the President to offer nuclear assistance to de Gaulle on the argument that Atlantic unity could be restored if France obtained the kind of privileged treatment hitherto reserved to Britain. They based their case on the 'fact' that France had proved its nuclear power status through the test of nuclear warheads.

for cooperation in nuclear matters as their price for letting Britain into the EEC, and then pointed out that "*despite speculation to the contrary, the U.S. were determined not to help the French in the nuclear field, either directly or indirectly through the UK.*"¹³² Ambassador Ormsby-Gore had reported that powerful forces in the Pentagon, "*probably with McNamara at their head,*" were looking for some way of improving relations with France; the price for France contributing more to NATO might be American support in the nuclear field.

*"... with their present concern about their relations with France, it is just possible that they may be hoping that we might suggest a pooling of our efforts in the nuclear field with the French as this would certainly make it easier for them with Congress. ... I have no evidence that the President's mind is turning in this direction, but taking into account the importance of our relations with France in the context of the EEC negotiations and our inevitably diminishing role in the nuclear field as the years go by, I felt that this was a possibility ... which might have attractions for the Americans."*¹³³

The American objections were manifold. Any move towards a triumvirate of the Western nuclear powers would alarm the Germans rather than keep them quiet, as Britain pretended. The U.S. concentrated on the means and tactics of preventing France from copying the British model, because helping the French in their nuclear programme would either provoke Germany to become the next *demandeur* for an independent nuclear force, or tempt the French to pass on its knowledge to the West Germans.¹³⁴ Kennedy and McNamara resented and distrusted French and German intentions, but they could not resist the Europeanists' argument that the U.S. had to find and offer a solution to the strategic situation, and that the multilateral approach, developed by the Eisenhower Administration, should be revived.¹³⁵ In accordance with the assumptions un-

¹³² Rusk statement, record of conversation between Kennedy and Macmillan, 28 April 1962, PREM 11 - 3783 and CAB.133-246.

¹³³ Ambassador Ormsby-Gore to Caccia, 13 April 1962, PREM 11 - 3783.

¹³⁴ McNamara statement, record of conversation, 28 April 1962, CAB. 133 - 246. On the report of Kennedy's Task Force on National Security (Dec.1960) and on CIA assessments (March 1961) of the danger of Germany drawing closer to France in some kind of a continental 'bloc' cf. Schertz, *Deutschlandpolitik*, pp. 60 ff.

¹³⁵ Gustav Schmidt, 'Die politischen Dimensionen', pp. 223 ff.; Jane E. Stromseth,

derlying the revision of nuclear strategy, Washington looked for a model which would level up German *nukleare Mitwirkung* to Britain's and France's say in NATO-defence matters.¹³⁶ The prerequisite for this was that the British thought it desirable to phase-out of the nuclear deterrent 'business', e.g. cancelling SKYBOLT which was expected to extend the life of the V-bomber force, or deciding to chose no substitute for SKYBOLT. The Europeanists in the State Department wanted their government to use such a moment for confronting Britain with the alternative either to 'buy into' a multilateral-integrated force or take the risk of 'going it alone'; assuming that neither Britain nor France were able or willing to afford the costs of building a strategic force on their own, the Europeanists calculated that Britain and possibly France might resign to a multilateral or even better to a "soft" (Nuclear Planning Group) scheme.¹³⁷ Under no circumstances should Washington agree to expand the special relationship, for such action was bound to seriously prejudice sound multilateral arrangements.¹³⁸

The likelihood that Germany and France would raise their conventional contributions to attain the target of 30 divisions on the central front could be improved, so the Europeanists argued, by concessions in the nuclear field; if deterrence - to prevent the outbreak of any war - was decisive, then both the provision of the forces and the guidelines for the decision on their use for political and military ends could not be restricted to the 'strategic powers', the U.S. and the UK, alone, but had to include *nukleare Mitwirkung*.

The Origins of Flexible Response. NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (London:Macmillan, 1988), chapter 5; Neustadt Report, pp. 21 ff., 26, 30 ff. The Nitze-Brown study group, commissioned to prepare position papers for the McNamara-Thornycroft and the Kennedy-Macmillan meetings at Nassau, incorporated British participation in the 'Lee-Smith'-MLF as a fourth option. Neustadt Report, p. 21; McNamara pursued this line in his discussions with Thornycroft, although to no avail; see below.

¹³⁶ The State Department envisaged as one of the options a 'European' nuclear force without an American veto; as an alternative designed to foreclose more ambitious German aspirations in the nuclear field, e.g. under cover of collaboration with France on a European solution, such a scheme had to emphasize integration and multilateralism. Kennedy and McNamara took Franco-German or/and German ambitions seriously; they threatened to repeal America's commitments to maintain armed forces in Europe if Bonn broke the agreements entered into in 1954; Minister of Defence (Thornycroft) report on visit to Washington, 18 Sept. 1962, PREM 11 - 3779.

¹³⁷ On the standpoints of the different factions in Washington and the resulting compromises see Neustadt report, pp. 21 ff., 30 ff., 60 ff.

¹³⁸ Should the V-bomber force become obsolete (in the mid-1960s), the British would have no more 'independence' than the Germans, provided the U.S. did not favour the British any longer; Neustadt Report, p. 26, 73.

Macmillan, however, hoped that the U.S. President would stop launching plans for a NATO-MRBM and making speeches, such as McNamara's Ann Arbor address, that could only embarrass Britain and France.

*"If we cannot persuade the Americans to keep quiet about the Common Market, I would hope that we could at least impress on Rusk the importance of leaving the nuclear question, and indeed the reorganisation of NATO, over until our negotiations with the Six had come to a head. In the nuclear field, we have an independent deterrent and the French are going to get one; these are facts which the Americans cannot alter. There is therefore no point in their going on talking about them; the moment to take stock will come soon after our talks with the Six have ended. ..."*¹³⁹

Instead of delaying action pending Britain's entry negotiations, and thus mortgaging U.S. policy to Britain's dilatory tactics over how to satisfy Germany's claim for 'equality'/*nukleare Mitwirkung*, the U.S. moved on to tackle the complications arising from de Gaulle's attempt to master-mind Europe. In this, the U.S. combined the carrot - a multilateral nuclear strategic force at the disposal of NATO¹⁴⁰ - with the stick: *"We shall not hesitate to make this point to the Germans if they show signs of accepting any idea of a Bonn-Paris axis. General de Gaulle really cannot have both our military presence and our diplomatic absence, and you should make this point with emphasis."*¹⁴¹

Struggling to defend America's role as Europe's federator and pacifier against de Gaulle's public attacks, the Kennedy Administration thought of restoring interdependence between North America and Western Europe; the MLF-project served as a counterweight to de Gaulle's attempt to present the *Force de Frappe* as a 'European' deterrent, but also as a palliative should something go wrong with the enlargement of the EEC. On the one hand,

¹³⁹ Macmillan to Lord Home, 24 June 1962, M/68/62, PREM 11-4583. At Nassau, Macmillan requested Kennedy either to be helpful or to keep silent, but not to push him to the wall.

¹⁴⁰ The Administration 'laboured' on a message which the Admiral Lee-Ambassador Smith mission should carry to European capitals (October and December 1962). The Europeanists got Rusk to sign and send a letter to McNamara, - 8 Sept. 1962; Neustadt Report, pp. 23-26, 30 ff. -, which reaffirmed the NSC directive of 21 April 1961 and followed the arguments of the Acheson Report (March 1961).

¹⁴¹ President Kennedy's instruction to Ambassador Gavin, Memorandum to Brubeck (State Department), 18 May 1962, quoted in Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 241.

Washington agreed to soft-pedal on the question of the NATO-MRBM force¹⁴² in order not to cause complications to the Brussels negotiations;¹⁴³ but on the other hand, Britain had to hold back her objections to the U.S. Government's ideas for achieving a flexible and balanced defence in order not to lose American support vis-à-vis Bonn and Rome as well as the good will of non-nuclear Germany and Italy.

4. France's stake in the Franco-German rapprochement and 'Europe'

For France, the EEC provided an opportunity to entrench France's central position in European counsels and at the same time harness the aid of her partners for maintaining *the Franc zone/ La Francophonie* in the service of restoring France's international position. By devaluing the Franc and liberalizing the external trade regime on his return to office, de Gaulle had disavowed Britain's thesis that a French-led EEC would be nothing else than French protectionism writ large; hence only Britain could make EEC-Europe more outward-looking and restore the pre-1914 international economic pattern of trade, investment, and development. Around 1960, the French economy became more interdependent with EEC-Europe;¹⁴⁴ the Franco-German exchange of trade and investment was expanding faster and began to surpass the volume of the bilateral German-American account. France had a vested economic (agricultural and balance of payments) interest in the division of Germany, - substituting for the *Kornkammer* of the lost eastern German provinces, etc., and owed its leadership status in 'free' Europe to the divisions of Europe and Germany/Berlin. Fearing that closer *de facto* relations between the two Germans, as recommended by Washington and London, might pave the way for 'unification' (via confederation ?), the French advocated non-recognition of the GDR.

Despite these ambiguities, Paris qualified for the role of Germany's most-favoured European partner. This was due to some extent to Washington's *idée fixe* that the presence of the U.S. in NATO-Europe in accordance with the double-purpose of containing the USSR and Germany's resurgence as a nationalist-expansionist power depended on the Franco-German rapprochement. This integrationist devise survived, even though de Gaulle undermined its meaning through pitching France for a struggle of power over the influence of

¹⁴² Britain had taken the initiative for a new NATO strategic doctrine with a view to prevent NATO from becoming the fourth nuclear (strategic) power, which would 'absorb' Britain's nuclear deterrent.

¹⁴³ Kennedy to Macmillan, 8. August 1962, PREM 11 - 3705.

¹⁴⁴ Gerhard Kiersch, 'Die Außenpolitik Frankreichs', in: W.Woyke, ed., *Netzwerk Weltpolitik. Großmächte, Mittelmächte und Regionen und ihre Außenpolitik nach dem 2. Weltkrieg*, Opladen 1989, pp. 193-215.

Gaullists or Atlanticists on the direction of German foreign policy. The U.S., however, knew that should it come to a confrontation between the America-first and France-first forces in Germany, the victim would be "Westorientierung" as such, a 'non-win'-situation for the "Westerners" in all three countries.

5. Bonn's assessment of the "Bonn(e) Entente"

*"The Germans see the advantages of the Common Market in political terms... Adenauer believes...that only a Franco- German political alliance can prevent the Anglo-Saxons from doing a deal with the Russians over Eastern Europe at Germany's expense. He is, therefore, prepared to pay an economic price for French political help."*¹⁴⁵

The Franco-German bargain was predicated upon the assurance that Bonn would not invite the Kremlin to play the 'German card' against Western Europe, whereas France would present to Moscow the view that it was the political injustice of denying the right to self-determination to the East Germans which caused the tensions in Europe.¹⁴⁶ The *Bonn(e) Entente* was not water-proof, but the partners were able to sustain a series of attacks on the faithfulness of either. Occasional rumours about French ideas for cooperation with the USSR in accomplishing a French thermo-nuclear warhead/ H-bomb or that France might conclude a treaty with Russia comprising a non-resort-to-force clause (benevolent neutrality)¹⁴⁷ irritated Bonn, but affected Bonn's 'official mind' to a lesser extent than the suspicions which de Gaulle raised

¹⁴⁵ De Zulueta note to Macmillan, 21 Oct.1959, PREM 11 - 2987; in a similar vein: Cabinet Conclusions, C.C. (60) 41.

¹⁴⁶ Wilfried Loth, 'Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen. Verständigung und Mißverständnisse', in: id., *Ost-West-Konflikt und deutsche Frage. Historische Ortsbestimmungen*, Munich 1989, pp. 159-172; Pierre Hassner, 'The view from Paris', in: Gordon, *Eroding Empire*, pp. 193 ff.; H.P. Schwarz, *Geschichte*, vol.III, p. 99, on the crucial first meeting between de Gaulle and Adenauer in mid-September 1958 at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises; see also Schwarz, *Der Staatsmann*, pp. 444 ff.

¹⁴⁷ H.P. Schwarz reports that Adenauer suspected de Gaulle of such inklings or that Strauß heard about de Gaulle's ideas about a neutrality-treaty from Speidel (Commander-in-Chief of NATO Central Europe forces); *Geschichte*, vol.III, p. 96, and *Der Staatsmann*, p. 442.

against the Americans and British seeking worldwide détente with Russia at the expense of European and German security.

The French trust in building a European Community together with Germany secured for France the singular position of becoming the sole judge of Germany's good behaviour towards her neighbours. Bonn was aware that if the French started telling the other West Europeans and the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, that West Germany was hopeless as a partner, then Germany would be left with no room for action and German foreign policy would be still born.¹⁴⁸ The Bonn Republic had no desire to view disputes with the French over the Common Agricultural Policy, financial regulations, NATO reform and many other 'crises' as a test of strength between Bonn and Paris, i.e. the beginning of a fight for leadership in 'Europe', and government and opposition parties made an effort to close ranks whenever British and/or American representatives attempted to encourage the Germans to challenge de Gaulle's stand on issues that were objectionable from the American and/or British points of view.¹⁴⁹

6. Multilateralism and *Unentbehrlichkeit*: Bonn's interest in making a virtue out of necessity.

The primary concern of Germany was how to make sure that Bonn would not have to face the USSR single-handed in its special conflict with the Kremlin. Therefore, Bonn stressed the importance for all the "*forces of the free nations of Western Europe to unite and stand together.*"¹⁵⁰ In order to prevent Germany's "*Singularisierung*", Adenauer and especially Strauß aimed at attaining an integrated defence system with institutionalised *nukleare Mitwirkung*. Within a multilateral framework it would be easier for Bonn to attain a similar status for the units of the *Bundeswehr* with regard to 'modern' (atomic) equipment; once atomic weapons systems (not the warheads) were introduced into the *Bundeswehr*, the Alliance would have to invite German participation in the planning- and decision-making processes.¹⁵¹ Hence the allies would not be

¹⁴⁸ This is Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's revelation of the *rationale* of his transformation from an Atlanticist into a stalwart of Franco-German 'joint action'.

¹⁴⁹ For an example, see Oliver Bange's article in this volume; cf. Christoph Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache. Die Nuklearfrage in der Allianzpolitik Deutschlands 1959-1966* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993).

¹⁵⁰ Record of meeting between Adenauer/von Brentano and Macmillan/ Lloyd, 10 August 1960, PREM 11 - 2993.

¹⁵¹ F.J. Strauß used his first appearance as Minister of Defence at the NAC in December 1956 to present his views. Strauß vacillated between a French- or an American-centred multilateral force.

able *nach eigenem Gutdünken* to deprive the Bonn Republic of the 'nuclearised' guarantees.

The political purpose was dominant in German thinking:¹⁵² in the "nuclear age", the Federal Republic would only get a hearing for its interest in keeping the German question open, if Bonn was involved in nuclear diplomacy at the top level. Equality with the European members of NATO and 'parity' with regard to the equipment vis-à-vis the "enemy" were a *conditio sine qua non* for German foreign policy. This raised the fear that in the not too distant future the policy designed to keep Germany in the Western camp as an equal partner might have the opposite effect.

*"In the circumstances (of nuclear stalemate between the superpowers) the U.S. may be tempted to withdraw into Fortress America and to leave Europe to fend for itself; and if, by that time, Germany was well on the way to being an independent nuclear power in its own right, the danger ... might be increased (that) Russia might be ready to pay a higher price to buy Germany out of the Western camp and Germany might be readier to accept such a price. ... If Germany had become a significant nuclear power by the time that America withdrew from Europe, it might be even more difficult than it would otherwise be to hold together any Western European alliance against Russia. ..."*¹⁵³

In order to dissipate such fears, Germany thought in terms of *nukleare Mitwirkung* within an integrated *balanced collective (European) force*; the U.S. recognised that the argument was justified and promulgated multilateral schemes. Even though, doubts remained whether the U.S. would consider allowing 'first use' in response to a Soviet attack or help the Bonn government to resist Soviet blackmailing strategies. The latter were clearly designed to distinguish between pressure on the Germans to relinquish their "essentials" and some prodding of America and Britain who seemed to be willing to accept the

¹⁵² Strauß memorandum, 9 April 1961, quoted in: Steinhoff/Pommerin, *Nuklearstrategie*, p. 159.

¹⁵³ H. Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet, to Prime Minister, "Germany and Nuclear Weapons", D 758/54, 12 Nov. 1958, PREM 11 - 2929. Adenauer had told Macmillan that in his conversations with Dulles he (Adenauer) had raised the problem that 'Europe' had to prepare in time for the situation, likely to occur by the mid-1960s, that the American electorate would demand the Government to 'bring the boys home' from Europe; Adenauer came to the conclusion that 'Europe' had to become a 'nuclear power' and that the process of uniting Europe had to proceed. Cf. Introduction, note 20.

reality that the GDR was the linchpin in the Kremlin's control over national-communist regimes (Poland) and therefore needed to be protected against the *Magnetwirkung* of the prosperous West German neighbour. Since Krushchev's crisis diplomacy was predicated on the assumption that the Western powers, if pushed to face the risk of a military confrontation in Central Europe, would inform their West German ally that they would not start a war over Soviet threats - such as concluding a peace treaty between the USSR and the GDR (in spite of the likely consequences for the status of Berlin) or to contain the military (non-nuclear) status of West Germany - and would therefore urge Bonn to recognise the 'facts of life', there was only one reaction for Bonn: To attempt to obtain - via *nukleare Mitwirkung* - an effective guarantee that the western allies would respect (thanks to Germany's *Unentbehrlichkeit*) the *droit de regard* of the Federal Republic to define the terms of *do-ut-des*, which were expected of Germany in an eventual package deal between East and West.¹⁵⁴

The growing assertiveness of the Bonn government led to the idea "*of bringing some part of the Western deterrent under joint control. ... Any NATO system of control on nuclear weapons systems would have to involve German participation.*"¹⁵⁵ Only then would Bonn be in a position to influence the West's postures in the Berlin crisis and on nuclear and conventional disarmament, to which NATO had committed itself (at a Council meeting in Bonn in May 1957), and only then would Bonn preserve the option of getting a political *quid pro quo* (e.g. releasing the GDR from the Soviet bloc) for giving up Ger-

¹⁵⁴ The confidential contacts - indirectly through the channel between G.Boshakov (KGB) and Robert Kennedy as well as directly - between Kennedy and Krushchev in late September/October 1961 are the most prominent example of the search for a 'deal', where the Federal Republic would have to pay the 'bill'; *FRUS*, series 1961-1961, vol. XIV: Berlin Crisis 1961-1962, pp. 444 ff., 502 ff. The forming of the last Adenauer Cabinet took its toll, but Washington reassured Bonn, once the protests came in. The reports by Nitze and Gilpatrick that the 'missile gap' was a bluff led to the conclusion that Krushchev, whose 'brinkmanship' rested on his "nuclear overconfidence", should be interested in a negotiated settlement. The reports were completed in October 1961. This took the pressure off Kennedy, and contributed to a shift of emphasis, i.e. 'healing' Bonn's wounds. Kennedy had known before (in July 1961) - through the revelations and debriefing of Oleg Penkovski, a high-ranking defector - about internal (including the Military's) resistance to Krushchev's brinkmanship and the not-so-'bright'-state of the USSR's armed forces; Jerrold Schecter and Peter Deriabin, *The Spy who saved the world. How a Soviet colonel changed the course of the Cold War* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 205 ff.

¹⁵⁵ C.C. 75 (61), Ministerial Meeting, 19 Dec. 1961, CAB.128-35.- On American and German attempts to bridge the gap see Steinhoff/Pommerin, *Nuklearstrategie*, pp. 158 f., 111 ff. On the state of the debate on the strategic review in NATO see Beatrice Heuser, 'The Development of NATO's Nuclear Strategy', in: *CEH*, vol.IV/1 (1995), pp. 37-66, especially, pp. 58 ff.

many's access to the control board of any NATO-European strategic (deterrent) force. Defence Minister F.J. Strauß (in 1957/9)¹⁵⁶ and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder (in 1962/5) believed that if Moscow was really afraid that a German finger on the trigger of a NATO-MRBM meant the nuclear rearmament of Germany, then the Kremlin might be encouraged to agree to a bargaining process on terms which would combine European Security and German unification. But to get that far at all, Germany had first to make sure that the Allies accepted the thesis that members of NATO could not be in favour of Germany belonging to a nuclearised alliance and at the same time object to the equipment of German forces with nuclear-capable weapons systems or even denying Bonn an effective voice in the nuclear planning process.¹⁵⁷

In order to counteract the impression that Germany intended to emerge as an independent nuclear power, the Bonn government supported SACEUR Norstad's and American government schemes for (a) NATO stockpiles (of tactical nuclear weapons) and (b) a NATO-MRBM. Reminding the U.S. that Germany was the only member of NATO with a sizeable force and the most exposed strategic position that had subordinated its armed forces to an international command, the Germans asserted that it was now the Alliance's turn to establish a NATO nuclear force and an authority (a managing or executive committee) on which Germany would be allowed to exercise adequate influence. Alarmed about the appeasement-like state of political thinking in Washington,¹⁵⁸ the reconstituted Adenauer government became more assertive

¹⁵⁶ F.J. Strauß, 'Einheit und Freiheit. Voraussetzungen für die Wiedervereinigung', in: *Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz*, IV/4 (15 February 1957), p. 4: "Die Bundesrepublik muß ihre Aufgabe darin sehen, sich für solche Verhandlungen ... das nötige Gewicht zu verschaffen, um überhaupt mit Aussicht auf Erfolg mitreden zu können. Deutschland muß also für seine Freunde so unentbehrlich und für den potentiellen Gegner so respektabel sein, daß beide Seiten auf seine Mitsprache bei den Verhandlungen Wert legen. ... Ohne den Besitz potentieller Macht wird Deutschland niemals eine Chance haben, gehört zu werden."; cf. Karl J. Brandstetter, *Allianz des Mißtrauens. Sicherheitspolitik und deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen in der Nachkriegszeit* (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1989), p. 124. Strauß stated that he would not exclude the possibility to offer the USSR Germany's *Verzicht* to have access to nuclear weapons in exchange for Moscow's agreement to unification; the status of united Germany should not be prejudiced by NATO ties, i.e. freedom of choice should also allow the option of armed neutrality; however, such an 'Austrian' solution could only come after unification.

¹⁵⁷ Record of conversation Adenauer/ Von Brentano - Macmillan, 10 August 1960, PREM 11 - 2993.

¹⁵⁸ H.P. Schwarz, *Der Staatsmann*, pp. 694, 686 ff., 703 ff.; H. Köhler, *Adenauer*, pp. 1134 ff. (the chapter is called *Der Krach mit Washington*). Macmillan urged Kennedy at their meetings in Washington to make Adenauer recognise the so-called realities. Adenauer wanted reassurance on the political as well as the military contingency planning concerning

in her nuclear diplomacy. Although the *motif* was political, the arguments put forward sounded rather technical. Defence Minister Strauß and Chancellor Adenauer insisted that in view of the progressing deployment of Soviet MRBM (SS-4 and SS-5) it was urgent to come to a decision on NATO as a 4th nuclear power in order to prevent the rise of a deadly imbalance of forces. But McNamara and Britain's Defence Minister Watkinson agreed, with the consent of SACEUR Norstad (13 Dec. 1961), that it was too early for the North Atlantic Council to tackle the issue of establishing a NATO-MRBM. However, Britain wanted a strategic review mainly for the purpose of foreclosing talks on establishing a multilateral nuclear force. London insisted on postponing the NATO-MRBM issue because there was no longer an agreed strategy for the Alliance; from Britain's point of view "*a necessary first step to (win NATO to agree on new atomic strategic guidelines) would be agreement between the governments of the U.S. and the U.K.*" It was this emphasis on the Anglo-American duopoly which made Strauß and Adenauer more assertive about the interests of the non-nuclear members of NATO; this also induced them to solidify the Franco-German partnership.

At the same time (October/December 1961) Adenauer¹⁵⁹ and Strauß¹⁶⁰ added to Germany's claim for a vote in NATO's counsels as a landmark of real partnership, a severe criticism of the U.S. veto power over American systems deployed on NATO-European territory; 'NATO' should be authorized for military reasons to use atomic weapons in NATO custody without the American President's previous authorization;¹⁶¹ this had been SACEUR's position since 1958, but it was, of course, anathema to McNamara.¹⁶² The U.S. - in Dean

Berlin. The 'leak' of Kroll's discussion with Krushchev embarrassed Adenauer.

¹⁵⁹ Regarding the background see note 153.

¹⁶⁰ F.J. Strauß, lecture at Georgetown University, 27 Nov. 1961, cf. *Die Internationale Politik 1961. Jahrbücher der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* (München: Oldenbourg, 1964), pp. 96-98; Steinhoff/Pommerin, *Nuklearstrategie*, pp. 86 ff.

¹⁶¹ Adenauer statements on the eve of his visit to the U.S. to meet Kennedy; 16 Nov. 1961; NYT, 23 Nov. 1961; cf. Köhler, *Adenauer*, pp. 1140 ff.

¹⁶² McNamara thought of a counterforce strategy and of using nuclear weapons, on a selective basis, at a relatively late stage of a conflict. The British and French strategic doctrine, directed towards different targets and probably destined for use earlier in a conflict, threatened, if used independently, the exercise of McNamara's doctrine of flexible response; therefore, he urged the restoration of the unity of control and command, i.e. the return to America's monopoly. Since McNamara's strategic review centred on the superpowers' mutual assured destruction, it raised many questions about America's nuclear guarantee for Western Europe. Strauß' criticism of Washington's insistence on the veto power of the U.S. President is in response to the situation that neither SACEUR nor the European

Rusk's words at a press conference - was appalled that the German Chancellor and Defence Minister disputed the American President's sole responsibility and instead advocated that the decision over millions of lives and deaths be entrusted to a collective NATO- European body.¹⁶³ The German government¹⁶⁴ assuaged the fears and stated that the use of nuclear weapons should not be possible without, and against, the authorization by the President of the U.S. Less excitedly, German experts and the SPD (Erl) recommended that NATO be asked to elaborate a directive, stipulating the criteria for the use and for the modalities of implementing the decision in case of the need for defensive action; such a directive would reduce the concern about direct control over nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁵ A British working party (under William Mottershead of the Ministry of Defence) reported in a similar vein; however, the Report recommended that only battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons, that were already integrated into NATO's military command structure in Europe, should be provided for in the selective (first) use of atomic weapons,¹⁶⁶ whereas 'strategic

members of NATO had any means to affect America's strategic planning, which resided with the Strategic Air Command. Cf. Heuser, 'Development', pp. 55 ff.

¹⁶³ However, in September 1962, McGeorge Bundy in a public speech listed a European nuclear force, independent of an U.S. veto, among the options. McNamara, too, recognised that "*politically there might be a case for a NATO system. ... A NATO system which met this demand would have to be a system free from American veto ...*", Record of meeting between McNamara and Thorneycroft, 11 Sept. 1962, PREM 11 - 3779. McNamara made his objections to this alternative clear, but did not deny the need for a diplomatic offensive. Cf. Neustadt Report, pp. 60 ff.

¹⁶⁴ F.J. Strauß, 4 Dec. 1961, television interview, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 6 Dec. 1962. On the context - e.g. Berlin contingency planning; U.S.-USSR talks; Macmillan's promptings on Kennedy to exercise pressure on Adenauer to recognise 'realities' - see H.-P. Schwarz, *Der Staatsmann*, pp. 694 ff., 703 ff.

¹⁶⁵ Erl, 12 Dec. 1961, "Mitspracherechte ohne Finger am Abzug", in: *FAZ*, 13 Dec. 1961, p.4. - The Athens guidelines, approved in May 1962, provided such a compromise; however, Strauß was not satisfied; and the U.S. for reasons of their own picked up the MLF-project again; cf. Steinhoff/Pommerin, *Nuklearstrategie*, pp.92-104. The 'directive' idea was advocated by spokesmen of the British Labour Party (Gaitskell, Gordon- Walker); it later resulted in the Healey-McNamara compromise on the Nuclear Planning Group.

¹⁶⁶ Macmillan proposed a tactical nuclear command directly under SACEUR to Kennedy, but Kennedy's priority was a substantial build-up of conventional forces and testing the Administration's ideas on NATO-MRBM and the Athens Guidelines on the European allies; Kennedy to Macmillan, 8 August 1962; Macmillan to Kennedy, 3 August 1962; PREM 11 - 3705. Kennedy send Macmillan the text of McNamara's Athens speech. Britain's strategic concept aimed at making "*such discriminatory use of those weapons as might be necessary to impose a pause or to demonstrate our will to use our strategic nuclear strength if fighting continued*". The U.S. agreed with most of this thinking, but insisted on

systems' (which could be launched against targets located in the Soviet Union and therefore involved nuclear escalation) should be and remain distinguishable from NATO's custody.¹⁶⁷

7. Community of interests of the nuclear powers or British compliance to American views on solving NATO's nuclear dilemma?

Britain related its struggle for influence on the direction which American and hence NATO strategy and forces posture might take to the responsibilities of the nuclear powers.

*"The importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries was already dominant and was increasing. This in turn underlined the importance of a general détente with Russia. It might be worth accepting some rough division of the world into spheres of influence if as a result the Russians could be brought to join with us in concentrating on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons."*¹⁶⁸

It was with regard to allaying the apprehensions of both France and the USSR about the advance of German rearmament - with occasional American backing - within the context of a NATO-European strategic force which induced Britain to look favourably at coordinating nuclear policy with France, at Anglo - American - French 'tripartism' and at talks between the 'Big Four'.¹⁶⁹ If the French, whatever their statements on the European mission of the *Force de Dissuasion* might otherwise suggest, persisted in denying Germany access to nuclear weapons,¹⁷⁰ the British could use this as a lever against American

the conventional build-up as a prerequisite; the U.S. also pointed out that a local nuclear engagement would expand rapidly into general nuclear war.

¹⁶⁷ B.Heuser, Development, pp. 61-63.

¹⁶⁸ C.C. 75 (61), 19 Dec. 1961, CAB. 128 - 35.

¹⁶⁹ "Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers", 25 March 1960, CAB. 131- 23; remarks of the Foreign Secretary in the meeting of the Defence Committee; see below 9). Adenauer asserted that his declaration in September 1954 on ABC weapons was directed to the WEU and NATO partners; it had never been made with any reference to the USSR; he objected to any proposal that might give the 'Soviets' "the right to police or inspect what Germany was doing," Memorandum of Conversation Adenauer-Kennedy, 22 Nov. 1961, in: *FRUS*, ser. 1961-63, vol. XIV, p. 626.

¹⁷⁰ Macmillan reported to Kennedy - on 27 November 1961 - that de Gaulle did not

urgings that the 'meagre' British and French strategic forces must be absorbed in a NATO-"Euromissile" strategic force.

The British interest in ensuring that the "*Germans were so far as possible not furnished with strategically offensive weapons and, in particular, making certain that they were never allowed to have free access to nuclear weapons*"¹⁷¹ was also shared by influential members of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations.¹⁷² At certain moments (Oct. 1961) the Kennedy Administration considered tentatively a deal trading "*Russian guarantees of Western access to Berlin for an American guarantee against German access to nuclear weapons.*"¹⁷³ But the U.S. Government, concerned about the viability of NATO and anxious to avoid the visible discrimination of the Federal Republic, also pursued the alternative route and raised the vision of a multi-lateral/'NATO-European' nuclear force in which the U.S. would neither participate nor possess a veto,¹⁷⁴ or some form of an integrated European nuclear force, provided progress was made in two directions: in building up conven-

wish to state that he ruled out the delivery of atomic weapons to the FRG: "*if this is a vital part of any agreement, (the Germans would have) to make a unilateral declaration that they will not accept nuclear weapons from anyone, except, of course, under the agreed key of the cupboard procedure*", Macmillan to Kennedy, T 655/61, FO to Wash. Embassy, Tel. 8712, PREM 11 - 4052.

¹⁷¹ Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, 25 March 1960, CAB. 131 - 23. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy were set against the 'nuclear rearmament' of the Federal Republic.

¹⁷² Watkinson- report to Macmillan on his conversations with McNamara, 15 Dec. 1961, PREM 11 - 3247. McNamara stated his interest in achieving a joint U.S.-U.K. position, including the idea of merging the British THOR-bases and V-bombers with certain U.S. forces stationed in Britain and America-based IRBMs into a NATO-MRBM. He objected to a European NATO force in which Germany was the predominant partner; McNamara said he would never agree to any German controlled nuclear force of any kind.

¹⁷³ Frank Costigliola, 'The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin', in: Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Kennedy's Quest for Victory. American Foreign Policy 1961-1963* (Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 46 f; cf. note 152); cf. *FRUS*, series 1961-1963, vol. VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, pp. 444 ff., 502 ff.

¹⁷⁴ L. Merchant asked President Kennedy to strike the formula "*with the passage of time and further developments of unity within the alliance and Europe, the control of the fleet could pass to the European partners*" from his instructions. He gave two reasons, 1) since the U.S. "in the crunch" could not deliver, the U.S. should not give an undertaking to its allies that it might abandon the veto; 2) it would be unwise and dangerous to leave missiles and warheads in the hands of Europeans who might if the time came ask the Americans out of the MLF; Merchant Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton, Box 13, file J.F.Kennedy Library Oral History Project 1966, pp. 148 ff., 159 ff., record of meeting attended by President Kennedy, R.McNamara, McG.Bundy, M.Taylor, P.Nitze, L.Merchant, late February 1963.

tional forces and in the process of uniting Europe and getting Britain into Europe.¹⁷⁵

The British Ambassador in Washington, Sir David Ormsby-Gore, suggested that his government should indicate to the American President - at an appropriate moment - the possibility of abandoning the independent deterrent at some time in the future.

*"... the gesture of giving up a purely national nuclear potential in order to help over the n-th power problem with Germany particularly in mind (would put the UK in a better position with the U.S.). I suggest this on the assumption that no one really believes we can maintain a purely British deterrent that makes economic and military sense for very much longer and that if we continue with our policy for purely prestige reasons, thereby encouraging the French and Germans to follow suit, then far from increasing our influence with the U.S. Government it will in the end prove to be a positive handicap in our relationships with the U.S."*¹⁷⁶

But for London it was no longer a matter of the bilateral relationships between the U.S./UK, UK/FRG and U.S./FRG, but of gaining leverage through initiating action to expand her relations with France and the USSR.

¹⁷⁵ In a letter to Macmillan, Kennedy reported as a result of his talks with Adenauer on 21/22 November 1961 that the Germans did not aim at unilateral ownership or control over nuclear weapons; *"they agreed that their needs could be met within a multilateral framework,"* Kennedy to Macmillan, 22 Nov. 1961, in: *FRUS*, vol. XIV, p. 633. - In December 1961, Kennedy and McNamara were persuaded by Macmillan and Watkinson that it was too early - in view of the disputes about adopting the strategy of flexible response - to reintroduce the NATO-MRBM question; see above chapter II.1. - By 1962, the situation had changed: McGeorge Bundy, September 1962, cf. Kleiman, *Atlantic Crisis*, p. 114; Neustadt Report, pp. 23 ff., 30 ff., 73 f. See below, chapter 10 on Ball's 'mission' in January and October 1963.- SACEUR Norstad had recommended (since 1958) to think in terms of 200-300 IRBM weapons which would be turned over to NATO for employment without reference to the U.S.; *"these weapons SACEUR could use on his own authority"*, Norstad Diary, entry 25 July 1958, Norstad Papers, Box 105, Eisenhower Library. On the Lee-Smith mission see Neustadt Report, pp. 30 f.; cf. G.Schmidt, 'Politische Dimension', pp. 230 ff.; Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Germany and the politics of nuclear weapons* (New York/London: Columbia University press, 1975), pp. 190 ff.

¹⁷⁶ Sir David Ormsby-Gore to Lord Home, 13 Dec. 1961, PREM 11-4166.

8. Striking a deal with France? Macmillan's attempt to determine the agenda and timing of reformatting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership.

But how could the Macmillan Government expect to strike a deal with France? We know that the British were aware that many groups in French politics which supported the EEC had an interest in excluding the U.K. from it¹⁷⁷ and that Adenauer would be reluctant to challenge de Gaulle over Britain's entry into EEC- Europe. Nevertheless the Macmillan Cabinet thought it could handle Europe politically. In past years, Britain had lost much ground in the fights over an OEEC-wide Free Trade Area concept or in obtaining a foothold in European arms productions and procurement. In contrast to 1956/8, Britain - after 1960 - could not take another economic initiative in Europe; the possibility of an initiative had to emerge in the defence field, where de Gaulle and Germany were doubtful about the reliability of America's interest in providing nuclear deterrence and defence. Could Britain expect to become more important to Paris and Bonn, as the American position of strength in Europe waned? And could Britain expect to organize the relations with Europe on terms which reflected Britain's views on the U.S. role in NATO and in East-West relations? Could Britain get into the Franco-German Alliance and make Paris and/or Bonn follow the British line? It is easier to explain why London thought it ought to influence either Germany or France and try to displace Germany to some extent as France's chosen ally, than to imagine a trilateral Franco-British-German relationship; positioning Britain into the relationships among the 'big three' in Western Europe is up to the present an unresolved problem.

Britain's answer to this problem in the early 1960s was to try to hold NATO together; this would then justify Britain's claim for leadership: "*without (NATO), WEU and the Six would collapse*".¹⁷⁸ Playing the NATO card always implied that Britain would make herself as indispensable to the Alliance as the U.S. had been up to now.¹⁷⁹ But how could Britain expect to overcome de Gaulle's aversion to NATO? Could Britain afford reformatting NATO and expanding WEU, in the hope that this might make de Gaulle more cooperative? Should Britain return to the idea which the Cabinet had rejected in 1957,

¹⁷⁷ De Zulueta to Macmillan, 21 Oct.1959, PREM 11-2987. - In 1962, when the Government prepared for the Commonwealth and Conservative Party Conferences in September/October, the list included - apart from the *Patronat* - Jean Monnet and Michel Deb r.

¹⁷⁸ Selwyn Lloyd to Macmillan, 13 Dec. 1959, PREM 11-2987.

¹⁷⁹ Frederick Bishop to Macmillan, "Thoughts on policy towards Western Europe", Dec. 1959, PREM 11-2987; these statements relate to Macmillan's "*Grand Design*"-Memorandum.

namely a WEU (i.e. joint Franco-British) nuclear force? Germany would consent to a British-French 'European' nuclear force only on condition that a European policy-making authority was set up and that liaison with the U.S. was assured. Would de Gaulle be helpful on this? Did Britain really want to turn WEU into something meaningful, inspire of known American suspicions of WEU as a potential 'third power'? The questions were raised, but there was no consistent and thorough-going review of the problems involved. What is clear is the political stimulus behind Macmillan's manoeuvres.

Macmillan was willing to let de Gaulle know that the U.K. would prefer a strong France to a resurgent Germany.¹⁸⁰ But for de Gaulle, a 'strong' France had different connotations: equality of status and influence at least with Britain in the North Atlantic partnership; accomplishing the prerequisites for tripartite arrangements - effective atomic and thermo-nuclear warheads; a breakthrough in the negotiations about the Common Agricultural Policy among the Six; settling the war in Algeria. There was not much room for action concerning arrangements between Britain and France until de Gaulle had achieved the prerequisites for a tripartite directorate in NATO, and there was less, as his 'veto' demonstrated in January 1963, when de Gaulle had become master in his own house. Macmillan was aware that jumping all these hurdles would be difficult. The Ministers of Defence, Watkinson and then Thorneycroft (since July 1962), however, concluded from their talks with Messmer, their French counterpart,¹⁸¹ that their initiatives paved the way for raising the idea with de Gaulle.

Because the British wanted a great deal from the French and since de Gaulle had it in his power to wreck Macmillan's Grand Design, it was thought inescapable to court de Gaulle's aspirations.¹⁸² In view of "*the inevitably diminishing role of Britain in the nuclear field as the years go by*",¹⁸³ it seemed worthwhile to examine the possibility of pooling British efforts in the nuclear field with the French, without necessarily offending the Americans. By playing the WEU card, Britain might be able to revive a common Franco-British inter-

¹⁸⁰ Macmillan and the Chancellor of the Exchequer favoured the approach to France; record of Chequers meeting, 29 Nov. 1959, PREM 11-2679.

¹⁸¹ Watkinson reported favourably on the results of his meetings with Messmer on 13/14 April 1961 - DEFE 13-211 and PREM 11-4224 - and a year later - 12/13 April and 4 June 1962, PREM 11-3712.

¹⁸² Edward Heath, in charge of 'European Affairs', doubted that it would help Britain's case with de Gaulle "*to try to buy our way in*" by any offer in the nuclear field; Neustadt report, p.41. It is not clear from the available records how much Heath officially learnt of the Defence Ministers' and Amery's approaches to Messmer, Joxe, and the French 'military'.

¹⁸³ Briefing "United States, Britain, France", 13 April 1962, PREM 11-3783; Ambassador Ormsby-Gore had raised the question in late 1961, see above.

est in effective control over Germany's rearmament. France might accept a triumvirate on an informal basis. Britain might help France to get the means of delivery and even a small independent deterrent, "*but nothing should be allowed to impair the ties between the U.S. and the U.K.*"¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, Macmillan was unwilling to adopt Kennedy's devise for reconciling de Gaulle to NATO, namely calling on France to head NATO-Europe's military (conventional) establishment;¹⁸⁵ in that case, Britain would have to reconcile itself to playing second fiddle.

9. "Was nutzt mir Macmillan, wenn ...?" The imbalances of give and take in Anglo-German relations.

The key question for the Macmillan government was how to restore closer cooperation with France. The existing alternatives were appalling: Germany, backed-up by France and through American support for 'integration with equality' - in NATO as well as in the EEC - seemed destined to become the anchor of Western Europe's economic and military stability. How would Britain fare under such circumstances? Should Britain copy the French and American example of lending a hand to Germany's resurgence, on the assumption that such support would be conducive to stabilizing democracy in Germany and to make the Germans permanently resist the 'Rapallo bazillus'? The British were as good or even doing better in talking the language of peaceful change etc., but they found it harder to treat the Federal Republic as a first-class partner.¹⁸⁶

This is surprising in view of Germany's perception of Britain. There was much admiration in Germany for Britain's political culture; there was also a coincidence of many German and British economic objectives, personified in Ludwig Erhard and many members of the German diplomatic corps. But on the

¹⁸⁴ Summary record of a meeting at Chequers, 29 Nov. 1959, PREM 11-2679; cf. Lord Home to Ambassador P.Dixon, 24 January 1961, FO 371-159671; Shuckburgh, "The Problem of France and the Development and Control of the Nuclear Forces of the West", 27 Febr./ 3 March 1961, FO 371 - 159668; R.Makins (FO) Memorandum, "Considerations affecting possible Anglo-French nuclear collaboration in the military field", 29 August 1962, PREM 11-3712; Home to Macmillan, 13 July 1962, PREM 11-3712.

¹⁸⁵ Kennedy-Macmillan meeting, 28 April 1962, CAB. 133-246. The approaching end of the Algerian war posed the question whether and under what circumstances France would re-integrate her conventional forces into NATO.

¹⁸⁶ In June 1954, when the French could not bring themselves to the point of decision on the EDC, Prime Minister Churchill advocated to base the Western Alliance on its '*three real elements of strength*', the U.S., Britain and West Germany. In order to attain the coherency between these three centres of western strength, the 'Anglo-Saxons' should accommodate the FRG's essentials; record of conversation between Eisenhower/Dulles and Churchill/Eden, 28 June 1954, in: FRUS, ser. 1952-54, vol. V, pp. 998 ff..

other hand, London also envisioned some chance of 'bullying' Germany, for the West German state during the 1958-63 period was not in a strong political position.¹⁸⁷ Nor was Germany's monetary position as strong as it seemed; according to Macmillan, "*(Britain's) underlying position was as good as, if not better than, that of the Germans whose balance of payments surplus resulted from military expenditures incurred within their own frontiers by the UK and the U.S.*"¹⁸⁸ The imbalance of payments - and the provision of sufficient world liquidity to finance the expansion of world trade - could be corrected by a stroke of the pen: the U.S. and the UK had only to agree to put pressure on the Germans to give them their money back!¹⁸⁹

Both the U.S. and France could heal Germany's wounds, once they realized that the leeway gained in approaching the USSR was not worth the damage caused to Germany's political landscape. Britain, however, had to be more forthcoming if she wanted the Anglo-German relationships to attain the level of Franco-German and American-German relationships. Otherwise Britain's chance of obtaining favours from Germany were restricted to moments of tension between Germany on the one hand and France **and** the U.S. on the other. Concessions which Britain wanted from Germany depended on the U.S. exerting pressure on Bonn, be it untied lending aid to less-developed countries, local support costs, revaluation of the DM, or asking the U.S. President to hint in a personal message to Adenauer that an agonising reappraisal would be necessary in all fields "*unless the Germans give (the UK) effective support for the enlarged EEC including Britain.*"¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Zulueta to Macmillan, 21 Oct. 1959, PREM 11-2987.

¹⁸⁸ Record of Conversation between Macmillan and Jacobson, Director of the IMF, 2 June 1961, PREM 11-4191.

¹⁸⁹ "... *we really must get together with the Americans or we shall have some disastrous disagreement from which only the Germans will profit, if anyone*", Ambassador Steel to Patrick Reilly, 6 February 1961, UEE 1072/2, in: FO 371 - 158008. This refers to the Anderson-Dillon 'mission' to Bonn and the danger that the Kennedy Administration might follow on with an attempt to settle the 'local support cost'-account with Bonn at the expense of the UK; cf. Wolfram Kaiser's article in this volume.

¹⁹⁰ Macmillan to Heath, 16 January 1963, T 30/63, FO Tel. 56 to UK Delegation, Brussels, PREM 11-4523. Macmillan asked Heath for advice whether such a move would be productive or counterproductive in influencing the power struggle between Adenauer and Schröder in the Foreign Minister's favour. Heath replied that the risks would outweigh any advantages to be gained from Kennedy's intervention. Heath recalled that Kennedy had talked to Adenauer in Washington in November 1962 without much impact on the Chancellor. There was also the danger of a leak, lending colour to de Gaulle's thesis that the Americans are in fact trying to run Europe; Heath to Macmillan, 16 January 1963, T 32/63, PREM 11-4523.

Bonn's impression, anyway, was that Britain was asking for more whilst offering little in exchange.¹⁹¹ The Federal Government was alarmed about the British attempts to make a virtue out of the necessity of reducing the overall defence burden and of approaching the USSR with offers to consider ideas for a zone of limitation of armaments or for neutralising West Berlin (rather than West Germany)¹⁹² or for a non-proliferation regime. "*Was nutzt mir Macmillan, wenn er dasselbe tut wie Bevan?*"¹⁹³ The common denominator of these propositions was that the well-known interests of the Bonn Republic were treated as a bargaining-object rather than as the non-negotiable postures of an equal partner. That was particularly so with respect to 'security'. If Britain's assumptions of what counted in the military and political balance of forces were appropriate, - namely the increasing importance of the U.S. and U.K. strategic deterrent, the continued presence of U.S. forces on the Continent, and the diminishing importance of the conventional forces, except for local conflicts, - it followed that "*a tripwire in France would be enough*"¹⁹⁴ to deter the USSR from thinking of launching a war in Europe. In such a scenario Germany could be considered of lesser importance. If so, it then made sense to think about planning for "thinning out forces" in endangered (border) areas or for zones of inspection in which the USSR would be invited to convince itself that German nuclear rearmament was not taking place, etc.¹⁹⁵ Such views did not pass unchallenged in British governing circles; the original idea that the use of German

¹⁹¹ An official's comment - that Britain had to think of recompensating Germany if Bonn resisted the ratification of the Adenauer- de Gaulle Treaty or headed the Five in their resistance against de Gaulle's veto - was not taken up at the 'political' level; Tomkins' minute to Ambassador Steel's Annual Report 1962, 17 January 1963, FO 371 - 169160.

¹⁹² The documents referring to the January/Februar 1959 'Jebb exercise', the Macmillan/Lloyd visit to the USSR, and Lloyd's talk with Kutznetsov are dealt with in Sabine Lee's contribution to this volume; CAB. 133-293 "Report of the Visit of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to the USSR, 21 February - 3rd March 1959". - Wilhelm Grewe suspected Britain of wanting to buy the stabilisation of the situation in West Berlin with offers which showed Moscow that the West was willing to accept the *Status quo*; W.Grewe, *Rückblenden*, pp. 390/1, letter to Auswärtiges Amt, 24 March 1959. In Anglo-American top level discussions - October 1961, April 1962 and October/November 1962 - Lord Home raised the question what terms could be considered as likely to accommodate Krushchev, i.e. induce the Kremlin to cool off the situation concerning Berlin and Germany.

¹⁹³ Adenauer, *Teegespräche, 1959-1961*, ed. R. Morsey and Hans-Peter Schwarz, p. 113.

¹⁹⁴ Briefing paper on German neutrality, January 1959, WG 1073/ 74 G, FO 371-145819. Macmillan argued in a similar vein in his meeting with Kennedy, 28 April 1962, Cab. 133-246.

¹⁹⁵ Briefing "Germany and European Security", 19 Febr. 1959, FO 371- 145820 (FO/MofD study).

territory and manpower were essential to the defence of Western Europe had still many adherents.¹⁹⁶ The main implication of preparing British minds for negotiations with Russia about Germany was, however, the fact "*that the detailed measures envisaged could all be introduced before implementation of any measure for German reunification.*"¹⁹⁷

This move towards de-linking the German question (unification; non-recognition of the GDR) from talks with Russia about European Security, which were to affect the 'defence-and security status' of Germany, was - from the perspective of Adenauer's Germany - the more disturbing as there were no compensatory British offers. One possibility of carrying the Germans and other allies with British diplomacy was to convince the Soviet Union that progress in East-West relations depended on offering something which the West could view as a positive advantage. But London did not give that impression.¹⁹⁸ On the contrary, the fear that disturbances in the GDR or in Eastern Europe might induce the Kremlin to use force, persuaded London to believe it would be better to accommodate to a permanently divided Europe if that were the price of stability and security. "*If it were a question of general stabilisation of the existing division in Europe ... we should presumably have no reason to object to recognition of the GDR (as a means to stabilize the position in the GDR).*"¹⁹⁹

Another possibility was to duplicate the U.S. posture in a positive manner. The idea was that Britain might consider to take over from the U.S. the role of becoming the major military non-German force in Germany and accrue similar political and financial/monetary advantages by stepping into America's footsteps. This idea did make no headway in Whitehall, even though the Prime Minister himself had raised the question: "*... ought we perhaps encourage the U.S. in their present deflationary mood to reduce their military expenditure in Europe rather than anywhere else, even on the understanding that we might have to increase ours?*"²⁰⁰ The answer was a unanimous 'No'; the traditional

¹⁹⁶ Rumbold/ Hoyer Millar-Memorandum, "Preparations for Negotiations with Russia about Germany," 2nd - 7th January 1959, FO 371 - 145819 listed the opposing views.

¹⁹⁷ "Germany and European Security", 19 Febr. 1959, FO 371 - 145820.

¹⁹⁸ Martin Hillenbrand, "Chancellor Adenauer's Visit, Scope Paper", 12 April 1961, quoted in: Adrian W.Schertz, *Die Deutschlandpolitik Kennedys und Johnsons. Unterschiedliche Ansätze innerhalb der amerikanischen Regierung* (Köln-Weimar-Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1992), pp. 64-65.

¹⁹⁹ Shuckburgh/Killick (FO) Memorandum, early August 1961, FO 371-160480; cf. record of conversations between Macmillan and Kennedy, 28 April 1962, CAB. 133-246; cf. highlights of conversation Dulles-Mikojan, 16 January 1959, see footnote 88).

²⁰⁰ Macmillan to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Secretary), 22 Oct. 1959, "European questions", PREM 11-2679.

view, established by Attlee and by Eden in 1951/2, prevailed that, although Britain's defence required a military presence on the Continent, the British commitment should 'never' exceed America's guarantees. Britain's forward deployment between the Rhine and the Weser was a prerequisite for tying the U.S. into European defence, but the BAOR was never meant to replace U.S. forces when these had completed their mission.²⁰¹ America's presence in Europe provided Britain with the opportunity to pursue her 'mission', i.e. to develop and sustain a truly global defence policy. On the other hand, London feared that discussion on defence issues in a purely European group would mean pressure on the United Kingdom for increased commitments to the defence of Europe; it would be, Macmillan instructed Heath at the end of January 1963, "*a mistake to make any move in this direction without prior American support in keeping the Germans from any dangerous leaning towards de Gaulle's ideas.*"²⁰²

10. The MLF project - A missed opportunity for aligning the 'real elements of strength' in NATO: America, Britain and Germany?

A third way to demonstrate that Britain shared the basic common interests with Germany and the U.S., namely that Western Europe - contrary to de Gaulle's thesis - could not dispense with the protection of the U.S., was to support the multilateral approach to solving NATO's nuclear dilemma, which Washington and Bonn had favoured since 1956/7.²⁰³ The British could earn the reputation that "*we were now better Europeans than France*", if they reaffirmed their attachment to the principles of *balanced collective forces and integration*; the endorsement of this rationale of NATO could at the same time reinforce Britain's relationships with the U.S. and the Bonn Republic, the "real elements of strength in the Western alliance".²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ The decision to send four additional divisions to NATO-Europe was based on the premise that this was temporary, until the European recovery would enable the allies to provide for their own security. President Eisenhower, who - as SACEUR - had testified to the Senate in this sense, reminded the European governments to do their 'duty' rather than blame the U.S. for planning the reduction of conventional forces overseas.

²⁰² Macmillan/ Lord Home to Heath, 29 January 1963, PREM 11-4524.

²⁰³ Gustav Schmidt, 'Divided Europe - Divided Germany, 1950-1963', in: id., ed., *CEH*, vol.III/2 (1994), pp. 155-192; id., 'Sicherheitspolitische Dimensionen', pp. 169-252. On Norstad's proposal to the NAC in December 1956 cf. Freeman, *Arms Control*, pp. 157 ff.; on American thinking in the late 1950s cf. St.Weber, 'Multilateralism'.

²⁰⁴ W. Churchill, see note 186. This view was rejected by many in Britain: Lord Beaverbrook, a fierce opponent of Britain's entry into EEC-Europe, depicted the Common Market as an "*American device to put us alongside Germany. As our power was broken and lost by two German wars, it is very hard on us now to be asked to align ourselves with*

The subject came to the fore in two situations: In January 1963 in the context of the 'Brussels breakdown' and American attempts to rescue the MLF as the platform of Anglo-American-German cooperation, and in September/October 1963, when France seemed to restore the opportunity for Britain to aim at tripartism and four-power diplomacy.

In January 1963, Ambassador Ormsby-Gore advised the Prime Minister from Washington that he (Macmillan) had only to inform the Federal Government that Britain was determined to join Washington's "*best endeavours to help establish a multilateral NATO nuclear force as soon as possible.*"²⁰⁵ If Britain moved in the direction of "integration with equality", the Germans might be willing to support bringing the United Kingdom into Europe sooner rather than later. Ambassador Steel, soon to leave his post in Bonn, advised his government to do all it could

*"to convince the Germans of our own loyalty to the European and Atlantic Alliance and our readiness to sink our own national interests in those of the larger group. I have already pointed out that the more forthcoming we can be about the European part in the control of NATO strategy and about the multilateral aspects of the Nassau Agreement the better. A further telling point is that our view of how Europe and Germany should be defended coincides with the German - the French view is on all major points very different."*²⁰⁶

The concept of presenting Britain as a 'European' power which had special links with America was thought likely to appeal to the Germans as a way out of their own dilemma, namely how to reconcile the Franco-German rapprochement/European unity with the transatlantic partnership. The United Kingdom had the opportunity to develop a European position within NATO through implementing both parts of the Nassau Agreement, Articles 7 and 8 to satisfy Washington and Bonn on the multilateral pattern, and Article 6 to

those villains", Beaverbrook to Macmillan, 7 March 1962, quoted in: Alistair Horne, *Macmillan: 1957-1986*, vol.II of the Official Biography (New York: Viking Press, 1989), p. 262.

²⁰⁵ Ambassador Ormsby-Gore, Washington Tel. 177 to FO, 16 January 1963, reporting on Ball's visit to Bonn; Ball recommended that Macmillan write to Adenauer in this sense; PREM 11-4523.

²⁰⁶ Ambassador Steel (Bonn) to FO, Tel. 80, 21 January 1963, PREM 11-4523.

attract France to the multinational scheme and thereby win de Gaulle back to NATO.²⁰⁷ However, by assigning a *Auslaufmodell* - V-Bombers and THOR missiles - to NATO "in the most European terms possible,"²⁰⁸ the Cabinet practically favoured the 'French' option and acted dilatory²⁰⁹ over the American/German decision in favour of the MLF project, which included the eventual integration - i.e. absorption - of POLARIS (submarines and missiles), the coping-stone of Britain's 'independent nuclear force'.

The uncertainties (a) as to what the Americans were actually proposing and how many of the conflicting ideas were firm U.S. policy,²¹⁰ and (b) whether the non-nuclear European partners, especially Germany and Italy, would accept the MLF should the U.S. insist on the veto,²¹¹ provided the pre-

²⁰⁷ The ambiguities in the Nassau Communiqué were not only due to the need to prevent a showdown; they reflect the balance of forces within the Kennedy Administration. In the preparatory meetings for the McNamara-Thorneycroft talks in London, the NAC session in Paris and the Kennedy-Macmillan talks in Nassau, McNamara offered the gist of the compromise: "(he) did not believe that the British would be pleased by any of the alternatives. ... What he thought we might consider, at some stage in the negotiations, was a proposal to give the British access to a more up-to-date weapons system on the condition that the venture become multilateral if and when a multilateral force should be developed. Such a course might conceivably be taken, for example, with POLARIS," Neustadt Report, p.60 (McG.Bundy notes of White House meeting, 10 Dec.1962, Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy). Neustadt adds that 'multilateral' in this context was not identical with MLF to McNamara or his auditors. McNamara told his close advisers before his meeting with Thorneycroft on 11 Dec.1962: "I've got a card up my sleeve but I'm going to let them play it: we give them POLARIS on the understanding they assign their subs to NATO", id., p. 62.

²⁰⁸ Shuckburgh, 29 January 1963, PREM 11-4524.

²⁰⁹ The tactics to delay and dilute the implementation of Articles 7 and 8 of the Nassau Agreement continued throughout 1963; the Cabinet - on 21 and 24 Sept. 1963 - decided that Lord Home should explain in his meetings with Rusk why Britain could not commit herself.

²¹⁰ In some context, the Americans spoke of the MLF as a 16th member of NATO, as if it had an independent existence. In another context, the U.S. regarded the Management or Executive Committee of contributors to be responsible for the control of the mixed-manned element only; however, others thought the Managing Committee should become sort of directing body of the Alliance. There were many unsolved problems; assuming that the Managing Committee operated by unanimity, the question then was whether the U.S. veto was in the same category as the veto of any other member. Britain wanted to establish an agency separate from the North Atlantic Council in order to maintain the position of 'second-in-command', i.e. the duopoly or a triumvirate, should France join a multinational/interallied nuclear force in Europe.

²¹¹ In January (meeting with Adenauer) and in October 1963 (meeting a French delegation, headed by Joxe), Ball declared that the MLF be a 'European' nuclear force; see below. In late February 1963, L. Merchant asked the President to strike a passage referring

text for British officials to employ dilatory methods. British representatives enjoyed playing havoc with the mixed-manned element of the MLF proposal; they pretended that the British - as well as the overwhelming part of the American - components of the strategic force had to remain beyond the control of any Management or Executive Committee that might be in charge of a NATO 'Euromissile' force; strategic targeting (directed towards Russian territory) must remain the sole responsibility of the U.S. and Britain (and eventually France).²¹² The British argued that with respect to targeting the 'independent nuclear force' was practically integrated to the U.S. deterrent; why then subordinate the British deterrent to the MLF, whereas the bulk of the U.S. deterrent (95% of their ICBM) would become the West's only truly independent strategic force? Even though President Kennedy personally urged Macmillan to give support on the MLF and "*show the Europeans that Nassau was in their interest*,"²¹³ as well as to make the Article 6 forces and their new command a reality no later than the Ottawa NATO meeting in May 1963, the British Cabinet delayed action on the MLF, assuming that the issue would burn itself out once the participants realized that the project caused more troubles than it could solve, particularly (1) with the Soviet Union and (2) with the French.²¹⁴

(1) The Foreign Secretary wanted to exploit the opportunity of coming to terms with the Soviet Union on both arms control and nuclear disarmament and a non-aggression pact; but Lord Home was sceptical whether any gesture and/or concession could make de Gaulle drop his 'extreme policies', hence he questioned the wisdom of talking to de Gaulle on his (the General's) chosen ground.²¹⁵ The Kremlin appeared willing to make progress on disarmament, if the Americans would drop the MLF and agree not to include Berlin in a non-aggression pact.²¹⁶ What counted was the prospect of elevating Britain to the

to the 'European option' from his instructions - see footnote 174).

²¹² Brief for Ministers, "NATO Nuclear Force: Visit of Mr. L.Merchant", (12) March 1963, PREM 11-4587.

²¹³ Kennedy to Macmillan, 14 March 1963, T 125/63, PREM 11-4581. Ambassador Ormsby-Gore - 29 May 1963, PREM 11-4166 - warned his Government of the political risks of contracting out of the MLF project; "*if at some stage (the President) repeats in public ... that if the MLF is established the U.S. will reduce their own provisions for covering certain targets in Europe, then I think it would be very hard for any one to claim that these missiles had no military value.*"

²¹⁴ The tactic to wait on the failures of others had failed - in 1950 with respect to the Schuman Plan and in 1955 with respect to the Messina initiative. It paid off finally with respect to the MLF project - in 1966/7.

²¹⁵ Lord Home to Macmillan, PM/63/97, 16 July 1963, PREM 11-4224.

²¹⁶ De Zulueta report to the Prime Minister on the Foreign Secretary's talks with

'highest' level of superpower diplomacy.

2) In this context, France mattered. An assurance by de Gaulle that France would 'never' assist Germany's eventual claim to nuclear power status was not only important as such, but was also essential to convince Washington that the British were correct in their assessment, namely that the threat of 'Europe' as a third power, based on a Franco-German nuclear entente, was hollow. Therefore, there was no urgency for the U.S. to offer, as Ball did in January 1963 and again in October 1963,²¹⁷ the MLF as a strictly European force. If the French, the direct recipient of Ball's proposition in October 1963, consented to a 'Europeanized', albeit NATO- correlated nuclear force, the French-American tensions over Germany's attachment could be reduced, and Britain would then have to come around to a multilateral-integrated scheme. Should this attempt fail, the risks would be different: If France, as seemed more likely, rejected the re-designed American offer, and if Britain and France declared the MLF a non-starter (or dead), the way would be open for a multinational NATO force and implicitly for any type of arrangement on which France and Britain could agree; the terms of such a package deal would reflect Britain's and France's priorities: No one, including the U.S. government, could forbid Paris and London to sustain a national nuclear deterrent, while rejecting Bonn's potential claim to a similar token for the country's great power status. Since nothing came off the post-Cuba and -Nassau efforts of the U.S. government or Washington's soundings in the context of the negotiations on a Teststop Treaty,²¹⁸ the French viewed the American efforts in relation to the contest

Gromyko, Rusk and U Thant (Secretary-General of the UN), 3 Oct. 1963, PREM 11-4226. -W.W.Rostow - in July 1963 - suspected Britain to insist - as the USSR did - on denying West Germany a strategic nuclear role; such 'détente on the cheap' would endanger the relationship with the Bonn Republic; cf. Freeman, *Arms Control*, p.145. The U.S. government had considered the linkage between guarantees on access to Berlin and non-proliferation before and after the building of the Berlin Wall, but did not pursue this line in the context of the Ball and Merchant missions (January/March 1963) and in August/October 1963. In July 1963, in the context of the *Harriman Probe*, the idea was put on the table in Washington.

²¹⁷ Record of Conversation between Ball and Couve de Murville, 8 Oct. 1963, JFK, NSF, Country series: France, Box 73.

²¹⁸ In a press conference on 29 July 1963, de Gaulle insisted - as he had done in 1958 and 1960 - on the position that France could accept American help in the nuclear field only on the condition that 'national independence' would not be impaired. The American position still was: No help to the development of strictly national nuclear forces. Kennedy repeated this proviso in his press conference, 2 August 1963. The U.S. could see no way how Britain and/or France could 'sell' their concept of a multinational force, consisting of forces assigned by Britain and France, as a 'European' strategic force. From the perspective of Washington, the only way to solve the German problem was an integrated-multilateral

between de Gaulle and Kennedy over 'masterminding' Germany.

The U.S. believed that the discussions on the MLF scheme had made progress and could well lead to a mutually satisfactory agreement; hence they pressed the British to end their sitting-on-the-fence attitude. The danger, as Macmillan realized,²¹⁹ was that Britain's failure to participate could seriously damage the relationships both with the U.S. and West Germany. This echoed the warnings from the British Embassies in Washington and Bonn. Nevertheless, the Cabinet hesitated to make a choice. British representatives were instructed that they should participate in the work of the planning group, but they could not commit the Government²²⁰ - it was "Messina" all over again.

As this situation evolved (July-September 1963), the French raised the stakes. The ideas about a package deal were promulgated by an array of French ministers, diplomats and *eminences grises* (like Maurice Schuman) in discussions with Thorneycroft and Amery.²²¹ Since the British Ministers for Defence and for Aviation left no doubt that they were in favour of British independence from the U.S., the French could test how far the "pro-French European" influences in British politics were willing and able to carry the Cabinet towards a settlement, combining a Franco-British nuclear force with agreements on agricultural, economic and monetary policy issues. The French perception of the probe was whether Britain would join a French appeal to rally Europe's forces; from Britain's perspective, the issue at stake was whether Britain could afford to respond to French signals at a moment when Kennedy urged the European members of NATO to acknowledge how important West Germany was and that the 'Atlanticists', who were to succeed Adenauer shortly, deserved support in order to start off well.

Macmillan and Home saw the point and welcomed the prospect of Erhard and Schröder taking over from Adenauer. But they thought that this change need not prevent them to pursue their ideas on détente. The government's idea was that understandings between the four powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole on the distinction between the 'Big Four' and the two Germanys would alleviate progress on a European settlement. In view of the Test Ban negotiations, the *Harriman Probe*, and the follow-on project to attain a non-proliferation accord, Macmillan had another reason to shift the emphasis from facilitating intra-NATO cooperation (with Germany) towards détente. "*We no longer need to be specially sensitive to German opinion because it is*

'Euromissile' force.

²¹⁹ Macmillan, 19 Sept. 1963, C.C. (63) 54, Top 3, CAB. 128-37.

²²⁰ C.C.(63) 56th meeting, Top 2, CAB. 128-37.

²²¹ The records are located in PREM 11-4223 and 4224.

clear that whether we get into the Common Market or not will depend upon Paris and not upon Bonn."²²²

However, progress once again depended upon carrying the U.S. with Britain. France (Defence Minister Messmer) wanted nuclear information from the U.S. as well as from the United Kingdom. Joint nuclear policy arrangements might help to attain de Gaulle's signature to the Test Ban Treaty, but the concessions must come from Washington. France might favour a package deal including a settlement of the Common Market issue and joint targeting of nuclear weapons, but again Washington's consent was essential.²²³ Although Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts reminded his superiors that creation of the MLF was Germany's first objective,²²⁴ Thorneycroft and Amery extended their efforts to get the Cabinet's backing for keeping the 'French' option on the table. In this, they succeeded; they could refer to French public statements about Anglo-French defence agreements, including the 'nuclear',²²⁵ to support their case. The critical aspect was the affect of the talk about a *entente nucléaire* on the U.S. Thorneycroft and Amery suggested that the opportunity to attain a package deal with France should be taken the more seriously as the U.S. had

²²² De Zulueta to Macmillan, "Overseas Affairs", B.11, 8 May 1963, PREM 11-4262.

²²³ Reports by Defence Minister Thorneycroft and Aviation Minister J. Amery to Macmillan on their discussions with Messmer and Ailleret, 19 July 1963, PREM 11-4224; Amery to Macmillan, 25 Sept. 1963, PREM 11-4243. - Ambassador Pierson Dixon - to FO, Tel. No. 650, 26 Sept. 1963 - cautioned, because French views "*are completely different to our own and unacceptable to U.S. and all our allies.*" De Zulueta, aware of Home's and Heath's objections, asked the Prime Minister to call Thorneycroft to order; he should not be allowed to prejudice the Government's policy. The British Embassy at Rome - Tel. 46, 3 Oct. 1963, PREM 11-4243 - reported that France's "*wish to represent the force de frappe as an instrument at the service of Europe*" was an attempt to embarrass the UK over the MLF.

²²⁴ Sir Frank Roberts, reporting on his conversation with Karl Carstens, to FO, Tel. 985, 26 September 1963, PREM 11-4243. Lord Home knew about Bonn's priorities, for Schröder had told him in August 1963 that his government was satisfied with the progress of the intergovernmental consultation group on the MLF scheme; Schröder expected the U.S. government to find a way around the veto problem; in order to meet the Italian and German request that the MLF would become a European force in accordance with progress in the process of 'Uniting Europe', the U.S. had to refrain from instituting the American President's veto power in the MLF 'charta'. The various devices discussed in Washington are mentioned in footnote 210).

²²⁵ It was argued that Habib-Deloncle's statement to the WEU Assembly on 23 Sept. 1963 must have de Gaulle's approval. The speech stimulated a public debate on a British-French *force de dissuasion*. Thorneycroft and Amery asserted that their talks with Messmer, Ailleret, Couve de Murville, M. Schuman had prepared the ground for taking the next step, i.e. approaching de Gaulle. Although Macmillan sympathised with their views, he was more reluctant than in 1960-62 to raise the question directly with de Gaulle.

always made difficulties over implementing the Anglo-American agreements on 'interdependence'. Macmillan and Home were familiar with that record, too; but they could not shrug off the warnings of Kennedy and Rusk that de Gaulle's mind was set on a national and by no means on a European 'deterrent', and that the U.S. could neither tolerate a Franco-German nor a British-French 'European' nuclear force.

Both schemes rested on the protection of 'national' interests; both refused the absorption of core programs into a *balanced collective (integrated) force*; both were therefore inadequate to satisfy the need for providing a safeguard against a recrudescence of exaggerated nationalism in German life and policy. From Washington's point of view, de Gaulle's alternative as well as a Franco-British *entente nucléaire* was bound to fail, because each of them in its own way was predicated on the discrimination of Germany, but none would be capable to cope with the increasing opposition of Germany against the indefinite continuation of the two-class status in NATO-Europe. Whether they intended it or not, de Gaulle's and Britain's national assertiveness in combination with the implicit discrimination against Germany's claim for equality of treatment within the Alliance would sooner rather than later undermine the position of moderate forces in German politics and thus provoke a backlash of power and 'old-style'-alliance politics.

The conclusion from this American thinking on the revival of 'nationalism' in the keynote-states of Europe is obvious: Since Paris and London relied on the U.S. to balance the Federal Republic's central role in European and NATO affairs, they rather had to accept America's device for drawing Germany permanently to the West: "Integration with equality". As a result of de Gaulle's challenge of the United States' role as a "European power", Washington objected to an Anglo-French *entente nucléaire* for the same reasons and in a similar vein as it had to a 'Franco-German axis'. London had to realize that - in contrast to the period 1959-1962 - Britain's ability to establish working relationships with France would no longer bolster her bargaining position vis-à-vis the Pentagon and the White House. But Whitehall also had to make up its mind whether to adapt British policy to the tendency in American policy, responding to the views promulgated by Acheson or McCloy, to regard the Bonn Republic "as the center of our policy."²²⁶ Due to the change of government in Bonn, Washington, and London in late 1963, the 'new men' had to take stock of the

²²⁶ McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, "Your Lunch with Acheson", 6 Dec. 1963, LBJ, NSF, McG.Bundy file, Box 1, Chronological File Dec. 1963 (2). Although Bundy warned the 'new' President of Acheson's hard line against de Gaulle and concentration on Germany in America's European policies, the Johnson Administration took the Erhard-Schröder-von Hassel government fully into account.

two sets of bilateral relationships Bonn-Washington/ Washington-London/ London-Bonn and London-Paris/ Washington-Paris/ London-Washington and to reassess the balance of advantages and disadvantages between the tripartite cooperation USA/Britain/France and the trilateral network Germany/USA/Britain.