

*Politics and Sentiment:
Catharine Macaulay's Republicanism*

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The identification of a woman's name with republicanism is rather unusual. After all, the traditional values of civic humanism were "manly";¹ martial valor and participation in national politics, for instance, were obviously not something for a woman in the eighteenth century. Moreover, political philosophy at that time was almost exclusively written by male authors. Nonetheless, Catharine Macaulay left her mark on the eighteenth century as a political thinker and pamphleteer, and even managed to become famous as a "female patriot" in both England and America. In the late eighteenth century, American political thought was steeped in British republicanism, and Macaulay herself knew quite a number of American politicians who thought highly of her work and were grateful for her support of the American cause during the War of Independence. Her eight-volume *History of England*, which was available in many libraries in Great Britain and in the colonies, was praised by politicians like William Pitt and John Adams; George Washington made special preparations when the "celebrated historian" Macaulay paid him a two-week visit at Mount Vernon, and Thomas Jefferson recommended her work as an antidote to that "poison" David Hume's history had injected into the minds of the British people.² In addition, Macaulay's political pamphlets were taken seriously by her opponents. Edmund Burke thought her the best author of the radical camp, and only

1 See, e.g., Ruth H. Bloch, "The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America," *Signs* 13, no. 1 (1987): 37–58.

2 For the reception of Macaulay's history, see Bridget Hill, *The Republican Virago: The Life and Times of Catharine Macaulay, Historian* (Oxford, 1992), 135–48. Macaulay's contemporary fame is illustrated by Mildred C. Beckwith, "Catharine Macaulay, Eighteenth Century Rebel: A Sketch of Her Life and Some Reflections on Her Place Among the Historians and Political Reformers of Her Time," Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1953, 123–33. For Jefferson's opinion on Hume, see Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh, eds., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, 20 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1904), 16:125–6.

half-jokingly admitted that he had been “afraid to answer” her vilification of his pamphlet *Thoughts on the Present Discontents*.³ Macaulay’s modifications of republican thought, which amounted to a cultural updating of the republican tradition and utilized republican tenets in an attempt to improve the position of women in society, were thus put forward by a person respected on both sides of the Atlantic.

The mere fact that Macaulay’s writings were regarded as important contributions to the political debate from the 1760s onward is enough to establish her importance as a woman who had proved that at least some members of the female sex were able to hold their own in a traditionally male field of activity. Thus Linda Kerber recognizes Macaulay’s impact, arguing that she was one of the few women who could serve as an example to American females aspiring to more than their designated role in the nineteenth century.⁴ But more important than her function as a potential role model were two features of Macaulay’s work: First, she modified the republican tradition in a way that made it more palatable to polite Britons, who in the last third of the eighteenth century had come to esteem refined and humane virtues that were incompatible with important republican values. Second, she put forward views that emphasized the equality of the sexes in intellect and character, and used republican values as arguments against the subordination of women.

Macaulay was not the most likely person to become celebrated as a radical historian and political pamphleteer. Neither her religious upbringing as a member of the Church of England nor her education, which mainly consisted of the free use of her father’s library, nor her status as a married woman of the upper middle class can be regarded as obvious bases for her achievement as a radical thinker. But even in her youth Macaulay loved to read books about Roman patriots sacrificing their lives for the liberty of their nation. At the beginning of her career as a radical historian and pamphleteer Macaulay firmly embraced the values of republicanism, which became more accessible to her after her success as a writer had brought her into close contact with people like Benjamin Rush, Richard Baron, and especially Thomas Hollis, who provided her with many valuable political tracts.⁵

3 Edmund Burke, Aug. 14, 1770, in Thomas W. Copeland, ed., *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke*, 10 vols. (Cambridge, 1958–78), 2:50.

4 Cf. Linda Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980), 196.

5 Macaulay’s youth, education, and reading are described in Hill, *Republican Virago*, 1–24, 165–71, and in Bridget Hill and Christopher Hill, “Catharine Macaulay’s History and Her Catalogue of Tracts,” *Seventeenth Century* 8, no. 2 (1993): 269–85. For a more extensive treatment of Macaulay’s

That a woman should advance republican ideals is at first sight rather surprising because the harsh virtues of martial valor, self-restraint, rational command of one's passions, and self-sacrifice for the common good were characteristics that in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were seen as qualities in men of the middle and upper classes. Moreover, the basic prerequisite for political autonomy, economic independence, excluded both the lower classes and (married) women from the political arena. Thus, the disdain for republicanism shown by some bluestockings seems understandable. Elizabeth Montague, for instance, wrote that she was sick of all that patriot din of liberty and averred that she was not sure whether Cato had not kicked his wife.⁶ Macaulay's reputation as a female patriot indicates, however, that republicanism did offer some opportunities for women in the late eighteenth century. Although women were not allowed to vote in national elections or sit in parliament, they could wield considerable influence as writers of pamphlets for humanitarian or political reform. Even conservative writers like James Fordyce acknowledged women's social and ultimately political importance as educators of England's future citizens.⁷

The fact that women could fulfill some important functions in late eighteenth-century society was the result of a number of cultural tendencies that served to enhance their status: a fundamental change in the conception of human nature, the growing popularity of the so-called culture of sentiment or sensibility, the upgrading of the private and social circle, the downgrading of classical knowledge, and the implications of John Locke's epistemological theories for the education of young citizens were the most important developments favorable to women. Some of these, of course, also contributed to the decline of republicanism in Britain during the 1780s because they served to popularize values contradictory to that political tradition.

First of all, the prevalent attitudes toward the nature of man changed in a way that made some of the tenets of civic humanism appear superfluous. More and more Englishmen – and Englishwomen – came to accept the view first put forth by Latitudinarian divines and the Earl of Shaftesbury that human nature was basically good. David Hume was one of those who argued that the passions were not something negative and in need of restraint

innovative modifications of British radical thought, see Vera Nünning, *"A Revolution in Sentiments, Manners, and Moral Opinions": Catharine Macaulay und die politische Kultur des englischen Radikalismus 1760–1790* (Heidelberg, 1998).

6 See Sylvia H. Myers, *The Bluestocking Circle: Women, Friendship, and the Life of the Mind in Eighteenth-Century England* (Oxford, 1990), 93.

7 Cf. James Fordyce, *Sermons to Young Women* (Philadelphia, 1787), 29.

by superior reason; he even claimed that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”⁸ Although not everyone agreed that reason should have such a subordinate role, prevalent collocations like the “social passions” indicated that feelings came to be valued as such. The republican view that only superior citizens were able to restrain their passions and sacrifice their private interests for the public good lost ground as people came to believe that feelings were basically supportive of virtuous behavior; or, in Shaftesbury’s words, that “*Love of one’s Country . . . must also be Self-Love.*”⁹

Many of those changes incompatible with traditional republicanism were in some way related to the culture of sentiment, something that among literary historians is regarded as so important that one of the terms commonly used to designate the second half of the eighteenth century is the “age of sentiment.”¹⁰ This culture is much more than just a “literary” phenomenon, manifesting itself in sentimental plays, poetry, and novels in which delicate maids try to preserve their virtue and “men of feeling” demonstrate their refined emotions. Rather, the literature that embodies values of sentiment is just one of several forms in which a new way of looking at man and the world came to be expressed. The new values were modified and popularized in philosophy, medicine, history, education, art criticism, and the sermon, and were practiced in the daily behavior of the middling ranks.¹¹

The foundation of the paradigmatic shift in the conception of man that lay behind the values of sentiment and ultimately contributed to undermining the tenets of republicanism was, as George S. Rousseau argued, John Locke’s epistemology. Locke had claimed that all human knowledge derived from ideas based on impressions that reached the brain via the nerves.¹² This view, which attributed great importance to the nerves as the mediators of knowledge and virtue, was complemented in the second half of the century by the stress placed on the delicacy of the nerves and fibers. Handbooks for domestic medicine brought home to their readers the idea that sensitive nerves led to a sharp intellect and refined

8 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40), ed. Lewis A. Selby-Brigge (Oxford, 1896), 415.

9 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics* (1711), 3 vols. (London, 1727), 1:119. For Shaftesbury’s view of human nature, see Norman S. Fiering, “Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37 (1976): 202.

10 Few historians have so far concerned themselves with this culture. The only book on English culture is G. J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago, Ill., 1992).

11 See Vera Nünning “Die Kultur der Empfindsamkeit: Eine mentalitätsgeschichtliche Skizze,” in Ansgar Nünning, ed., *Eine andere Geschichte der englischen Literatur: Epochen, Gattungen und Teilgebiete im Überblick* (Trier, 1996), 107–26.

12 Cf. George S. Rousseau, “Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres: Towards Defining the Origins of Sensibility,” in R. F. Brissenden and J. C. Eade, eds., *Studies in the Eighteenth Century III* (Canberra, 1976), 141–5.

feelings.¹³ Delicate emotions thus came to be regarded as the most important feature of man. Even the commonwealth man Lord Kames was convinced that “[m]an is distinguished from the brute creation . . . by the greater delicacy of his perceptions and feelings.”¹⁴

This new conception of man, which was fundamentally opposed to the republican conviction that feelings had to be restrained by reason, had ethical and ultimately political implications. Sensibility was cherished because it gave rise to sympathy and thus to virtue. In its broadest meaning, sympathy meant the ability of an observer to put himself in another's shoes. Educators, moralists, and preachers advised their readers to cultivate their capacity for sympathy because it was thought to lead to compassion, which in turn called forth benevolence, the highest ideal in mid-eighteenth-century Britain.¹⁵ Thus, benevolence and morality could be inculcated by cultivating sympathy.

As a consequence, demonstrating one's sympathy became a way of proving one's moral worth. According to the prevalent belief in the close relationship between body and soul, emotions manifested themselves first in the “natural,” allegedly “universal” language of the body – most of all, in the tears that flowed so abundantly in sentimental literature. Exquisite emotions also found expression in “true politeness,” which, in contrast to the superficial and hypocritical manners attributed to aristocrats, was held to be based on sincere emotions. A less obvious embodiment of delicate feelings was shown by those suffering from so-called nervous disorders, something only highly sensitive and intelligent people had to endure. Even sturdy Englishmen like James Boswell were rather proud of suffering from this sort of disease, also labeled “hypocondria,” because it proved one's superior capacity to feel and thus one's morality.¹⁶

This new ideal was a far cry from the independent, hardy, and valorous individual who was considered to be the ideal citizen in the republican tradition. The refined and delicate emotions now held to be characteristic of virtuous people were incompatible with the rather strict and, in Thomas Sheridan's words, “painful” values of republicanism.¹⁷ To see the difference one need only contrast the newly fashionable English indulgence toward

13 Cf. John Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1988), 205–13.

14 Henry Home, Lord Kames, *Elements of Criticism* (1762), 3 vols. (New York, 1967), 2:3.

15 Cf., e.g., John Dwyer, *Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1987), 60–3, and Fiering, “Irresistible Compassion,” 200–5.

16 Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability*, 201–40, provides a very good overview of the relation between sentiment and “nervous disorders.” For the “natural” and universal language of the body, see Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, 2:116–32.

17 Thomas Sheridan, *British Education: or, the Source of the Disorders of Great Britain* (Dublin, 1756), 54.

children and the new market for toys and children's books, on the one hand, and Benjamin Rush's recommendations for plain diet and strict daily discipline for his "republican machines," on the other. To refined Englishmen and women, republican virtues grew increasingly out of touch with their daily lives and new values. For Adam Smith, this was only natural: "Among civilized nations, the virtues which are founded upon humanity, are more cultivated than those which are founded upon self-denial and the command of the passions."¹⁸ Although they often still held center stage in political discourse, self-sacrifice for the common good and protestations of being willing "to seal" reforms "with my Blood" became increasingly unfashionable.¹⁹

Moreover, even writers interested in the fate of the nation and convinced that Britain was pervaded by such luxury and corruption that national ruin was imminent increasingly looked to sentimental values to find a remedy for the nation's ills. Because many commonwealth men were convinced that public virtue was not to be expected from compatriots of their degenerate age, one means of improving public morals was looking to the moral value of sympathy. Especially Scottish writers hit on the moral value of improving private conversation and recommended cultivating virtue by strengthening sensibility and sympathy as an antidote to the luxury allegedly omnipresent in the public sector.²⁰

Interestingly enough, during the first ten years of her writing career Macaulay certainly was not one of those writers in favor of the culture of sentiment. In her numerous letters to republicans on both sides of the Atlantic she presented herself as a patriot and stressed that "the administration of that patriotic virtue which so eminently flourished in the glorious states of Greece and for a short period of time in this Country . . . always subsisted in my character."²¹

In the first five volumes of her *History of England* and in the political pamphlets she wrote in the 1760s and early 1770s she was true to her word. In these writings Macaulay was preeminently a mouthpiece for republican values. As recent scholarship has stressed, this, however, was perfectly compatible with recommending Locke's political works and insisting on the importance of natural rights.²² In her writings Macaulay, like John

18 Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), ed. David D. Raphael and Alec L. Macfie (Oxford, 1976), 204–5.

19 Cf. Earl of Abingdon, *Thoughts on the Letters of Edmund Burke* (Oxford, 1777), 68. For the distance between republican ideals and daily life, see Dwyer, *Virtuous Discourse*, 101.

20 Cf. Dwyer, *Virtuous Discourse*, 187. For continuing fears of luxury, see James Raven, *Judging New Wealth: Popular Publishing and Responses to Commerce in England, 1750–1800* (Oxford, 1992), 157–72.

21 Catharine Macaulay to John Wilkes, 1768 or 1769, British Library Add. MSS. 30.870, f. 242.

22 For an early view of this opinion, held by writers such as Lance Banning, Mark E. Kann, and Alan Houston, see Jeffrey C. Isaac, "Republicanism vs. Liberalism? A Reconsideration," *History of Political Thought* 9 (1988): 349–77.

Cartwright, used elements from both traditional republicanism and Locke's writings that served to strengthen her argument. She sometimes referred to the Bible, natural law, the ancient constitution of England, and republican values in the same text. Thus she affirmed that the "doctrine of Christ asserted the equal rights of men"²³ and used Locke's conception of the original compact to refute Thomas Hobbes's absolutist notions in her early pamphlet *Loose Remarks on Certain Positions to be Found in Mr. Hobbes' Philosophical Rudiments of Government*.²⁴ She also quotes Locke's *Two Treatises* extensively in her *History of England* to justify the conviction and execution of Charles I because of his "breach of trust and nonperformance of obligations."²⁵ For her it was the inherent right of the people to oppose tyrants to the utmost: "Exclude this position, and all governments are equal tyrannies; the destroyers, not the preservers of the rights of nature."²⁶

In her early writings, however, Macaulay based her argument less on natural law than on republican values; J. G. A. Pocock even called her a "simon-pure representative of the old quasi-republican tradition."²⁷ Although she accepted the "mixed constitution" of king, lords, and an independent House of Commons as an adequate form of government for the rather unenlightened citizens in eighteenth-century Britain, like James Burgh she preferred the republican form of government in theory.²⁸ In her plan for a constitution for Corsica in 1767 she used elements from James Harrington's *Oceana* and divided the legislative branch into a senate and a house of representatives. Because of her belief that most rulers had a "rage for absolute power,"²⁹ the executive was under normal circumstances to reside in the house of representatives.³⁰

Quite a number of Macaulay's political principles stem from her pessimistic view of human nature. She shared the belief that the drive for

23 Catharine Macaulay, *The History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the Brunswick Line*, 8 vols. (London, 1763–83), 3:329n; for Cartwright's use of three traditions in one sentence, see John Cartwright, "American Independence, the Interest and Glory of Great Britain" (1774), in Paul H. Smith, ed., *English Defenders of American Freedom* (Washington, D.C., 1972), 140.

24 The title continues: *and Society with a Short Sketch of a Democratical Form of Government in a Letter to Signior Paoli*; both tracts were first published by W. Johnston as one volume in 1767 in London.

25 Macaulay, *History*, 4:406; see also 4:404, 407–8.

26 *Ibid.*, 4:408.

27 J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1985), 290. For Macaulay's republicanism, see Hill, *Republican Virago*, 164–83.

28 This was the position of nearly all the English republicans; for Burgh, see James Burgh, *Political Disquisitions* (1774–75), 3 vols. (New York, 1971), 3:18.

29 See Macaulay, *History*, 8:64.

30 Macaulay believed that only under extraordinary circumstances should a single man be entrusted with executive power, and the period of his rule should be limited to twelve months at the most. See Macaulay, *Loose Remarks*, 22–3, 27.

power was insatiable and that the passions of man had to be governed by superior reason. Governors should not be trusted; “every degree of confidence in government” was liable to be abused.³¹ In her opinion one of the ways of preventing this abuse of power was the rotation of members of parliament. She agreed with Harrington that rotation would put a stop to corruption.³² Moreover, citizens had to watch their rulers carefully and assert their own rights if necessary. A prerequisite for autonomy and responsible political participation was economic independence. In her early writings Macaulay shared the prevalent view that yeomen and gentlemen with large landed estates were truly independent and had a special interest in the common good.³³ She also set great store by the equality of citizens. Like Locke or Richard Price, however, she only defended *political* equality while emphasizing that there was a “natural subordination established by God himself,”³⁴ based on personal merit or riches that should not be meddled with. In her opinion the lower sorts not only lacked the intellectual education necessary for a sound understanding of politics, but they were also unable to restrain their passions and recognize the common interest; they were far too irrational to govern themselves, let alone others: “The common herd of men are incapable of judging of argument, and must be led to action by their passions.”³⁵ To Macaulay, their only virtue lay in obedience to the right rulers. When she claimed that the consent of the governed was a necessary prerequisite for a legitimate government, she was referring only to the middle and upper classes of society.³⁶

Like other commonwealth men Macaulay modified some of the tenets of republicanism.³⁷ She was among the first radicals of the eighteenth century to claim extensive rights for the people. As early as 1767 she argued in her proposal for a constitution for Corsica that the wishes of citizens were more important than the opinions of their representatives. The senate should first discuss important questions and then make its conclusions

31 Macaulay, *History*, 1:221n.

32 Macaulay, *Loose Remarks*, 34; see also Catharine Macaulay, *Observations on a Pamphlet, entitled, “Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents”* (London, 1770), 17.

33 Macaulay, *History*, 1:xvi; see also *ibid.*, 1:317, 3:239.

34 Macaulay, *History*, 4: 332n; see also Richard Price, *Additional Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty* (Dublin, 1777), 34.

35 Macaulay, *History*, 3:152; see also *ibid.*, 7:260. Most radicals at the time held this opinion. See, e.g., Joseph Priestley, *Lectures on History, and General Policy* (1788), 2 vols. (London, 1793), 2:57.

36 See, e.g., Macaulay, *History*, 4:383: “the people under God, are the origin of all just power.” See also her *Loose Remarks*, 5–6.

37 I do not want to maintain that there is such a thing as a “pure” republicanism; however, a few of Macaulay’s opinions modify republican values in a way slightly different from those of her contemporaries.

known to the people; but the electors should first decide what was to be done: "Let these proposals be promulgated one month before the meeting of the representatives toward the passing them; that the people may have time to deliberate on them, and give what directions they shall judge proper to their representatives."³⁸ In 1775 Macaulay affirmed the right of English citizens to give their representatives binding instructions.³⁹ Although she conceded that the wishes of the electorate might not always result in the best policy, she considered it "as a far lesser evil than to submit to an indefinite obligation of obedience."⁴⁰ Macaulay thus preferred a bad policy that corresponded to the will of the people over good measures dictated by a sovereign parliament.

She therefore turned the existing hierarchy with respect to representatives and electorate on its head and advocated the sovereignty of the people, something that should be realized by a parliament truly conforming to the citizens' will. In order to achieve this aim Macaulay recommended a number of reforms, most of which she justified in her historical writings as necessary for restoring the ancient rights of free Englishmen. She argued for the right of suffrage for all householders ("taken away by the disfranchising statute of Henry the Sixth"), the ballot, more equal representation, place bills, annual parliaments, and the abolition of rotten boroughs.⁴¹

Moreover, Macaulay interpreted the concept of independence in a truly radical way. She rejected any authority that might serve to circumscribe free thought. Thus, she was strictly against any established religion whatsoever because it inevitably led to "that resignation of private judgment, which is so favorable to civil tyranny."⁴² She also condemned narrow religious beliefs because they made men mere instruments of the will of priests.⁴³ Similarly, she was strongly opposed to uncritically following any principle whatsoever. In her history of the seventeenth century Macaulay conceded that the king had all the precedents and laws on his side, but she nonetheless asked her readers to identify with those who adhered to the true spirit of the English constitution and recognized that custom might give "not only a legal, but a sacred and perpetual, establishment to

38 Macaulay, *Loose Remarks*, 24.

39 Cf. Macaulay, "An Address to the People of England, Scotland and Ireland on the Present Important Crisis of Affairs" (1775), in Smith, ed., *English Defenders*, 115–16.

40 Macaulay, "Address," 118.

41 Macaulay, *History*, 8:330. See also *ibid.*, 1:60, 2:262–3, 406, 8:330–1; see also Macaulay, "On the English Constitution," *The Patriot*, vol. 1, no. 6, June 11, 1792, 207, and *ibid.*, no. 7, June 26, 1792, 219.

42 Macaulay, *History*, 2:55; see also *ibid.*, 2:54.

43 Macaulay, *History*, 3:253; see also *ibid.*, 4:142: "In all the catalogue of human frailties, there are none which more corrupt the heart, or deprave the understanding, than the follies of religion."

tyranny.”⁴⁴ Macaulay thus enlarged the concept of independence in a way that stressed the autonomy of the individual. Paradoxically enough, she used the authority of history to persuade her readers to reject all authority and rely only on their own judgment.

In her early work Macaulay also subscribed to those features of republicanism that have been described as nostalgic and backward-looking because they did not conform to contemporary economic conditions or popular values. She confirmed that the loss of liberty and eventual national ruin would follow the spread of luxury and recommended both agrarian and sumptuary laws as precautions.⁴⁵ Moreover, she fully accepted the harsh martial values of the republican tradition. She praised self-denial and “the exalted passions of sacrificing private views to public happiness,”⁴⁶ and she regarded war as desirable insofar as it hardened citizens and “produced a warlike spirit”⁴⁷ that enabled them to defend their liberties. Her whole history was written with the view to presenting “Patriots who have sacrificed their tender affections, their properties, their lives, to the interest of society”⁴⁸ as praiseworthy examples of desirable behavior. Her utter disregard of the values of sensibility at this early stage in her writing career also manifested itself in her opinion that it was a good thing to have miscreants sentenced to death: “A discipline thus severe and just, as it made the parliament terrible to their enemies, so it inspired their partisans with the utmost reverence and devotion.”⁴⁹

In sum, up to the 1770s Macaulay supported nearly all the tenets of republicanism, and both her historical and political works represented and justified republican values. Dealing with the seventeenth century in her famous *History of England* she held up examples of patriotic behavior, illustrated radical values, showed the success a determined resistance to the crown could have, and established a pattern of interpretation that could also be used to interpret political events in the late eighteenth century. Moreover, Macaulay formulated reforms that were allegedly necessary for restoring the ancient constitution, put forth an alternative republican model of political values and behavior, and provided radicals of the eighteenth century with a native tradition.

Her role as “female patriot” and her authority as the first radical historian of the eighteenth century earned her both praise and fame, but

44 *Ibid.*, 4:38–9, 3:322–3n, 291. See also *ibid.*, 3:33n., 1:xiv–xv.

45 Cf. *ibid.*, 1:84, 3:187–8n; see also her *Loose Remarks*, 24–6.

46 Macaulay, *Loose Remarks*, 22.

47 Macaulay, *History*, 5:155; see also *ibid.*, 2:215. 48 *Ibid.*, 1:vii.

49 *Ibid.*, 4:94.

apparently she was cut to the quick by criticism from representatives of the culture of sentiment. As she tells her readers in the preface to the sixth volume of her history, published in 1781 after a lapse of nine years, she had been accused of a lack of sympathy. From the mid-1770s on Macaulay tried to deflect this criticism in both word and deed. First, she moved from London to Bath to cure her “nervous disorders,” which, for contemporaries steeped in the culture of sentiment, was a sure sign of the delicacy of her nerves and feelings. Second, she discontinued her work on a history of England in the seventeenth century to write a history of England in the eighteenth century in a style that conformed to fashionable polite values. In contrast to her former, scholarly history, which had extensive footnotes and long quotes, this new work had no notes and was written in epistolary form,⁵⁰ employing this easy style to convey radical values. Macaulay’s aim in writing this history was slightly different from her earlier historical work. In her account of the eighteenth century she concentrated on the growth of political corruption and the degeneracy of the times. She thus tried to persuade her contemporaries that reforms were absolutely necessary if the ruin of the nation was to be prevented. To mobilize broad support for political reforms her exposition focused on those points that radicals and the “country” opposition could agree on: repealing the septennial act, implementing place acts disabling crown officers from sitting in parliament, introducing a frugal style of government, reducing taxes, and repaying the public debt, the debt serving only the so-called “money’d interest” despised by both Tories and radicals. In 1778 Macaulay did not specify how often elections should be held; she also did not mention any reforms, such as the ballot or the extension of suffrage, which would have alienated the more moderate “country” opposition among her readership. In her history of the eighteenth century she thus put forth an agenda that one year later became the backbone of Christopher Wyvill’s *Association Movement*. However, Macaulay’s history was not a success. It was held in high esteem by radicals like Capel Lofft, but the general audience did not take to it – presumably because the attempt to blend polite style and traditional political values remained rather clumsy and because Macaulay’s second marriage to William Graham, a Scottish

50 Catharine Macaulay, *The History of England from the Revolution to the Present Time, in a Series of Letters* (Bath, 1778). This work is usually criticized as being second rate at best; see, e.g., Marianne B. Geiger, “Mercy Otis Warren and Catharine Sawbridge Macaulay: Historians in the Transatlantic Republican Tradition (England),” Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1986, 281, and Barbara B. Schnorrenberg, “An Opportunity Missed: Catharine Macaulay on the Revolution of 1688,” *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture* 20 (1990): 233.

surgeon's mate more than twenty years younger than she, proved to be detrimental to her reputation.⁵¹

Despite this setback Macaulay did not abandon her attempt to combine republican and polite values. The last three volumes of her *History of England* are politically just as radical as her earlier work, condemning the Restoration as the "grand catastrophe" that "produced the return of national slavery."⁵² At the same time, however, she refrained from commending harshness and martial values. In the preface to her sixth volume Macaulay even adopted the role of the tender and sympathetic patriot. On the one hand, she defended her earlier praise of those who risked their lives to further the liberty of their country; on the other hand, she firmly repudiated the accusation that she lacked humanity and even claimed that she had felt great sympathy for Charles I: "In this inquiry I was so far from feeling myself the bloody-minded Republican, as I have been termed by the butcherly writers of these days . . . that I shed many tears whilst I was writing his [Charles'] catastrophe."⁵³ Macaulay also began to evaluate behavior using the criterion of humanity. She even attributed politeness and sensitive dispositions to commonwealth men, claiming that they wanted to prevent the shedding of blood and tried to foster humanity.⁵⁴

In her last political work, her pamphlet criticizing Burke's fatal *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Macaulay also made use of the values of sensibility. In it she showed that she had lost none of her political sting; she even clarified former ambiguities when she flatly repudiated the authority of history as an important basis for legitimizing political reforms. What is more, she castigated the birthrights of freeborn Englishmen as arrogant and chauvinist pretensions because they denied the legitimate rights of all other countrymen. Her review of the possible legitimations of governments led her to conclude that all lawful political authority rested on the "unalienable and indefeasible rights of man."⁵⁵ The "*will of the people*"⁵⁶ was the only legitimate source of political authority. At the same time Macaulay made sure that her views no longer could be criticized for their alleged lack of feeling by supporting her defense of the French Revolution with argu-

51 Cf., e.g., Florence S. Boos and William Boos, "Catharine Macaulay: Historian and Political Reformer," *International Journal of Women's Studies* 3, no. 1 (1980): 53.

52 Cf. Macaulay, *History*, 5:321, 342.

53 *Ibid.*, 6:xii; see also *ibid.*, vii–xi.

54 Cf. *ibid.*, 6:15–16, 351, 358, 7:214, 276, 355, 8:24–5, 205–6.

55 Catharine Macaulay, *Observations on the Reflections of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, on the Revolution in France* (1790) (Boston, 1791), 38; see also *ibid.*, 19, 38: the "native and unalienable rights of man." For her critique of the "boasted birthright of an Englishman," see *ibid.*, 13.

56 *Ibid.*, 39. Original emphasis.

ments based on the values of sentiment. She thus explained that the realization of natural rights in France could be prevented only through the "the effusion of *oceans* of blood,"⁵⁷ which no one with any degree of sympathy could wish for. She even avoided the republican term *public virtue* and instead claimed that it was "*liberal benevolence*, which . . . cheerfully sacrifices a *personal interest* to the *welfare* of the community."⁵⁸

The influence of the culture of sensibility on Macaulay's thought is most obvious in her 1790 *Letters on Education*. This venture into educational theory did not, however, represent a withdrawal from politics; Macaulay had imbibed republican values and knew about the supreme political importance of the manners and morals of a nation. Her educational treatise was firmly based on Locke's epistemology. Macaulay repeated time and again that the senses were "the only inlets to human knowledge."⁵⁹ Education consisted "of all the impressions received through the organs of sense, from the hour of birth to the hour of death,"⁶⁰ and was of paramount importance to the formation of a pupil's character. She was thus able to argue that every passion or faculty lies latent in the human mind and can be strengthened only by the power of impressions and associations. The aims of her educational treatise combined elements of republicanism with the culture of sentiment: She wanted to form rules that prevented "the capricious tyranny of the passions" while aiming at refining and sensitizing the mind.⁶¹

Macaulay was conscious of the fact that no society had before attempted to combine both radical and sentimental values.⁶² She nonetheless reviewed the systems of education of the ancient city-states in order to search for precedents for her new theory of education. In her chapters on Athens, Sparta, and Rome, she praised their realization of republican values but criticized their manners, which were too unrefined. She made quite clear that the only reason for admiring the ancients lay in their self-denying moderation and heroic patriotism.⁶³ On the whole she did not regard the ancient patriots as models to be emulated because they lacked benevolence. Indeed, their very virtues "were often at enmity with their humanity."⁶⁴ Although Macaulay adhered to the view that the spread of luxury had caused the fall of Rome, she offered a more positive evaluation of luxury than she had

57 *Ibid.*, 37. Original emphasis. 58 *Ibid.*, 16. Original emphasis.

59 Catharine Macaulay, *Letters on Education: With Observations on Religious and Metaphysical Subjects* (1790) (New York, 1974), 237; see also *ibid.*, 163, 295.

60 *Ibid.*, 274.

61 *Ibid.*, i; see also *ibid.*, iv, 425, 106, 422–3.

62 Cf. *ibid.*, 250.

63 Cf. *ibid.*, 248, 272.

64 *Ibid.*, 240; see also 241, 251.

before. She acknowledged the possible relationship between luxury and refinement popularized by Scottish philosophers, and argued that the Romans were not as civilized as her own contemporaries, “for the privation of those luxuries which equally tend to corrupt and improve the mind, allowed them no means to acquire those graces and virtues which render the species objects of our admiration and esteem.”⁶⁵ Thus, she conceded that there are two sorts of luxury, one of which “improved” and refined the human mind.

In contrast to the other English radicals who confined their advice on education to matters involving family, tutors, and schools, Macaulay based her recommendations on Locke’s epistemology and the overall importance of impressions. In her discussion of “public education” she also concerned herself with architecture, gardening, and other ornamental arts that, in her opinion, were luxuries that might serve useful ends. She advocated the avoidance of experiences that might foster tendencies toward cruelty and instead the creation of circumstances that encouraged benevolence. She thus wanted to eliminate slaughterhouses and executions from public view and to encourage even poor people to cultivate small gardens.⁶⁶ Although she concentrated on experiences that allegedly foster sympathy, she did not forget her political agenda. She even argued that church pews should have no decorations that might “foster pride and servility” and thus were detrimental to the idea of political and religious equality.⁶⁷

Macaulay’s emphasis on sympathy was politically important. For her, the passing of laws favorable to sympathy would make coercive laws unnecessary because people governed by sympathy would perform “the duties of humanity” willingly.⁶⁸ Sympathy was thus a necessary component of responsible moral and political behavior.

However, Macaulay was not prepared to assign a subordinate role to reason as advocated by some Scottish philosophers. In her opinion reason was “always able to discern the moral difference of things.”⁶⁹ She stressed again and again that there were immutable principles of virtue, independent of the changing manners and opinions of societies. It was therefore most important to develop the intellectual faculties of pupils to enable them to recognize those principles.⁷⁰

65 *Ibid.*, 239.

67 *Ibid.*, 333.

69 *Ibid.*, 193.

70 Cf., e.g., *ibid.*, 49: “There is no cultivation which yields so promising a harvest as the cultivation of the understanding; . . . a mind, irradiated by the clear light of wisdom, must be equal to every task which reason imposes on it” (see also *ibid.*, 23, 95).

66 Cf. *ibid.*, 276–81, 303–7.

68 *Ibid.*, 275–6.

In addition to sympathy and reason Macaulay thought that one tenet of republicanism was indispensable to responsible moral behavior. One aim of her educational treatise, therefore, was "to preserve as much as possible the independence of the mind."⁷¹ In a letter titled *The Great Advantage of Inducing Habits of Independence in Children* Macaulay referred to the "blessings of liberty," which she wanted to secure by making her pupils independent.⁷² For her, independence was of paramount importance because it prevented people from mindlessly following authority, which had nothing to do with truth. Moreover, she wanted to prevent the development of narrow-mindedness in her pupils and advised them to follow only those laws "which your enlightened reason dictates on a principle of conscience."⁷³ She even recommended that the scriptures should not be read before the age of twenty-one, by which time pupils had acquired critical faculties and independent minds. Although she granted that it might be wise to induce religious habits like praying earlier on, she was strictly against reading the Bible at an age when pupils were not yet able to evaluate its content and had to accept it as authority.⁷⁴ As to Macaulay's last reason for cultivating independence, she was well ahead of her time for she was one of the first in Britain to place value on originality. In contrast to many of her contemporaries, in 1790 Macaulay rejected authority because it inhibited original thought: "Opinions taken up on mere authority, must ever prevent original thinking, must stop the progress of improvement, and instead of producing rational agents, can only make man the mere ape of man."⁷⁵

Macaulay's plan for education thus combined ideals of republicanism with the culture of sentiment. She sought to cultivate reason, independence, and sympathy as necessary prerequisites for responsible moral and thus political behavior. Macaulay also stressed that citizens must possess both private and public virtues to fulfill their political duties. In order to understand and, if necessary, criticize and resist political measures, citizens should be independent, rational, and virtuous: "The mere citizen will have learnt to obey the laws of his country, but he will never understand those principles on which all laws ought to be established; and without such an understanding, he can never be . . . truly moral; nor will he ever have any of that active wisdom which is necessary for co-operating in any plan of reformation."⁷⁶

71 Ibid., 128.

72 Ibid., 66–8.

73 Ibid., 187–8; see also *ibid.*, 127, 196.

74 Cf. *ibid.*, 90, 134–9.

75 Ibid., 127; see also *ibid.*, vi, 105. For the contemporary meaning of originality, see the OED and Jay Fliegelman, *Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language, and the Culture of Performance* (Stanford, Calif., 1993), 164–6.

76 Macaulay, *Letters on Education*, 198; see also *ibid.*, 105, 139.

For Macaulay, as for Price, responsible political behavior was based on private morality. Macaulay thus modified her earlier opinions, which had been grounded solely on the tenets of republicanism. By 1790 she was convinced that citizens, in order to fulfill their duties, had to cultivate sympathy as well as achieve independence and develop their intellectual faculties. Independence and benevolence were essential components of informed political behavior.⁷⁷

Macaulay's educational views can thus be read as complementary to her political writings. One might even claim that her work on education was meant to clear the ground for political change. In the late 1780s, when political reform movements stood little chance of success, it became more important to publish educational than political treatises. Because Macaulay believed, with Joseph Priestley, that public opinion was the basis for all political reform, it was first of all necessary to prepare the minds of the people, to make them want to throw off their shackles.⁷⁸ Macaulay did not want to produce "republican machines" who thought that they belonged to their country; she wanted her pupils to become autonomous human beings able to reach independent moral and political decisions. Thus, her treatise on education is ultimately a deeply political work.

Moreover, I argue that her educational tract shows her concern for the position of women in society and is in fact a rare combination of the values of sentiment, republicanism, and feminism. To claim Macaulay's importance as a precursor of feminism may seem rather farfetched. Susan Staves has argued that Macaulay's republicanism ultimately neglected the rights of women.⁷⁹ Staves's judgment must be taken with a grain of salt, however, because she discusses only the few remarks about women in Macaulay's historical and political writings; she does not take into account Macaulay's educational treatise. This is unfortunate for two reasons: First, in the writings that are predominantly influenced by republicanism, Macaulay projects a rather ambivalent attitude toward women. For instance, she praises one

77 See *ibid.*, 112. Benevolence was of central importance both in the culture of sentiment and in Macaulay's treatise on education. I have not stressed that aspect of her work because benevolence was held to be not only the consequence of sympathy but also the most important ideal in eighteenth-century Britain. For Price's view of the necessity of private morality in citizens, see Richard Price, *A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, Delivered on November 4, 1789* (London, 1789), 43.

78 For Macaulay's opinion, see the diary of Sulas Neville, Apr. 30, 1768; quoted in G. M. Ditchfield, "Some Literary and Political Views of Catharine Macaulay," *American Notes and Queries* 12 (1974): 73; for Priestley, see "A Political Dialogue on the General Principles of Government" (1791), in John T. Rutt, ed., *The Theological and Miscellaneous Works of Joseph Priestley* (1817–1832), 25 vols. (New York, 1972), 25:107.

79 Cf. Susan Staves, "'The Liberty of the She-Subject of England': Rights Rhetoric and the Female Thucydides," *Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature* 1 (1989): 180.

petition of women in support of parliament and derides another petition by women “clamour[ing]” for peace, and even argues that parliament was justified in having them dispersed by means of arms.⁸⁰ In her historical writings Macaulay's attitude toward women is subordinated to the overall political aim of her work. Second, leaving out her educational treatise results in a one-sided account at best because Macaulay believed in the political importance of education.

One can take an observation by Mary Wollstonecraft as a starting point for a reappraisal of Macaulay's opinions on women. Wollstonecraft not only highly praised Macaulay; she even wrote her a letter saying “You are the only female writer who I coincide in opinion with respecting the rank our sex ought to endeavour to attain in the world.”⁸¹ I do not want to deny the differences between Macaulay's and Wollstonecraft's feminism, but Wollstonecraft certainly was not wide of the mark when she thought that her views and those of Macaulay on female education and the social position of women were remarkably similar.

Macaulay used Locke's epistemology for her own specific ends when she claimed that there were no innate differences between the sexes. Because Locke had shown that because there are no innate ideas, there could be no natural female characteristics either: “as the organs of sense are the same in both sexes, and consequently their perceptions, this difference which exists between them, can only arise from a different combination of their ideas.”⁸² Because she was convinced that there is “*No characteristic Difference in Sex*,” Macaulay emphasized that she only used the masculine pronoun in her educational work for stylistic reasons and that all her rules of education applied to both boys and girls.⁸³ Although she conceded that the customs of Europe should be taken into account in such things as reserving the rougher sports for boys, she set great store in a firm and vigorous constitution in women, who should do anything but conform to Burke's ideal of a “lispering” and “tottering” beauty. Because she wanted boys and girls to develop all their faculties she recommended that they should

80 Cf. Macaulay, *History*, 3:186–8 and 4:30. Staves, “She-Subject,” 168–9, cites only one of these petitions and concludes that Macaulay principally supported political action by women.

81 Mary Wollstonecraft, Dec. 1790, quoted in Bridget Hill, “The Links Between Mary Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay: New Evidence,” *Women's History Review* 4, no. 2 (1995): 177. See also Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1791), ed. Ulrich H. Hardt (Troy, N.Y., 1982), 170, 226.

82 Macaulay, *Letters on Education*, 179.

83 Cf. *ibid.*, 203, 142, 62. Original emphasis. Florence S. Boos, “Catharine Macaulay's Letters on Education (1790): An Early Feminist Polemic,” *University of Michigan Papers in Women's Studies* 2 (1976): 65, claims that Macaulay's denial of innate differences between the sexes was unique.

be educated together. Macaulay differed from most of her contemporaries in that she wanted to educate boys and girls on a strictly equal basis: "Confine not the education of your daughters to what is regarded as the ornamental parts of it, nor deny the graces to your sons."⁸⁴ Men should be just as tender, affectionate, sympathetic, and benevolent as women, and females should be just as rational and independent as men. This aim was not only founded on the fundamental similarity of the sexes but also substantiated by the fact that the immutable principles of virtue were the same for men and women, and that both sexes should be enabled to lead a virtuous life to prepare themselves for heavenly judgment: "There is but one rule of right for the conduct of all rational beings; consequently . . . true virtue in one sex must be equally so in the other."⁸⁵ Macaulay's description of her ideal female pupil as a "careless, modest beauty, grave, manly, noble, full of strength and majesty" demonstrates how radically she wanted to transcend the popular gender roles of her time.⁸⁶ Macaulay went even further than Wollstonecraft when she claimed that girls should not be taught any virtue that was relevant only to their own sex. Whereas Wollstonecraft wanted to use the power of existing customs to instill chastity in girls, Macaulay was strictly against teaching anything on the grounds of authority only. Her pupils were always to act according to their own consciences.⁸⁷

The contemporary differences between men and women contradicted her thesis of the natural similarity of the sexes, and Macaulay gave a balanced evaluation of the reasons accounting for the subordination of women. She referred to history and argued that in former times men abused their bodily strength "to destroy all the natural rights of the female species, and to reduce them to a state of abject slavery."⁸⁸ Both sexes then persisted in upholding the resulting complementary distribution of rights and duties between men and women, men because it was very flattering to them and women because they had learnt to derive all their self-esteem from the

84 Macaulay, *Letters on Education*, 47–8, 50. This was taken over by Wollstonecraft; cf. *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, 100–1, 333, 349–50. For Burke's ideal, see "A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful" (1757), in *The Works of Edmund Burke*, 6 vols. (London, 1894–1900), 1:129.

85 Macaulay, *Letters on Education*, 201; see also *ibid.*, 105, 139.

86 *Ibid.*, 221. Most writers, such as James Fordyce and Lord Kames, had an abhorrence of "manly" women.

87 Cf. Macaulay, *Letters on Education*, 212, 220. Macaulay also denounced the double standard, which to her mind resulted from the fact that chastity had been regarded as the property of men; see *ibid.*, 220. For Wollstonecraft's view on chastity, see Wollstonecraft, "Review of Catharine Macaulay's *Letters on Education*," in Janet Todd, ed., *A Wollstonecraft Anthology* (Cambridge, 1989), 116.

88 Macaulay, *Letters on Education*, 206.

admiration of men, and therefore counterfeited weakness and other allegedly female characteristics. For women, this hypocrisy was a kind of self-preservation because they had been taught to avoid reason and independence, and their only way to get a husband was by using their personal charms. Thus, women could have power only if they debased themselves. Educated to become coquettes, girls learned to give up all their virtues. Consequently, the “education of women . . . is precisely that which must necessarily tend to corrupt and debilitate both the powers of mind and body.”⁸⁹ For Macaulay the many faults and weaknesses of women in the late eighteenth century were entirely the result of their education and their status in society, which denied them their rights and made them dependent on men.⁹⁰

In her educational treatise Macaulay thus put forth a powerful criticism of the subordination of women. She used republican and sentimental values to convince her readers that both men and women would be happier and more virtuous if they enjoyed the same rights. First, she appealed to both the sentimental abhorrence of hypocrisy and coquettishness and the appreciation of a happy domestic life to criticize the status quo. She argued that men would be happier if they had educated wives with whom they could share their rational and refined pleasures.⁹¹ Second, she used all the republican arguments against slavery, tyranny, and the debilitating consequences of dependence in support of her view that men and women should be treated as equals. Although she refrained from asking for definite legislative reforms, Macaulay deplored the dependence and powerlessness of women in much the same terms she employed in her historical and political writings: She denounced the tyranny of husbands and the corresponding slavery of wives, regretted that women were forced to delight in the few prerogatives they had by tyrannizing their suitors, and lamented the fact that women lacked both civil and political rights, and were thus denied their natural rights: “For with a total and absolute exclusion of every political right to the sex in general, married women, whose situation demands a particular indulgence, have hardly a civil right to save them from the gross-est injuries.”⁹² She even enlisted divine support for her view that the subjection of women should be revoked: “So little did a wise and just Providence intend to make the condition of slavery an unalterable law of

89 *Ibid.*, 205, 207–8, 211, 213.

90 See *ibid.*, 202, 209, 214. Macaulay’s criticism of the conduct and attitudes of women was never so harsh as Wollstonecraft’s.

91 See *ibid.*, 207. This was a common argument by feminists at the time.

92 *Ibid.*, 206–12.

female nature, that in the same proportion as the male sex have consulted the interest of their own happiness, they have relaxed in their tyranny over women.”⁹³ Thus, the nature of men and women, their rational interests and happiness, and the will of God all required that men and women should enjoy the same rights. For these reasons and because that was the only way to encourage virtue and pave the way for the happiness of men and women, it was necessary to educate both sexes on an equal basis. Men should be taught to recognize the value of an equal partnership, and women should learn to give up their indirect influence and precarious power in exchange for rational privileges.

Macaulay’s educational views logically lead to the conclusion that both sexes should have equal rights. In an inconspicuous way that may have proved less repellent to contemporary readers than more partisan and antagonistic writing, Macaulay succeeded in arguing that the subjection of women should be abandoned because it was detrimental to female virtue, to the happiness of both sexes, and even to the progress and improvement of society. Macaulay’s *Letters on Education*, which contained many of the ideas Wollstonecraft later put forth in her less coherent and more partisan and uncompromising *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, can thus arguably be read as a trailblazing feminist work.

In summary, one can say that the particularities of Macaulay’s republicanism consist mainly in a modification of republican values that made them more attractive to a late-eighteenth-century audience and her use of republican ideas to criticize the position of women in society. At the time, both were as remarkable as they were unusual. Perhaps being a woman made it easier for Macaulay to adjust her republicanism to fashionable sentimental values and apply republican and humane ideals to the education of women. After all, sensibility, sympathy, affections, and polite manners were allegedly more akin to females than to men. Moreover, Macaulay had nothing to lose by adopting sentimental values and neglecting some of the harsher republican virtues, which were irrelevant to women anyway. For male radicals, adopting sentimental values might have exposed them to the charge of being effeminate.

Being a woman certainly made Macaulay more aware of the sorry state of women’s rights than any male author would have been. Indeed, it was hardly possible to be less aware of female rights than contemporary male radicals were. John Cartwright, for instance, could barely conceal his contempt when he rejected the claim of John Wesley and Josiah Tucker that

93 *Ibid.*, 206–7.

the radicals' principles involving natural rights logically implied political rights for women.⁹⁴ Even Price, whose ethical theory was ahead of its time and who valued humane values more than other radicals, did not seem to notice that his criticism of denying Americans their rights might apply just as well to denying the rights of women: "But alas! it often happens in the *Political World* as it does in *Religion*, that the people who cry out most vehemently for Liberty to themselves are the most unwilling to grant it to others."⁹⁵ This reluctance is perhaps to be expected: The radicals rejected and questioned so many prevalent beliefs that it is not surprising they did not question their own position in relation to their wives.⁹⁶ Macaulay, however, took the bull by the horns: After she had adopted the role of the female patriot instructing her countrymen on their political rights and being a "simon-pure" republican for a decade, she was willing to take up the values of sentiment in her political work and employed both republicanism and sentiment as bases for the improvement of the position of women in society.

94 John Cartwright, *The Legislative Rights of the Commonalty Vindicated; Or Take Your Choice!* (1776), 2d ed. (London, 1777), 46–7.

95 Richard Price, *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty* (London, 1776), 92–3.

96 It should not be ignored, however, that Macaulay was less willing than radicals like Burgh or Priestley to recognize the rights of the lower middle classes. Although she was less strict in her later work, Macaulay wanted to keep the social hierarchy with respect to the middle and lower classes intact.