3. The Britishness of the English Revolution 1640-1660

John Morrill

This volume of essays addresses a question which most historians throughout the British Isles prefer not to think about. Yet it is a question at the heart of modern British politics, as the status of Northern Ireland constantly reminds us, and as the calls now supported by at least one in four of the Scottish people for self-determination within a federal Europe increasingly calls before us. The whole question of national identity and of the cultural homogeneity of long-standing political units is of central importance in the reconstruction of a new Europe in the wake of the collapse of state socialism, and the ambiguities are horrifyingly displayed by the break-up of Yugoslavia.

I

There never has been a term to describe the polity made up of the British Isles. The Tudor conquest of Ireland and the dynastic union of England and Scotland created an imperium entitled the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, and no subsequent union of parliaments and governments introduced a single term for this imperium. English governors never wished to accord to the inhabitants of Ireland the status or rights of honorary Englishmen. And yet the early modern period saw great movements of peoples within the British Isles,[1] and a process of acculturation emanating from Lowland

[1] "British Isles" is itself an unfortunate term. Historically (from the times of the Roman geographers, through the historical mythologizing of Geoffrey of Monmouth, to the proclamation of the Kingdom of Great Britain in 1604) the word "Britain" applied only to

England and from Lowland Scotland. Tens of thousands of Englishmen and Scotsmen settled in Ireland - and not just in Ulster - in the early decades of the century, and as a result of the Cromwellian settlement in the mid-seventeenth century, perhaps as many 20,000 former New Model soldiers settled on the land granted them in settlement of their arrears of pay, and many hundreds amongst the leading families in the City of London and amongst the gentry acquired estates in settlement of their claims.[2]

Professor Canny and others have demonstrated how we can view this process as part of the wider Westward Enterprize of colonization and settlement which assimilates the English experience in the seventeenth century to that of the West Indies and North America, and that of the native Irish people to that of the native American peoples.[3] This in turn leads on naturally to a view of what is happening in early modern Britain as part of a general development of English trade, settlement and dominion around the Atlantic rim, creating what Professor John Pocock has called "the atlantic archipelago".[4] Such an approach does not help us to understand what is happening on mainland Britain, however, for the effective integration of Wales into the English polity in the century after 1540 and the nature of

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the island comprising the kingdoms of England and Scotland and the kingdom/principality of Wales. Understood as a geographical term only, it has to serve as the only one available.

[2] A New History of Ireland, vol. III, Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691, eds. T. W. Moody et al., Oxford 1974, ch. XIV; K. S. BOTTIGHEIMER, English Money and Irish Land, Oxford 1971.

[3] N. CANNY, Kingdom and Colony. Ireland in the Atlantic World, Baltimore 1988. For some caveats to his generally attractive approach, see the review of Canny's work by Hiram Morgan, who points out, for example, that English Kings never ennobled native Americans in the way they ennobled noble native Irishness, nor did they bring them over to London to be executed for treason: H. MORGAN, Review of CANNY, Kingdom and Colony, in: The International History Review 111 (1991), pp. 801-806.

[4] J. G. A. POCOCK, British history: a plea for a new subject, in: Journal of Modern History 40 (1975), pp. 601-628; IDEM, The limits and divisions of British History. In search of the unknown subject, in: American Historical Review 87 (1982), pp. 311-336.

Anglo-Scottish relations do not fit the pattern of internal colonization at all.[5] One of the most startling aspects of British History in the seventeenth century is the almost complete lack of interest amongst the English in acquiring land and power in Scotland and the complete absence of English migration to Scotland even in the wake of the military conquest of 1650-1654. It is for this reason that of the models that have been developed for an understanding of the question posed by the organizers of this conference (Three Nations - a Common History?) the one I find the most helpful and fruitful is the one recently explored by Steven Ellis.[6] Amongst his hypotheses is one that divides the history of the British Isles into three phases, for the periods 1066-1453, 1453-1689 and since 1689.

I would like to develop this hypothesis and take it even further than he does. Thus I would see the period from 1066 to 1453 as witnessing the development of Anglo-Norman Pales in England, Scotland and Ireland (dominated by Norman political, legal and social institutions and cultures) shading off into largely unincorporated Gaelic/Celtic regions with distinctive linguistic, social and political systems where English or Scottish royal authority was exercised, if at all, under franchise agreements with Gaelic lords. Kings of England were rulers of an imperium straddling the Channel into Normandy, Gascony and beyond, and they looked to expand their power south and east. Their highest ambition was to be crowned Kings of France. They were only fitfully and largely ineffectually concerned to extend their

[5] For the Act of Union itself, see G. WILLIAMS, Recovery, Reorientation and Reformation: Wales c.1415-1642, Oxford 1988, chs. 11-12; P. ROBERTS, Wales and England after the Tudor union. Crown, principality and parliament 1543-1624, in: C. CROSS et al. (eds.), Law and Government under the Tudors, Cambridge 1987, pp. 111-138; and W. ROBINSON, The Tudor revolution in Welsh government, in: English Historical Review 103 (1988), pp. 1-20; and for a stimulating recent analysis P. JENKINS, A History of Modern Wales, 1536-1990, Harlow 1991.

[6] See especially S. ELLIS, "Not mere English". The British perspective 1400-1650, in: History Today 28 (Dec. 1988), pp. 41-48.

authority north and west, to make good their suzerainty over Scotland let alone to extend their authority in Ireland.

By this analysis, the great turning point came from the mid-fifteenth century and especially from the 1530s, first with the loss of the Continental possessions of the English Crown and a natural refocusing of attention on the more vulnerable if less lucrative unassimilated regions of the British Isles, and then with the impact of the Reformation and the need to impose and to police religious uniformity. This absorbed much the greater part of the military energies of the English Crown throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so that it was only with the development of effective political control and the establishment of Protestant élites in social power throughout the British Isles that the development of a strong European and transoceanic role was possible, from the 1690s and more particularly from the 1710s. At the heart of this second period, the period of creating English and anglophone hegemony throughout Britain, lies the so-called English Revolution of 1640-1660. This was indeed a period of unique violence in English history (more than half the battles involving more than 1,000 men ever fought on English soil were fought during the decade 1640-1649), and it culminated with the public trial and execution of the King and the abolition of monarchy, House of Lords and state church. I have written at length on this subject.[7] But it really does need to be called the British Revolution rather than the English Revolution, not only because it began as rebellion of the majority populations in Scotland and Ireland against royal authoritarianism and Anglicization, but also because at its heart was a constitutional revolution in each kingdom, a much greater social transformation in Ireland and Scotland than in England, and an unparalleled

[7] For accessible summaries of my views, see J. S. MORRILL, The Impact of the English Civil War, London 1991; IDEM, Revolution and Restoration. Britain in the 1650s, London 1992; IDEM, The Nature of the English Revolution, Harlow forthcoming 1993.

process of integrative union, creating a sovereign Parliament of Britain for the only time before the nineteenth century.

The story of the British Isles in this period, then, resembles the story of France and Spain. For England, Scotland and Ireland read Castile, Aragon and Portugal or France, Brittany and Burgundy. In that sense it is no more and no less anachronistic to speak of early modern British than of early modern Spanish or French history. Subsequent history alone has made it unfashionable to do so. Seen within the trajectories of early modern history, British state formation in these centuries can be seen to parallel and echo French and Spanish state formation.

For the most part, Continental monarchs did not create united kingdoms through the merger of existing institutions in each or through the superimposition of the existing institutions of one kingdom on the other, but through the manipulation of political élites and the creation of new supra-national institutions (of which the very last any seventeenth monarch would contemplate would be an Estates- or Parliament-General). James I's policy towards the Scottish nobility - to encourage them to establish themselves as cultural amphibians, living partly in England and partly in Scotland, combining an economic centre-of-gravity north of the Border and a political centre-of-gravity south of it, acquiring English titles as well as Scottish ones and English wives instead of Scottish ones - was a policy extended by Charles I to incorporate the Irish nobility.[8] The Irish Protestant nobility were largely recent settlers who maintained strong links with the

[8] For the Anglo-Scottish nobility, see the work of K. BROWN, Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union 1603-1715, Basingstoke 1992, chs. 3-5; IDEM, Courtiers and cavaliers. Service, Anglicization and loyalty among the royalist nobility, in: J. S. MORRILL (ed.), The Scottish National Covenant in its British Context, Edinburgh 1991, pp. 155-192; for the Anglo-Irish nobility, see the forthcoming M. Litt. thesis Trinity College Dublin, by P. LITTLE.

English gentry (the Earl of Cork is the supreme example of this),[9] but we must never forget how far wardship and intermarriage was integrating the Old English and Irish nobilities into English political culture: Clanricard was, after all, a half-brother of the third Earl of Essex, Inchiquin a son-in-law of St. Leger, Ormond a royal ward brought up largely at Hatfield and Lambeth; while Antrim married to the widow of the great Duke of Buckingham. Not for nothing did James VI and I see a union of hearts and minds (and bodies too, he might have added) as the key to the union of the kingdoms.[10] As we learn more about the "politics of access" as the key to the politics in the early modern period, so the lack of royal interest in integrating Privy Councils seems unimportant in comparison with the growth of an integrated royal household with the Bedchamber as a kind of embryonic *conseil d'en haut.*

We must then not be put off by the lack of progress towards a single Council or a single Parliament. James I was stymied in all his grander schemes by the dog-in-a-manger attitudes of English MPs and by the limited freedom of manoeuvre already possessed by kings of England to subvert the Parliament of England;[11] but his policy in Scotland and Ireland (and Charles I's, too, when he got round to one) was ruthlessly to exploit royal discretion in respect of membership and control of procedure (including the proxies of Englishmen with Scottish and Irish titles) to pursue British policies.

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[9] For Cork, see N. CANNY, The Upstart Earl: the Social and Mental World of Richard Boyle, First Earl of Cork, Cambridge 1982, esp. pp. 124-138. More generally, see the remarks of J. A. MURPHY, The politics of the Munster Protestants, in: Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological Society 76 (1971), 1-20, pp. 4-7 (which discusses families like the Jephsons and the Percivals). See, too, the discussion of the "Irish" bloc in the Long Parliament by J. R. MACCORMACK, Irish adventurers and the English civil war, in: Irish Historical Studies 10 (1956), pp. 21-58.

[10] See especially the discussion in B. GALLOWAY, The Union of England and Scotland, 1603-1608, Edinburgh 1986, pp. 15 f, 20, 33 f, 48, 163-166.

[11] Ibid., pp. 93-130.

and even Union of Arms schemes. And yet the patterning of reformation in Britain does nurture separate if not separatist cultural identities. However much there was a triumph of the English language, English social institutions, political and administrative structures throughout the British Isles in this period, the development of Counter-Reformation theology in Ireland and of Genevan Covenant theology in Scotland limited the achievement of a British identity in ways not parallelled in the new monarchies on the Continent.[12]

II

And yet, and yet: there are several major problems with this approach. It suggests that British History is what the English do to the outlying parts of the archipelago. Any attempt to show how the Scots and Irish changed English culture or institutions would be brief indeed (at least for this period).[13] It would have to discuss the ambivalent relationship between the Covenanters and the English Puritans; the extent to which Irish Catholicism shaped English antipopery as a dominant political force; and perhaps the creation of a British court culture. But it would not suggest that regional cultures were being homogenized in the way that the pre-conquest ones were homogenized in the 200 years after 1066 into an English culture.

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[12] For Scotland, see M. STEELE, The theological background to the national covenant, in: MORRILL, Covenant (above n. 8), pp. 31-67; for Ireland, New History of Ireland, III (above n. 2), chs. 4, 7; C. LENNON, The Counter Reformation in Ireland 1542-1641, in: C. BRADY, R. GILLESPIE (eds.), Natives and Newcomers, Dublin 1986, pp. 75-92.

[13] The consequences of a measure of the integration of the kingdoms set in train by the events of the seventeenth century can be found more clearly in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the Scots were a dominant presence amongst colonial soldiers and statesmen; with the Scottish Enlightenment seeping south; and with Irish Catholicism helping to shape the English Catholic *risorgimento*.

Furthermore, should we not still be talking about three separate histories colliding and intertwined but ultimately separate in the way that the histories of Cornwall, Lancashire and East Anglia are not separate histories but aspects of a single history? The English shires for all their self-consciousness as ancient entities with their own particular customs and individual adaptations of institutional forms, jury systems/arrangements for quarter sessions etc.[14] were united by common dynastic, institutional and religious structures, just as such structures divided the three kingdoms. The central problem was the classic problem of early modern Europe, the problem of multiple kingdoms: of a union of crowns but not of political systems, let alone political cultures.[15] The twin themes of seventeenth-century British History like the twin themes of Spanish or French history are the drive for political integration and more-or-less deliberate processes of acculturation. Thus England, Ireland and (until 1707) Scotland retained independent parliaments, and semi-independent administrative and executive systems. But while the social systems (patterns of landownership, transmission of property rights etc.) were increasingly assimilated to the English one, and while Anglicization was increasingly the price that native élites had to pay to enjoy political power in Scotland and Ireland, there remain significant differences in the political cultures of the metropolitan and outlying kingdoms. The Anglo-Scottish union of 1603 was the product not of conquest but of dynastic roulette and it brought the Scottish Stewart line to the throne of England. The minnow sought to swallow the whale. The development of English power in Ireland was the consequence of an undeclared war of conquest and it was a partly-disguised process of internal colonization from England and from Scotland, which allowed a variety of constitutional theories to flourish and wilt alongside one another: that Ireland was a free nation occupied by a

[14] See MORRILL, English Revolution (above n. 7), ch. 8.

[15] For a recent collection that looks at this from a European perspective, see M. GREENGRASS (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence. The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe, London 1991, chs. 6 and 7 of which deal with Ireland and Scotland.

foreign force which should be restored to the Irish people; that the Kingdom of Ireland was part of the English Empire and that all its inhabitants enjoyed the same rights and privileges as the English did (*civis Britannicus sum*); that the Irish were a conquered people who possessed only such rights as their conquerors chose to confer on them.[16]

With such conflicting constitutional theories around, it is not surprising that constitutional practice was profoundly muddled. It has been pointed out, for example, that although many theorists (Patrick Darcy in the 1640s and William Molyneux in the 1690s being the best known and most vigorous) asserted that the English Parliament had no authority in Ireland and that only Irish statutes were cognizable there, in fact the English Parliament legislated for Ireland on at least 36 occasions in the years 1532-1640.[17] Furthermore, there was considerable confusion about the precise meaning of Poyning's Law, which ensured that the King retained control of legislation introduced into the Irish Parliament. When the Earl of Leicester (upon his appointment as Lord Lieutenant in 1641) wrote a memorial to himself on Poyning's Law, he failed to notice the changes in that 1494 law introduced by an amending statute of 1557.[18] The other complicating factor was religion. The state churches in England, Scotland and Ireland were Protestant and the Church of

[16] See S. ELLIS, Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community and the Conflict of Cultures 1470-1604, London 1985, esp. pp. 151-182; M. PERCEVAL-MAXWELL, Ireland and the monarchy in the early Stuart multiple kingdoms, in: Historical Journal 34 (1991), pp. 283-287; C. BRADY, The decline of the Irish kingdom, in: GREENGRASS, Conquest, pp. 96-101; IDEM, Court, castle and country: the framework of government in Tudor Ireland, in: BRADY, GILLESPIE, Natives (above n. 12), pp. 22-49; A. CLARKE, The Old English in Ireland, London 1966, p. 146.

[17] A. G. DONALDSON, The Application in Ireland of English and British Legislation made before 1801, unpublished Ph.D. thesis Queen's University Belfast 1952. I am grateful to Alan Ford for this reference.

[18] PERCEVAL-MAXWELL, Ireland and the monarchy (above n. 16), pp. 280 f, 284. The 1557 Act excluded the English Privy Council from any formal part in the approval of Irish Acts.

Ireland was very much a rib out of the side of the Church of England,[19] while the Church of Scotland was deeply affected by its leaders' exile in England under Edward VI and with the English in Germany and Switzerland in the later 1550s. It was under constant pressure from 1603 if not earlier to assimilate itself more nearly to the government and liturgy if not to the jurisdiction of the Church of England.[20] In Ireland a majority of the population, by far the greater part of the communities settled there before 1560, rejected Protestantism and the state church by no later than 1625, leaving the Church of Ireland as essentially a church of new settlers, whose own beleagueredness and isolation shaped that church away from the ethos of its parent church.[21] In Scotland crucial aspects of the way the later sixteenth-century Kirk had adjusted to Scottish conditions - especially the strong parochial structures and discipline - inoculated those below the élite against Anglicization.[22]

[19] The English Act of Supremacy of 1559 was re-enacted exactly by the Irish Parliament of 1560; and the Act of Uniformity was re-enacted with just a few (though significant) variants. The best discussion is in H. JEFFERIES, The Irish Parliament of 1560. The Anglican reforms authorised, in: Journal of Ecclesiastical History 26 (1988), pp. 128-141.

[20] C. RUSSELL, The Causes of the English Civil War, Oxford 1990, pp. 26-57, 109-130; G. DONALDSON, The Scottish Reformation, Cambridge 1960, esp. chs. 3, 7, 9.

[21] A. FORD, The Protestant Reformation in Ireland, in: BRADY, GILLESPIE, Natives (above n. 12), pp. 50-74. I have also benefited from reading an as yet unpublished paper by A. FORD, Dependent or Independent? The Church of Ireland and the Church of England 1536-1666.

[22] J. KIRK, Patterns of Reform, Edinburgh 1989, chs. 6, 9.

III

Let us finally come down to the events of the mid-seventeenth-century Revolution. Does a closer analysis help us to sort out an answer to the question "Three Nations - a Common History?" English historians have long accepted that there were crucial connections between the Scots revolt of 1638-1641 and the Irish rebellion of 1641 - and the outbreak of the Civil War, but they tended to see these as exogenous factors, *dei ex machina*, which had effects on the course and outcome of the English Civil War, rather than as part of a single conflict, or as evidence that the unit of study ought to be the British Isles. This is even true of Conrad Russell, who has called English historians back to a proper understanding of what he has termed "a crisis of multiple kingship, the billiard-ball effect of each of the kingdoms on the affairs of the others".[23] Russell's recent work has certainly helped enormously to elucidate that effect. For example, he has traced in detail how a Scots presence in the north of England in the twelve months after the battle of Newburn which dictated that Charles should call an English Parliament, made possible the development of parliamentary share in executive power (by deliberately prolonging the treaty for the sake of their English friends) which helped to make it the Long Parliament.[24] He has recently gone so far as to assert that the demilitarized English élite "needed the Scots to take the place of the medieval barons' affinities".[25] He has shown how important Scots commissioners were to the energizing of religious issues in 1641 (and more generally the close and secret co-operation between alienated groups in

[23] RUSSELL, Causes (above n. 20); IDEM, The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642, Oxford 1991; IDEM, Unrevolutionary England, London 1991, chs. 13, 15.

[24] IDEM, Unrevolutionary England, p. 242.

[25] IDEM, The Scottish Party in the English Parliaments or the Myth of the English Revolution, Inaugural Lecture at King's College, London, 29 Jan. 1991, p. 12.

England and Scotland from no later than 1638).[26] He has shown the importance of constitutional copy-catting - citing the instances of the Irish Queries as a copying of the English Petition of Right; of the Impeachments modelled on the English ones; of the Triennial Acts of Scotland and England and the conciliar aspects of the English reform programme of 1641-1642 and the Scottish reforms of 1640-1641.[27] He has shown how the Irish Rebellion was closely connected to the constitutional usurpations of the English Parliament of the sovereignty of the Irish Parliament and how the Irish Rebellion turned a chronic condition in the English body politic into an acute one.[28] The more Russell has studied the problem the more convinced he has become (and the more convincing) that it is impossible to study what is happening in any of the kingdoms without recognizing the effects on the others, effects which in due season became the source of changes producing their own effects in all three kingdoms.

Yet, even Russell fails to solve our conundrum. There is a tension between the titles of Russell's two recent books: *The Causes of the English Civil War*; *The Fall of the British Monarchies*. In fact, in both cases his concern is to explain the course of English history. Russell argues that to understand what happens in England in 1642 we need to see what happened first in Scotland and Ireland, so that we can see how that allows us to understand English history. Thus we do not hear about the non-religious background to the Scottish revolt. We are not invited to consider the causes of the 1638 rebellion. Neither book discusses or evaluates the Act of Revocation or the reorganization of Scottish government, for example. The Fall of the Irish Monarchy in 1641 is treated as even more of a *diabolus ex machina*, a bolt out of the blue that matters because it destroyed lingering hopes of a settlement in England. Even though Strafford's fall on charges connected with

[26] IDEM, Fall (above n. 23), esp. pp. 98-100, 165 f, 304 f.
[27] IDEM, Unrevolutionary England (above n. 23), pp. 242 f.
[28] Ibid., pp. 263-279.

Ireland revealed a reconfiguration of Irish politics as a result of his adamantine authoritarianism in Ireland, there is no analysis of events in Ireland in *The Fall of the British Monarchies* until we reach page 373.

This matters. Russell is interested in explaining England's collapse into civil war. He says that it could not have happened (at least as it did) without the prior collapse of royal authority in Scotland and Ireland. He offers three main reasons for this. Firstly, he suggests that whatever the financial and military frailties of the English state, the élite was sufficiently in control and the vested interest of the élite too tied into the existing structures for any successful rebellion to be feasible. There may have been combustible material around, but spontaneous combustion was impossible. Secondly, the violence in Scotland created conditions for the recall of the English Parliament in circumstances in which uniquely the King lost the initiative; and the violence in Ireland created an issue (control of the army of reconquest) that forced a politically divided élite to arms. Thirdly, the Scottish Rebellion caused leading members of the English political élite to commit treason. Ever thereafter they were compelled by fear for their own survival to make demands of the King which he simply could not be expected to concede.

All this is true. But why did Scotland and Ireland rebel? Here Russell is in difficulties. For by not examining the causes of those rebellions he leaves open the possibility that there are common causes of all three rebellions. The causes of the events may have been local and specific. But it is equally possible that they were interconnected. Russell's billiard-ball effect requires an equal and equally full analysis of the preconditions of the collapse of the Scottish, Irish and English monarchies. What we are offered in these books is not a holistic approach to British History but an enriched English history. What we do not get, and yet what the logic of Russell's argument and the detail of his researches demand, is a study of *The Causes of the British Civil War*(s). We need to know the causes of the events that led to a British civil

war rather than an account of how events in two became causes of the event in a third kingdom.[29]

IV

I am, then, on balance prepared to argue for the crisis of the 1640s as a single crisis, not just as a series of interlocking crises but as necessarily interdependent in just the same way (no more as well as no less) as the crises in Catalonia, Sicily, Naples and Portugal were part of a single Spanish Imperial crisis. If only James VI and I had followed up his own musings of 1604 and taken the title Emperor of Britain, how much easier might all this have been!

The most important reason for persisting in this approach is that certain individuals and groups clearly considered that there was one conflict, and responded with a strategic plan that was pan-British. Most obviously this is true of King Charles I. From the moment that the Scots resisted his authoritarian policies, Charles saw the implications for the whole of Britain. And he strove to mobilize the resources of Britain to deal with Scottish rebels as easily and unselfconsciously as the Tudors raised the resources of England to deal with rebels in the Western, the Eastern or the Northern Counties.[30]

From the very beginning of the Scottish crisis, Charles was convinced that the rebels intended to overthrow the Scottish Bishops, and he was convinced that this would undermine their standing in England and in Ireland. This would be fatal to royal authority in matters of religion and in the Parliaments,

[29] These comments on the views of Conrad Russell are drawn from my lengthy review of his three recent books which appears in full in: MORRILL, English Revolution (above n. 7), pp. 252-271.

[30] Ibid., pp. 91-117.

where the bishops represented a powerful bloc vote. The defeat of the Covenanters was seen as essential for the maintenance of royal authority throughout the British Isles. None of his obsessions was to prove so self-fulfilling. From the beginning, therefore, Charles determined to bring the military resources of all three kingdoms to bear on the Scots. It just did not occur to him that this was inappropriate. It was a policy he was vigorously to pursue in 1639, 1640, 1641, 1643, 1645 and 1647-1648. From the moment at which his authority was challenged in England he worked tirelessly to bring in Scottish troops and Irish troops - and he did not care whether they were Old English Protestant or Irish Confederacy troops - into the English arena. His strategic planning always involved having troops from each of his kingdoms in the others.[31] This culminated in another three-kingdom rebellion against the Long Parliament and its army in 1648.

Two of Charles's closest advisers further represent this unitary approach to the wars. Randall Macdonnell, second Earl of Antrim was a Catholic, a courtier married to the widow of Charles's beloved and assassinated privado, the Duke of Buckingham, the greatest landowner in the north of Ireland (with an estate of 15,000 hectares), and the heir to the ancient but suppressed Lordship of the Isles, for example, leadership of all the clans of the western Highlands and islands, a suzerainty straddling the Irish Sea. Antrim's ambitions involved the restoration of his lands and titles in Scotland and therefore the destruction of his supplanters, the clan Campbell, whose leader, the Marquis of Argyll, was the dominant figure in the Covenanting movement from 1638 on. It is easy to dismiss him as a man consumed with an unreasoning desire to reclaim his patrimony. In fact as Jane Ohlmeyer has recently shown, he was an ambitious and sophisticated statesman trapped between a Gaelic past and anglified future. His Ulster home, Dunluce Castle,

[31] This is a subject well dealt with by RUSSELL, Fall (above n. 23); P. DONALD, An Uncounselled King. Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637-1641, Cambridge 1990; M. MENDLE, Dangerous Positions, Tuscaloosa (Alab.) 1985, pp. 114-170.

was lavishly furnished with the latest tapestries characteristic of southern-English taste, while he and his household sat around on silken upholstered chairs as Gaelic bards and harpists entertained him, and while he was served at table by a retinue wearing traditional Irish garb. On no less than eight occasions between 1638 and 1648 Antrim put forward proposals for a pan-British military effort to restore the King's fortunes. On every occasion the despatch of his Ulster kinsmen to recapture the forfeited Macdonald lands in Kintyre and Jura was a central feature, and the only part of any of the plans effectively realized was just such an expeditionary force. But before and after he joined the Irish Confederacy in the autumn of 1643 his plans always involved schemes for the liberation of Ireland and Scotland as the prelude to a pan-Gaelic assault on Southern England. Antrim's travels between Ireland and the royal court, and between Britain and the Continent had, as their dominant purpose, the realization of a royal victory not in three distinct wars but in the various theatres of a single war.[32]

A final example must be James, third Marquis of Hamilton and second Earl of Cambridge. An example *par excellence* of a Scots nobleman whose lands lay in Scotland and offices in England, a man whose base of operations was as Gentleman of the Bedchamber and Master of Horse to Charles I and who would have shared the sentiment of those Whitehall-based Scots who (caught between the Covenanters who controlled their estates and the king who controlled their offices) petitioned Charles as his "British subjects".[33] The Covenanting minister Robert Baillie described him "a great lover both of the King and the country" and, Keith Brown has written, it was his misfortune to

[32] J. OHLMEYER, A Seventeenth-Century Survivor. The Political Career of Randall Macdonnell, First Marquis and Second Earl of Antrim, Ph.D. thesis Trinity College Dublin 1990. This will be published as a book by Cambridge University Press in early 1993.

[33] E. J. COWAN, The union of the crowns and the crisis of the constitution in 17th-century Scotland, in: S. DYRVIK et al. (eds.), The Satellite State in the 17th and 18th Centuries, Oslo 1980, 121-140, p. 131.

lose the trust of both.[34] But the point is that, after early indiscretions in seeking to unleash Antrim's Catholic Irish on Scotland in 1639, he worked tirelessly for a constitutional-royalist settlement throughout the British Isles, losing the trust of the King for his secret negotiations with the more moderate Covenanters and of the Covenanters for his secret negotiations with restraining voices around the Court. An architect of the Engagement of 1648, a truly pan-British document, by which the Scots agreed to send an army to join English and Irish troops to restore Charles to his authority in England and Ireland, General of the army crushed by Cromwell at the battle of Preston, it is symbolic that Hamilton should be executed in England under his English title as Earl of Cambridge.[35]

For all these men there was but one conflict and they always thought about it in three-dimensional terms. Whatever problem they had to solve, or whatever setback they experienced, they naturally and unselfconsciously thought about the implications for all three kingdoms. They did not envisage a post-war world in which there would be unitary institutions, but they assumed that no settlement was possible in one kingdom without their being a settlement in all three.

In many ways the leaders of the Covenanting movement in Scotland went further than this. From not later than the winter of 1639-1640 they were fighting not simply or principally to nurture Scottish liberties under a Scottish King, but for a federal union of the three kingdoms and three churches. They had recognized that there would be no protection for Scotland against a King willing to mobilize the resources of the three kingdoms unless he was equally constrained in all kingdoms. Having in 1639-1640 inflicted the first important Scots defeat on an English army for over 300 years, they made a common

[34] BROWN, Kingdom or Province (above n. 8), pp. 116, 123.

[35] Hamilton's career down to 1641 is the subject of an almost completed Ph.D. thesis Cambridge, by J. SCALLY, The early career of James, 3rd Marquis and 1st Duke of Hamilton. I have profited greatly from reading John Scally's work and discussing Anglo-Scottish relations in this period with him.

form of church government and confession of faith, along with political structures designed to co-ordinate policy-making and legislation in the two kingdoms, a prime objective of the subsequent peace negotiations. They also assumed that the Irish Church would be reformed along identical lines and that the Scots would be accorded an active role in the affairs of Ireland. As we will see, they were continually rebuffed by the English Parliament, but they were ever more determined that there could be no settlement other than a British one. It was this which brought the Covenanters into the war in Ireland in 1642 and in England in 1643. The Solemn League and Covenant is an agreement covering all three kingdoms and requiring changes in the government and religion of all three. The outcome the Scots sought was a federal union with separate political, legal and ecclesiastical institutions in each but a high degree of congruity and co-operation between them. This is most dramatically illustrated by the Westminster Assembly, the meeting of English and Scots ministers and lay assessors which met to design a system of church government and discipline, confession of faith, catechism and service book which would be introduced into the independent churches of England, Scotland and Ireland. The Scots were massively outnumbered at that assembly, but bound themselves to accept its decisions, although it would involve changes in the Kirk. Hence their rage when the English Parliament chopped and changed what had been agreed in the assembly without any reference to them.[36]

The disillusionment of the Covenanting leadership with the English was concerned with a whole range of British issues: the dishonouring of

[36] This paragraph is based on a great deal of reading in primary and secondary sources. Amongst the most accessible of the latter are D. STEVENSON, The Scottish Revolution, Newton Abbott 1973; and IDEM, Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates, Belfast 1980; and the essays by D. STEVENSON and by E. COWAN in: R. A. MASON (ed.), Scotland and England 1286-1815, Edinburgh 1986.

agreements to provide for the Scottish army in Ireland;[37] the establishing of a new Lord Lieutenant to undertake an English reconquest of Ireland in defiance of promises that it would be a British undertaking;[38] the standing down of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, the only co-ordinating body created in the war years;[39] and the continuing indifference of the English to Scots demands for the appointment of *conservatores pacis* or other joint commissions of parliamentary commissioners and councillors from the two kingdoms.[40] No wonder many lukewarm supporters of the Solemn League transferred their hopes for a federal unionist future from an alliance with the Long Parliament to an alliance with a hopefully chastened and wiser King.[41]

Nothing illustrates more dramatically the unswerving commitment of the Covenanting leadership to federal unionism, to a single historical destiny, than their response to the trial and execution of Charles I. On the very day that news of the regicide reached Scotland, Charles II was proclaimed King of Great Britain and Ireland in Edinburgh, and less than two years later he swore, again as King of Great Britain and Ireland, to introduce the Covenants into all his kingdoms.[42] If the Scots had proclaimed Charles as King of Scotland but not of England and Ireland, the chances are they would have

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[37] D. STEVENSON, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Scotland 1644-1651, London 1977, chs. 1-3; IDEM, Financing the cause of the Covenant, 1637-1651, in: Scottish Historical Review 51 (1952), pp. 89-123.

[38] Journal of the House of Lords, 1578-1714, 18 vols., London 1767, VIII, p. 127.

[39] M. A. KISHLANSKY, The Rise of the New Model Army, Cambridge 1979, pp. 164-167.

[40] DONALD, Uncounselled King (above n. 31), pp. 273-306.

[41] Anglo-Scottish relations in the later 1640s need a complete new study. In the meantime the relevant chapters in S. R. GARDINER, History of the Great Civil War 1642-49, 4 vols., 2nd edn. London 1893, III and IV, and STEVENSON, Counter-Revolution (above n. 37), remain valuable.

[42] The Forme and Coronation of Charles II, Aberdeen 1651 - most accessible in a generally reliable transcript in: J. KERR, Covenants and Covenanters, Edinburgh 1895, pp. 386-389.

been left alone by the English Parliament and army. It was because they saw no historical security or destiny for themselves outside a union that the Scots proclaimed Charles King of Britain and mobilized themselves once more for a third and fateful British civil war.

V

The situation in Ireland is more complex, both in the sense that political fragmentation was more complete, with deep divisions within as well as between the various political cultures, and in the sense that the aspirations of all groups are less elemental than those of the Covenanters in Scotland.[43] What can be said is that even in the extremities of 1648-1650, Irish separatism fails to emerge.[44] In the 1680s one finds in Ireland those Catholic nationalists willing to contemplate a severance of the links with the Crown of England and the development of an independent Irish Commonwealth, perhaps under the protectorship of the King of France (in the 1640s it would have been the King of Spain).[45] The model would have been the fledgling Dutch Republic under the Pacification of Ghent of 1576, where

[43] What follows is based largely on the following: New History of Ireland, III (above n. 2), chs. X-XIV, and works cited there; and STEVENSON, Scottish Covenanters (above n. 36).

[44] I base this on my own reading of the two principal collections of papers relating to the Confederacy of Kilkenny: SIR JOHN GILBERT, History of the Irish Confederation and the War in Ireland 1641-1649, 7 vols., Dublin 1882-1891 (see for example, II, pp. 80, 210-212, III, pp. 190-194, 263 f, 336-339); and Commentarius Rinuccinianus de sedis apostolicae legatione ad foederatos Hiberniae catholicos, 6 vols., Dublin 1932-1949 (see, for example, I, pp. 314-319, II, pp. 510-518. I am also grateful to P. O'hAnnrachain of University College Dublin for his knowledgeable confirmation of this view).

[45] J. MILLER, The Earl of Tyrconnel and James II's Irish policy 1685-1688, in: Historical Journal 20 (1977), pp. 821-823.

the seventeen provinces threw over Spanish sovereignty and sought the protection of England or Austria. But in fact Irish separatism was almost as rare as Cornish or Yorkshire separatism.[46]

The failure of any group to promote such a solution in the 1640s is a deafening silence indeed. Instead all groups sought to redefine their relationship to the Crown. Most Confederates wished to emphasize the autonomy and sovereignty of the Irish Crown, to end the dependency upon the English Council, to exclude the claims of the English Parliament to legislate for, let alone exercise jurisdiction over the affairs of Ireland, and to guarantee that autonomy by constitutional changes which mirrored (or echoed) those measures which had - by the reforms enshrined in the 1641 Treaty of London - secured effective autonomy for the Scottish élite and Scottish indigenous institutions. Confederate leaders were not divided over the sort of Irish constitutional settlement they wanted; and they had little interest in the sort of federal union schemes that the Scots saw as essential to a new stability.[47] None were so sanguine as to see the establishment as Catholicism in all three kingdoms as a precondition for its survival in one. But Confederate leaders were divided about how far they could and should join Charles I in a three-kingdom war to secure his outright military victory

[46] J. C. BECKETT, The Confederation of Kilkenny reviewed, in: M. ROBERTS (ed.), Historical Studies. Papers read before The Irish Conference of Historians, II, Belfast 1959, pp. 29-41, remains a marvellously clear and decisive assessment of the agreement on ends and disagreements on means amongst the Confederates. It is best supplemented by J. LOWE, Charles I and the confederation of Kilkenny, in: Irish Historical Studies 14 (1964), pp. 1-19; J. I. CASWAY, Owen Roe O'Neill and the struggle for Catholic Ireland, Philadelphia 1984, esp. pp. 84-101; OHLMEYER, Randall Macdonnell (above n. 32), chs. 3-5.

[47] For the details of the deal struck between the Earl of Glamorgan and a majority of the Confederates that guaranteed an Ireland run by and for the Catholic Irish in the same way as the Treaty of London guaranteed a Scotland run by and for the Protestant Scots, see J. LOWE, The Glamorgan mission to Ireland 1645-6, in: Studia Hibernica (1964), pp. 155-194. The difference was precisely that the Confederates did not believe that the security of such a deal required a federal union of the English and Irish Crowns.

which one group - made up mainly but not exclusively of Old English Catholics - saw as the key to a new stability in Ireland.

The main divisions amongst the Irish Confederates concerned some purely Irish issues, the most important of which (which split the Old English from the Gaelic Irish) was the issue of the restoration of Church lands.[48] But the other issue was the British one. The clerical party around Rinuccini saw no reason to help Charles win his war in England. Their task was to use his weakness in England to secure maximum concessions in Ireland. Others saw this as shortsighted: reaching a winning compromise on Irish issues and helping him win in England were seen as the best guarantees of Irish liberties: Rinuccini's policy risked demanding more than he would ever honour and risked costing him the English war with the very consequences which were to ensue. Both sides remained committed to the very solemn Confederate oath to uphold the Crown. At most the Old English were (in the words of the confederate motto) *pro deo, pro rege, pro patria* and the clerical party *pro deo, pro patria, pro rege*.[49]

The Old English Protestants and the rainbow coalitions of groups that Ormond gathered together were perhaps closest to the Scots in seeing a post-war settlement in terms of a new harmony of interests between the kingdoms, though I have to say that I do not think we are yet in a position to assess precisely what Ormond had in mind. For example, Lord Inchiquin, who appeared to change sides at least four times in the 1640s, is best seen rather as a man whose preoccupations were with the defeat of Catholicism and with the rights of self-determination of those already settled in Munster.

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[48] Well rehearsed by BECKETT, Confederation (above n. 46), pp. 36-38. BECKETT is at pains to show how the Confederates sought to prevent divisions along the lines of Old English/Irish, but he shows how these proved to be in vain.

[49] For some key documents on this theme, see Calendar of State Papers Ireland, 1603-1670, 13 vols., ed. C. W. RUSSELL et al., London 1870-1910, vol. 1633-1647, p. 336; GILBERT, Confederation (above n. 44), II, pp. 24-28, 34-41, 71-84, 210-212; Commentarius Rinuccinianus (above n. 44), pp. 728-732.

This made him relatively indifferent as to which English Protestants he could enlist as the agents of that victory; but also as someone determined to keep out an interloping Lord Lieutenant (Lord Lisle, 1646-1647) who sought to take over in the name of families like the Boyles, Percivals and Jephsons whose landed interests straddled the Irish Sea.[50] On the other hand, Ormond appears to develop a more straightforwardly pan-British stance - as we have seen the Engagement of January 1648 was a strategy involving Hamilton and a group of repentant Scottish nobles, Ormond and his allies in Ireland and Charles and key members of the former Essex group in England. The document lays out a pan-British strategy for re-establishing royal authority in all three kingdoms, and a federated structure in Great Britain once the war was over. But no provision was made for the constitutional arrangements that would define the relations with England. If Ormond thought he had an understanding on that score, I do not know what it was.[51]

The New English were divided, too. There were certainly those who had welcomed (and had indeed commanded) the direct intervention of the Long Parliament in the internal affairs of Ireland back in 1641 (most obviously in having Strafford impeached in an English Parliament for treasons against the Crown of Ireland). By the later 1640s they were the group who welcomed Viscount Lisle as Parliament's Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, with a brief to crush the Confederates and reward the English Adventurers. The implications of this for the separate or co-ordinate constitutional development of Ireland were sufficiently disturbing for many leading members of the Protestant communities in Ireland (headed by those around the Irish Protestant Lord Inchiquin in Munster), for fighting to break out between rival groups within the former pro-parliamentary groups. With Inchiquin, perhaps more than with any other group in Ireland in the 1640s, we find a group that tries to hold the

[50] MURPHY, Munster Protestants (above n. 9), pp. 7-19.

[51] I am not saying that no-one has explored this question; just that this is an area I have not researched deeply, and at this stage, in this workshop paper, I cannot comment further.

Britishness of the crisis at bay; to talk about the distinctness of the Irish monarchy and a longing to solve Ireland's problems without reference to events across the water.[52]

None the less, I have already implied that there were those at the time who were single-minded in seeing the affairs of Scotland as at best a noisome intrusion into English affairs, to be pushed out of sight and as far as possible out of mind. I am referring to the very army leaders and Long Parliament leaders whose Little-Englander attitudes drove the Covenanters to distraction. The hallmarks of men like Viscount Saye and the Earl of Northumberland in the Lords and Pym and later St. John and Cromwell in the Commons was a desire to use Scots military muscle to defeat the King of England, but not to honour any political (let alone religious) agreements with them that created any kind of federal union; and a refusal to find out about the complexities of Irish political culture. Ireland was to be conquered and raped, and a policy of religious apartheid developed to justify the mass expropriation of the native peoples.[53] To complete the picture they were determined to deny the rights of the Scots to any involvement in the government of post-conquest Ireland.

Their view was certainly not a holistic one. In 1640, these men were willing to barter with Charles: he could have the funds to raise a major royal army against the Covenanters if they could have grievances settled. In 1641, they were grateful to the Scots for ensuring a Long Parliament but they stalled every attempt to negotiate clause 8 of the Treaty of London which would

[52] MURPHY, Munster Protestants (above n. 9), pp. 9-20.

[53] The spokesman for this party was very much SIR JOHN TEMPLE, whose *The Irish Rebellion*, London 1646, needs much more attention than it has hitherto received. Other spokesmen for the view that the barbarism of the Irish permitted a wholesale expropriation include H. PARKER (The Irish Massacre, London 1649) and J. MILTON (Observations upon the Articles of Peace with the Irish Rebels, London 1649, repr. in Complete Prose Works of John Milton, 8 vols., III, New Haven (Conn.) 1967, pp. 259-334). For an interpretation of Protestant attitudes that puts more stress on religious factors, see T. C. BARNARD, Crises of identity amongst Irish Protestants, in: Past and Present 127 (1990), pp. 39-83.

have redefined the relationship of the kingdoms.[54] It set the pattern for the years that followed. The terms of the Solemn League and Covenant were only taken seriously by the English so far as they advanced military victory and as soon as that was accomplished the Parliament did two things which showed its true feelings: it stood down the Committee of Both Kingdoms and it appointed a new Lord Lieutenant for Ireland with a remit that excluded the Scots.

Perhaps even more telling, however, was what happened when such actions and the emasculation of the accords of the Westminster Assembly and the proclamation of a measure of religious liberty drove the Scots into an alliance with Charles I. For once Cromwell and the New Model had defeated the Scots, they showed little interest in conquering Scotland or in incorporating it into a British state. They delightedly withdrew as soon as Argyll and his faction staged a coup in Edinburgh: "A lesser party of a Parliament hath made it lawful to declare the greater part a faction," he cried (and, foretelling Pride's Purge, "think of the examples and consequences").[55] Now "I do think the affairs of Scotland are in a thriving condition as to the interest of honest men".[56] Although "our brothers in Scotland," he reported, "were our greatest enemies, God has justified us in their sight; caused us to requite good for evil, casing them to acknowledge it publicly by acts of state, and privately". Conquest, he continued, "was not unfeasible, but I think not Christian".[57] As David Stevenson put it, "by requiting evil with good, Cromwell hoped he had put the Scots under the unbreakable moral obligation

[54] The fullest account of these proceedings is in DONALD, Uncounselled King (above n. 31), pp. 273-306. The analysis by SCALLY in: 3rd Marquis of Hamilton (above n. 35), is also important.

[55] W. C. ABBOTT (ed.), Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, 4 vols., Oxford 1937-1948, I, p. 678.

[56] Ibid., p. 669.

[57] Ibid., pp. 677 f.

to live in friendship with England".[58] The English had no interest in Scotland so long as it posed no threat to England. When they executed Charles I (Charles I of Scotland remember), they abolished monarchy in England and Ireland but were silent about Scotland. As far as they were concerned the union of the crowns had been severed and Scotland was free to go along its own line as a free independent state. As Portugal had been united to Spain in 1580 and resumed its own separate historical path in 1640, so Scotland was now free to go its own way.

The Little Englander politicians and generals who executed Charles were thus stunned and disoriented when the Scottish executive (on 5 February 1649, the very day that news reached Edinburgh) proclaimed Charles II as "King of Great Britain, France and Ireland", and when the Scots went on in due course to crown Charles at Scone with a solemn oath to give his assent to acts to be passed "enjoining [the Covenants] in my other dominions". Only this forced the English into reluctant conquest and incorporative union with its northern Protestant neighbour.[59] What is amazing is the lack of intellectual fervour, enthusiasm, curiosity about the process of absorption, and the indifference in England to sustaining it beyond 1660. The British unions of the 1650s involved the English in a sort of shotgun bigamy.

[58] D. STEVENSON, Cromwell, Scotland and Ireland, in: J. MORRILL (ed.), Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution, Harlow 1990, 149-180, p. 154.

[59] MORRILL, English Revolution (above n. 7), pp. 116 f. Note that he was proclaimed and crowned as King of Great Britain not as King of Scotland and England (and cf. how, even after the incorporating union of 1652-1654, the official title of the new state is the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, Ireland).

VI

At first sight the 1650s are uniquely a period when the assertion of Britishness is essential to an understanding of the historical process. For the only time before 1801 there was a single legislature for the whole of the British archipelago, and a greater degree of administrative and judicial centralization. The general elections of 1654, 1656 and 1659 saw the return of 30 MPs for Scotland and Ireland; there was a single Council of State/Privy Council based in Whitehall with counsellors or commissioners in Edinburgh and Dublin whose independence resembled that of the pre-war Councils in the North and in the Marches of Wales far more than it resembled that of the pre-war royal Councils on Scotland and Ireland.[60] The degree of military integration under the Lord General Cromwell was also greater than at any other period. Certainly it is not possible to write Scottish or Irish history at this time except in a British context: of unprecedented English intervention, control and acculturation. Land transfers in Ireland reduced the landholding of the native and ancient settler communities from more than two-thirds of the total area of Ireland to barely one fifth, and the arrival of new absentee and settler English Protestant landowners set the pattern for the establishment of the Ascendancy that was to shape the political and cultural identity of Ireland for the next 250 years.[61] Although there was no English colonization of Scotland in the 1650s, there was a systematic attempt to change the social basis of power away from the established nobility with the creation of a

[60] For Scotland, see F. D. DOW, Cromwellian Scotland, Edinburgh 1979, pp. 162-194 (for the full text of the instructions under which the Scottish Council operated, see Calendar of State Papers Domestic, 1655, pp. 108-110, 255 f); and for Ireland, T. BARNARD, Cromwellian Ireland, Oxford 1975, pp. 16-26.

[61] New History of Ireland, III (above n. 2); R. GILLESPIE, Landed society and the interregnum in Scotland and Ireland, and D. STEVENSON, The effects of revolution and conquest on Scotland, both in: R. MITCHISON, P. ROEBUCK (eds.), Economy and Society in Scotland and Ireland 1500-1939, Edinburgh 1988, pp. 38-57.

strong autonomous class of small proprietors who were responsive to the Anglicization of Scottish law and government. Furthermore, the commissioners for the administration of justice in Scotland were to be predominantly English and their task was to impose English civil law on the Scots and assimilate Scottish criminal law to English process and substance.[62]

And yet even in the 1650s the situation is not straightforward. Viewed from an English perspective there was considerable lack of enthusiasm for and interest in the union of the three ex-kingdoms.[63]

No-one came up with a new name for the new polity: the Instrument of Government provides a paper constitution for "the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland"; and neither the constitutional bill of the First Protectorate nor the Humble Petition and Advice modified that style.[64] The union of parliaments was a legal fiction, the electoral provision for Scotland and Ireland being principally intended to ensure the return of representatives

[62] DOW, Cromwellian Scotland (above n. 60), see index, sub Administration of Justice; L. M. SMITH, Sackcloth for the sinner and punishment for the crime? Church and secular courts in Cromwellian Scotland, in: J. DWYER et al. (eds.), New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland, Edinburgh n.d., pp. 116-132.

[63] My thinking on this issue has been much stimulated by a chance to read D. HIRST's unpublished paper Experiencing Britain. English Responses to Union, 1649-1660, and to discussing it with him.

[64] S. R. GARDINER (ed.), Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 3rd edn. Oxford 1902, pp. 405, 427, 447. Note that Wales had now been constitutionally subsumed; and note the disappearance of the term Britain or Great Britain for England and Scotland, favoured as it had been by James VI/I, Charles I and the Covenanters. It is perhaps also worth noting that while Harrington's *Oceana* attempts to provide a model society for the whole of British Isles, it remains in three separate states (Oceana = England; Marpesia = Scotland, Panopea = Ireland) with no common name; Marpesia was to be an "inexhaustible magazeen of auxiliaries" for Oceana's armies, and Panopea the dumping ground for its surplus population, but they were not just provinces of a single polity, but rather semi-autonomous colonial dependencies (The Political Works of James Harrington, ed. J. G. A. POCOCK, Cambridge 1977, pp. 71, 159, 257, 315).

of the garrisons and of English colonial administrators;[65] while the legislative record of the parliaments of the 1650s shows little concern either to make special provision for the needs of Scotland and Ireland, nor to take account of conditions or custom there in the framing of legislation.[66] If union meant free trade for Scots (and for Irish Protestants), it did not mean fiscal equality: successive regimes taxing England hard, but Scotland and Ireland much harder.[67] No wonder Robert Blair could write that "as for the embodying of Scotland with England, it will be as when the poor bird is embodied into the hawk that hath eaten it up".[68]

Much English theory about the subordination of Ireland to England had always relied on conquest theory. But in the 1650s an all-too-palpable new conquest gave the English a sense of the abrogation of whatever rights the people may have possessed. Hence the chilling opening of the 1652 Act for the Settlement of Ireland (imposed, note, by the *soi-disant* Parliament of the Commonwealth and Free State of England)[69] which spoke of all those of the "Irish nation" who were not "of the inferior sort" as being penalized "according to the respective demerits and considerations under which they fall".[70] One consequence of the massive compensation in the form of Irish lands handed over to the Adventurers was the strengthening of the trend that saw social power in Ireland in the hands of absentee landowners.[71] This in

[65] P. PINCKNEY, The Scottish representation in the Cromwellian Parliament of 1656, in: Scottish Historical Review 46 (1967); E. GOLDWATER, The Scottish franchise and political lobbying during the Cromwellian protectorate, in: Historical Journal 20 (1978), pp. 29-42.

[66] This is based on a browsing of the material in C. H. FIRTH, R. S. RAIT (eds.), Acts and Ordinances of the Civil Wars and Interregnum, 3 vols., London 1911, esp. II.

[67] GILLESPIE, Landed society (above n. 61), p. 40, cites good evidence that assessments represented an income tax on landholders of 20% in Scotland and 33% in Ireland. It is generally recognized that the burden in England was around 10%.

[68] T. MCCRIE (ed.), The Life of Robert Blair, in: Wodrow Society 13 (1848), p. 192.

[69] GARDINER, Constitutional Documents (above n. 64), p. 388.

[70] Ibid., p. 394.

[71] BOTTIGHEIMER, Irish Land (above n. 2), pp. 115-162.

turn created an interest group keen to see Ireland as integrated into a pan-British state, just as it left the native population more disfranchised, embittered and alienated. To understand Irish history in the 1650s one needs a British perspective; and one dimension of that history is the eradication of what survived of the Old English political culture, and the enhancement of pan-British judicial and administrative forms. It completed the creation of just two political cultures for Ireland: what Brendan Bradshaw has termed the (new) New English (who owed little to the previous historical experience of the island) and the New Irish (who were completely proof against anything distinctively English or British).[72]

The Scottish situation was if anything even more complex. The English contemplated but then abandoned the idea of annexing Lowland Scotland.[73] They then opted for an incorporative union, which was to be based upon a pretense of consent. The Scottish shires and parliamentary boroughs were invited to send delegates to a meeting at Dalkeith; and that gathering in turn was allowed, in return for a prior commitment to accept a union scheme, to send representatives to London. What those Scots had expected to be a round-table conference of equals was in fact no more than an opportunity to address the English Council of State which dismissed them before by itself determining the form of union which was never re-submitted to Scotland for confirmation. There was a rhetoric of consultation and consent, and a logic that came from the barrel of a musket.[74] In 1707, the Scottish establishment accepted a union of legislatures and executive in return for free trade and guarantees - for long not violated - of judicial and ecclesiastical autonomy.

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[72] The English governors in Ireland even set in motion plans to prevent intermarriage between English settlers and native Irish women (see, for example, R. DUNLOP, Ireland Under the Commonwealth, 2 vols., Manchester 1913, II item 1049, pp. 711-712).

[73] HIRST, Experiencing Britain (above n. 63).

[74] C. S. TERRY, The Cromwellian Union, Edinburgh 1902, pp. xv-li, 27-97. There is a splendidly forthright account of the union in a briefing document drawn up by the Earl of Loudoun for Charles II, in: C. H. FIRTH, Scotland under the Commonwealth, Edinburgh 1895, pp. 208-213.

Fifty years earlier they had imposed upon them a degree of constitutional subordination not unlike that of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but with effective ecclesiastical devolution and the benefits of free trade. The really important difference was that, in 1707, it was the Scottish nobility who were bought off; in the 1650s it was the Scottish farmers. In neither case did the English have any interest in or enthusiasm for the assimilation of Scotland. As Derek Hirst will show in a forthcoming essay,[75] English pamphleteers, preachers and polemicists made heavy weather of the benefits of union: the essential message was that taking on Scotland was what later would be seen as the White Man's Burden: the title of one anonymous tract - *Veni, Vidi, Vici* perhaps catching the same mood. The Scots were absorbed into a British and anglified institutions imposed upon them - a reformed shrievalty, real commissions of the peace.[76] But there was to be little interest in bringing the élites together, seeking to create a common culture and shared values, a merger of the symbols of power and status, a union of hearts and minds. It was the precise obverse of James's vision of union. It was cold, uncaring, begrudging. There is a British History of the 1650s; but it was about as enthusiastic as British Europeanism in the 1990s. And insofar as it had long-term effects it was to accelerate the process by which the Scottish nobility (having shared exile with their English colleagues) were assimilated in manners and attitudes to the English nobility.[77]

I feel that I need to make one other major qualification to my claim for seeing what happened as part of a single process. The nature of the war changed its character as it moved from one kingdom to another. In England the war was fought on both sides with a fairly strict adherence to the

[75] HIRST, Experiencing Britain (above n. 63).

[76] James VI had introduced the shadow but not the substance to Scotland. But so long as the Scottish nobility retained their heritable jurisdictions, the powers of Justices of the Peace were vestigial. (J. WORMALD, Court, Kirk and Community, Scotland 1470-1625, London 1981, pp. 162 f; DOW, Cromwellian Scotland [above n. 60], index sub Justices).

[77] See the comments in STEVENSON, Effects (above n. 61), pp. 52 f.

seventeenth-century equivalent of the Geneva Conventions: prisoners of war were taken and re-enlisted by their captors or released on promises that they would not re-engage themselves; sieges were ended by negotiation on often generous terms almost always honoured to the letter; if towns were stormed, the number of civilian casualties was nominal and damage limited. Martial law was not used against civilians and little used against combatants on the opposing side. The Scots in England behaved themselves similarly.

English and Irish campaigns in Scotland were rather tougher. Montrose's campaigns with Irish levies in the mid 1640s were notoriously bloody - an army committed to lightning strikes and to living off the land could not afford to transport prisoners: "They killed with the same careless neglect that they kill a hen or a capon for their supper," wrote one observer. In the 1650s the English occupying army made the local population responsible for any guerrila acts carried out in their parish - a £ 50 fine for each English soldier killed if those responsible were not handed over within 24 hours, for example.

But it was a different kind of war in Ireland. In England it was rare for more than 1 in 10 even on the King's side to be killed, in Ireland a death rate of one third or a half was normal. From the very beginning it was like that. When Major General Robert Monro first encountered 2,500 Irish rebels in April 1642, he shot and hanged all prisoners. When he entered Newry, he again summarily executed 60 civilians including the priests. When Sir Charles Coote stormed Sligo in 1646, he refused quarter and killed all the garrison and many civilians. The Confederates responded in kind. Cromwell's notorious butchery at Drogheda and Wexford followed the well-established Sarajevo conventions that applied in Ireland in place of the Geneva ones. Most striking of all are General Fleetwood's orders as Lord Deputy in the 1650s: in the event of a sectarian murder, the people responsible were to be handed over within 24 hours or 4 hostages would be taken and shipped to Barbados as slaves and every other person in the district transported to Connacht or County Clare. It was English troops carrying out reprisals in

Ireland. But it was not part of the same historical experience as the war in England.[78]

In the space I am allowed I have done little more than illustrate the poverty of the English language in providing a vocabulary of political community for exploring and explaining the shared and divergent histories of the component parts of the British revolutionary process of the mid-seventeenth century. I shall have to fall back on theology and suggest that in trying to make sense of the history of the British Isles in the mid-seventeenth century, one has a Trinitarian doctrine of Nicene or perhaps even Athanasian complexity.

[78] IDEM, Counter-Revolution (above n. 37), pp. 106-110, 171-178, 231-234; DOW, Cromwellian Scotland (above n. 60), pp. 19-21; R. HUTTON, The British Republic 1649-1660, London 1989, pp. 46-48; New History of Ireland, III (above n. 2), pp. 124, 146-148; P. B. ELLIS, Hell or Connaught! The Cromwellian Colonisation of Ireland 1652-1660, Belfast 1988, pp. 144 f; B. DONEGAN, Codes and conduct in the English civil wars, in: Past and Present 118 (1988), pp. 65-95; C. CARLTON, The English Civil Wars as a Military Experience, in press.