Gimme shelter:
self-help housing struggles within and against the state in New York City and West Berlin†
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In this essay we want to examine the meanings and uses of self-help housing practices by focusing on two, quite distinct cases - the reform movement for tenant self-management in New York City, and the 'rehab-squatters movement' in West Berlin. In New York, tenant self-management has been incorporated into the current repertoire of municipal housing programmes to a degree unimaginable a decade ago, affecting the lives of several thousand poor tenants. The West Berlin squatters' movement has also garnered national attention in the Federal Republic of Germany, as the most concentrated remnant of the wave of squatting that occurred throughout Germany in 1981. While the prospects for the institutionalization of self-help housing in West Berlin are at this writing not good (January 1983), it remains the case that the concept, practice and feasibility of self-help housing as public policy has been placed on the German agenda.

Beyond the intrinsic interest of these two situations, we want to look at the politics of self-help housing as a concrete expression of a broader relationship between the capitalist state and the 'new social movements'. Before examining the West Berlin and New York cases, therefore, we want to briefly outline a theoretical framework which, along with our own practical experiences, has helped structure this work.

I Self-help social movements and the state: a crisis of reproduction

Self-help activities - focused not merely on housing, but addressing virtually every facet of everyday life - have arisen in the past decade or so on the basis of, and against, an increasingly crisis-ridden system of the material and cultural reproduction of labour power i.e. the reproduction of labour power organized by the capitalist state. The centrality of the state in this process, as Aglietta and others have argued, is not coincidental, although it is contradictory. Rather, the state has been the key institutional means by which the relationship between labour and capital was restructured during the years of the depression, the second world war and the immediate postwar period. The state played a crucial role not only in providing the institutional and political basis for the apparent resolution of capital's crisis of accumulation, but also for the incorporation of working-class demands for a larger and more secure social wage (the first, in fact, presupposing the second) (Aglietta, 1979).

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The formation of the welfare state (or more broadly, the 'statification' of everyday life), however, had a double effect. While weakening traditional forms of social cohesion and reproduction - the family, neighbourhood and other non- state institutions - this process also increased demands on the state for need satisfaction and created new arenas within which qualitatively different needs are struggled over (Hirsch, 1981). Against an increasingly Taylorized social life, and against the instrumentalized and control-oriented relations of service delivery of state bureaucracies, social struggles of the past 20 years have been marked by a search for a new subjectivity against the objectifications and distortions of state- organized relations of reproduction in advanced capitalist countries.

This conflict, essentially over the forms of social life, need formation and satisfaction, and in the end, human nature, is embedded even in those struggles focused more explicitly on getting access to, maintaining or increasing material means of life, or the social wage. And it is, further, inherently a political struggle, insofar as the state continues to be the prime location and object of these struggles. Not even in the case of New York City, we would argue, where the question of material survival is so self-evidently on the agenda, can the emergence of a neighbourhood-based self-help movement be explained simply through a reductionist argument about so-called material conditions. The central question of the arena of struggle over self-help is precisely whether the state has the capacity to suppress and transform street-level demands and practices of self-organization and control, which represent a democratic challenge from below. Certainly in West Berlin, self-help struggles are explicitly grounded in a critique of monetized relation- ships, professionalism and dependency, on the absence of substantive democracy and the erosion of a solidaristic social life.

This, we suggest, is a foundation upon which so-called new social movements have emerged, and upon which their relationship to the state can be understood. It also helps to account for the centrality of self-help as a theme and social practice in the movements. It is not merely a matter of material survival, but also an attempt to recover a self-organized empowering social life.

Qualitatively different and quantitatively expanded demands, in turn, have exacerbated state crisis tendencies. At the same time that the state can no longer compensate for social, environmental and personal distortions thrown up by commodified or bureaucratized forms of need satisfaction and the damaging effects of accumulation, it can also no longer shift the burden of responsibility for socialization and control to weakened, traditional non-state institutions. To the contrary, as the current process of capital restructuring through crisis profoundly reshapes the relationship between state and society, a new normative order appears necessary, with the purpose of permanently lowering the costs of reproduction of labourpower (O'Connor, 1984). What seems to be at stake, in other words, is a new form of social organization, predicated upon a changed normative orientation, which can be made functional for a new regime of capital accumulation.

As 'reindustrialization' through computerization and different forms of labour control such as quality-of-work circles and 'union-free environments' are seen as crucial steps in the restructuring of the labour process, so, too would a new 'self-reliant' citizenry be seen as an integral part of the management of state crisis tendencies. In both cases, first, the effect would be to cheapen the bundle of consumption goods entering into the reproduction of labourpower. State-organized self- help, moreover, would offer an opportunity to reduce citizen demands upon limited state revenues (hence freeing state revenues for infrastructural investment, among other things) while also reshaping citizen expectations and practices away from the state altogether (hence freeing the state from a disruptive 'democratic distemper').

Insofar as most experiments in 'self-reliance' have been undertaken by movements opposed to the state, however, the realization of this transformation in norms and state-society relationships is a complex one. It involves the appropriation by the state of oppositional social practices embodied in social movements. We would expect, then, the production of an arena of struggle over self-help to involve not only conflict about the level of benefits provided by the state, but also a struggle over the divisions of labour between movement constituencies and their organizations, as well as the internal divisions of labour within the organizations. We would furthermore anticipate a conflict over the definition of needs, as well as the means to satisfying those needs. Finally, we would expect the arena of struggle over self-help to highlight the question of how the state itself is organized, and who controls it, through a struggle for democracy.

To summarize, from the point of view of the movements out of which it arose, self-help not only represents a means to solve material needs, but also contains themes of autonomy, self-organization and the self-definition of needs. That is, self-help represents an essentially democratic critique of the state organization of labour power and increasing tendencies towards the marginalization of economically superfluous and socially disruptive strata. From the point of view of the state, self-help represents not only a partial solution to fiscal crisis tendencies - through the use of state clients' non-monetized labour (Harms, 1982, *50)* -- but also a new structure for reshaping and disciplining the normative orientations of citizens. That is, self-help is represented as a form of societal self-maintenance and self-policing (Brecher and Horton, 1981,23). Moreover, self-help can provide a key political legitimation for a neocorporatist restructuring of the relationship between state and society, through the use of neighbourhood-based self-help groups as 'mediating structures' standing between state and society (Egan *et d.,* 1981, *6).* In this sense, self-help groups are seen as providing the organizational and social 'glue' which public or private 'megastructures' cannot.

That such an arena of conflict and negotiation over self-help housing emerges at all is predicated upon these mutually interdependent interests. That these interests are inherently contradictory suggests, however, that the continued reproduction of such an arena is problematic, and its outcomes unpredictable.

I1 Tenant self-management and self-help housing New York City

in 1978, the City of New York's Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) embarked upon a major new effort in housing management, by taking over responsibility for the more than 10000 buildings which had been abandoned by private landlords during the previous decade. True to the crisis conditions under which it had been adopted, HPD's so-called 'in Rem Housing Management Plan'[1] was functionally based on a triage formula.

Those buildings considered 'economically unviable' and physically beyond repair were to be emptied out and demolished, the tenants 'consolidated' into other city-owned buildings. Those considered in the best physical condition and in good locations with steady tenant rent payments were to be sold as quickly as possible to the private sector - landlords, community organizations and tenant cooperatives. In principle at least, tenant cooperatives would have the opportunity to purchase their buildings for only $250 per apartment. Those buildings in between - the walking wounded so to speak - were to be more thoroughly 'treated' through HPD's management and rehabilitation programme (in Rem, 1979, 11).

Organizationally, in 1981 about two thirds of the total number of occupied apartments involved in the In Rem programme - approximately 23000 - were managed through the centralized Office of Central Property Management, along with about 5000 vacant buildings (see Table 1). The remaining third - about 12 000 apartments - were managed through the Division of Alternative Management Programs, which was composed of six separate programmes. Of these, two are attempts by HPD to contract out housing management functions to private real estate firms (the 'Private Ownership Management Program' and 'Management in Partnership Program', the latter involving a sponsoring community organization partner), while a third transfers housing units to the quasi-autonomous New York City Housing Authority.

The remaining three, however - accounting for nearly 9000 occupied apartments - depend for their success upon some form of community or tenant-based self-management. These three programmes are:

1) The Community Management Program (CMP): originally begun in 1972-73 in response to tenant and community group pressures on the city. Under the Community Management Program, neighbourhood organizations contract with HPD to manage municipally-owned housing. In 1981, 15 1 buildings with 1998 occupied apartments were involved.

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[1] 'The programme is named after the tax foreclosure process the City of New York uses to gain title to properties when landlords default on their property taxes and user fees.

Table 1 Division of alternative management workload by programme 1981

Programme	*Buildings*	*Units*	*Occupied units*
Community Management	151	2664	1998
Tenant interim lease	246	5718	5109
7A court administrator	87	2364	1983
Housing authority	47	933	584
Management in partnership	68	1745	1270
Private ownership management	48	1363	1217
Total DAMP	647	14787	12161
Central property management workload			
	Buildings	Vacant buildings	Occupied buildings/units
	8180	4907	3 273123 079

Source: Table 1, In Rem Housing Program, Third Annual Report, 1981

2) The Article 7A program (7A): originally begun in the mid-1970s after successful lobbying by the New York City neighbourhood movement brought changes in New York State housing law. Under the change, state courts were permitted to appoint 'administrators' to manage buildings where the landlord had failed to do so. This was adapted in the late 1970s to permit tenants living in the buildings to be appointed administrators following a short training course run by HPD.I n 1981, 87 buildings with 1983 occupied apartments were involved.
3) The Tenant Interim Lease Program (TIL): begun in 1978 as an HPD management strategy on the basis of recommendations from the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB), a key technical assistance organization for the New York neighbourhood movement. Under the TIL programme, tenant associations in city-owned buildings contract directly with HPD to take on full management and maintenance responsibilities, plus eventual ownership as a tenant cooperative. As of 1981,246 buildings with 5 109 occupied apartments were involved.

As this brief summary suggests, these three community and tenant-based self-management programmes were the product of a neighbourhood movement which had gained an extraordinary level of competence in dealing with the problems and potentialities of self-managed shelter during the 1970s. What the summary does not show is that this institutionalization of self-management into the centre of New York City's housing management strategy was something far less than a full victory for the movement.

The neighbourhood-based black and Puerto Rican groups which made up the core of the New York neighbourhood movement either traced their origins to the 'community control' struggles of the late 1960s and early 1970s, or else had been formed during the early and mid-1970s to resist municipal austerity policies and to provide a concrete alternative. As early as 1971, demands for tenant self-management came out of a major occupation of a much disputed urban renewal site on Manhattan's Upper West Side, when 1000 squatters moved in and took over dozens of city-owned buildings as part of 'Operation Move-In'. By the mid-l970s, the city-wide umbrella organization for the more established neighbourhood development groups - the Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers - numbered over 20 member groups,[2] while a broader coalition of local groups concerned with getting federal Community Development Block Grant funds administered by the City of New York into poor neighbourhoods had over 200 participating members. While the New York neighbourhood movement broadened out to include local groups which had a different constituency and orientation,[3] and while several technical assistant organizations servicing local groups played an increasingly important role in setting the agenda for the movement, the impetus of the movement continued to come from local neighbourhood groups organizing poor black and Puerto Rican tenants during the 1970s. For example:

Adopt-a-Building, based on the Lower East Side (or 'Loisaida', as the group renamed the district) helped organize the first experiments in sweat equity urban homesteading, community-based economic development, and alternative energy and open space projects after years of involvement in local tenant organizing campaigns. The Renigades, a street gang gone straight, worked with UHAB staff to bring sweat equity urban homesteading to east Harlem. Los Sures, working in the Southside neighbourhood of Brooklyn near the East River, was described as the 'embodiment of a spontaneous community outburst' at its beginning as a tough tenant advocate and squatting organizer (Johnson, nd, 14). The People's Firehouse, located in the Northside neighbourhood next to Los Sures, organized its largely Polish constituency to block the shutdown of the local fire station by occupying the building for two years, and then went on to work with anti-arson groups based in Boston to develop a neighbourhood-based anti-arson organizing strategy. In the South Bronx, the People's Development Corporation saw its project as building a self-reliant 'village of 10 000 people' through community-based economic development, sweat equity urban homesteading, tenant management, and a structure of democratic neighbourhood control. In the North Bronx, the Northwest Bronx Clergy and Community Coalition brought together a district- wide network of groups to organize tenants and home owners against bank dis- investment, arson-for-profit and municipal cutbacks, with support from the National People's Action headed by Gale Cincotta.

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[3] The Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers was formed in 1974 by a coalition of neighbourhood organizations to prevent intergroup competition from growing too intense, to pool their fundraising and lobbying capabilities, and to provide a vehicle for city-wide technical assistance services. Also attached to the association was the People's Housing Net- work, which began providing tenant organizing training in 1978, and the journal of the New York neighbourhood movement, *City Limits*. The association's first executive director - until 1978 - was the late Bob Schur, who came to this post from his job as Comissioner in the then Housing and Development Administration during the Lindsay years.

[4] For example, groups such as Flatbush Development Corporation, which was formed in 1976 by middleclass white home owners allied with mainstream Democratic Party officials. The group's founders were concerned about falling property values in their neighbourhood as well as rising incidence of crime, following the influx of black tenants into nearby apartment complexes. Despite the fact that whites make up only a third of the district's population, there are only three non-white members on the 20-member board of directors.

In turn, a practical principle of self-organization was the central theme for these groups' organizing strategies, on several levels: **as** a means for everyday survival for tenants in landlord-abandoned buildings; as a means for organizing a popular power base to fight austerity and 'get into the state' for crucially needed benefits; and as a means of breaking through the relations of powerlessness, dependency and individuation which poor tenants confronted in their everyday experiences. Taken together, self-organization was understood as something more than a means for material survival, **as** an end in itself, a way to break out of the 'ghetto attitude' of defeat, towards a self-determining community. In this respect, the New York neighbourhood movement represented a practical critique of austerity and marginalization, a democratic challenge to domination and dependency. It was, in its origins, an oppositional movement from the grassroots.

The institutionalization of community and tenant-based self-management should have therefore been one of the sweetest fruits of the New York neighbour- hood movement. Instead, it has become a battleground between tenants, com- munity groups, private developers and government agencies. This is so, we argue, because community and tenant-based self-management programmes administered by the City of New York were designed neither to empower poor tenants, nor to buck the trends towards austerity and elite domination. Rather, tenant self-help was reformulated and appropriated from the street level by state agencies in an attempt to restore tax and rental revenue flows from slum properties to the public treasury, and to reorganize a slum housing market left in chaos by 10 years of landlord abandonment and bank disinvestment.

Certainly, municipal and federal subsidies to poor people's housing have had a positive effect on shelter conditions - after years of neglect and destruction, virtually any level of support would, However, this subsidy to what 'constitute some of the most deteriorated housing stock in the city' is less than half that of other standard federal or local housing subsidies, including the Section 8 Existing Rent Subsidy Program, which only supplements tenant rent-paying capacities and involves no housing rehabilitation whatsoever (see Table 2; Stegman, 1982, 215-16). Furthermore, as Table 3 suggests, In Rem tenants are poorer and pay more of their income as rent than most New Yorkers. Not surprisingly, when HPD took over management of In Rem housing, it discovered that tenants in the central management system were paying only 33% of the total possible rent due. This unorganized rent strike has left the city with a heaped up rent bill of mammoth proportions: between 1979 and 1981, the city effectively lost about $50 million in foregone rents. In turn, HPD's In Rem legal division mailed out 18000 notices of

Table 2 Maximum annual subsidy per unit in New York City by programme 1980

IN REM		
Central management: total units		
Federal	$799	
City	257	
Total		$1056
Central management: occupied units only		
Federal	$1234	
City	397	
Total		$1631
Alternative management		
Federal	$1868	
City	142	
Total		$2010
Housing authority: (including tax exemption)		
Federal projects	$4513	
City projects	$3306	
State projects	$5474	
Section 8		
Section 8 existing	$4130	
Section 8 new construction	$8259	
Section 8 set aside	$4877	
Section 8 moderate rehab.	$4053	

Source: Table 11, In Rem Housing Program, Third Annual Report, City of New York, 1981

Table 3 Household characteristics in In Rem rental housing and total rental stock, New York City, 1981

Characteristic	In Rem N = 33816	All renters N = 1976044
White	18.6%	57.1%
Black	53.5	23.4
Puerto Rican	24.1	13.1
Other	3.8	6.4
Female head of household	51.9%	46.9%
At least one child:		
Under 6	20.0	14.0
Under 18	42.0	29.0
Median income	$6865	$11 001
Median gross rent	$210	$265
Median rent-income ratio	36.7	28.9
Percentage of households:		
With rent-income ratio over 35%	51.2	37.1
Receiving public assistance	29.7	13.3
Below federal poverty level	45.8	25.3
Overcrowding: 1.01 or more persons per room	11.8	6.5
1.51 or more persons per room	4.3	1.7

Source: US Bureau of the Census, 1981 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey proportions: between 1979 and 1981, the city effectively lost about $50 million in tenants. In 1981, the city placed another 1700 welfare tenants on rent payment systems which threaten them with the cutoff of all benefits if they fail to pay their rent (In Rem, 1981, 9). Implementing self-management simply as a ‘self-help’ programme among several policy alternatives obliterated its meaning as a self- organized challenge to precisely this state of affairs.

This holds true inside the self-help programmes themselves. Under pressure to reduce the time and money invested in self-managing buildings, HPD has more and more pursued a policy of tightening up entry requirements into the self-help programmes, while pressuring tenant associations to purchase their buildings before they were ready to go independent. Moreover, in those neighbourhoods where the private housing market is heating up, HPD has ‘refused to commit itself to a firm sales price’ with tenant-managed buildings *(City Limits,* April 1982, 6). One such area is the Clinton neighbourhood in Manhattan, midway between a planned Portman glass and steel hotel on Broadway, and the new publicly subsidized Convention Center rising on the Hudson River. In March 1982, Tenant Interim Lease tenants in Clinton were told by HPD officials that the basic sales price usually charged to TIL tenants of $250 per apartment was no longer in effect. Instead, the tenants would have to purchase their buildings at a price of between $9000 and $13 500 per apartment, which was what the city figured as the market price. When hundreds of Clinton tenants ‘hooted and stomped their way through meetings aimed at rejecting’ the price hike, HPD retreated and has restored the low price.

HPD has also argued that city-owned buildings are not covered by local rent control laws - which leaves tenants with no administrative appeals process. Given the low level of subsidy, tenants are threatened with major rent increases forced by HPD in order to make the buildings economically self-sufficient, even if this means that tenants cannot afford to pay. While HPD has promised that tenants in need would be provided with Section 8 rent subsidies, the fact remains that even prior to the Reagan administration, the Section 8 programme was servicing only some 33 00 poor tenants when the total level of need was estimated at somewhere over one million.[4] The failure by the 97th Congress to appropriate any funds for low-income housing, plus the Reagan administration’s overt threats to virtually any support for programmes of this kind, make tenants’ situations even more uncertain.

In cases where street-level self-organization challenges state-organized self-help, the response has been repressive. On 8 December 1981, 50 police officers from the New York City Tactical Patrol Force and four local precincts occupied 126 Lasalle Street on Manhattan’s Upper West Side, and forcibly evicted the 19 tenants.

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[4] Figures from Harold Sole, director of the Section 8 rent subsidy programme, New York City Housing Authority.

The police and HPD officials claimed that the tenants were for the most part squatters ‘trespassing’ on city-owned property, despite the fact that tenants had been putting their own funds into the building and had applied for participation in the Tenant Interim Lease Program. ‘We consider ourselves homesteaders’, one tenant told the Village Voice, ’who have a right to live here’. Officials from HPD, however, regarded the tenants as making a ‘political statement’. ‘They can’t just come in and take over city-owned property’, one official told the press. ‘We can- not allow this to happen. It will only set a precedent’ (Village Voice, 16 March 1982; City Limits, 8 January 1982).

Community and tenant-based self-management, which had emerged in the 1970s as a challenge from the bottom-up against landlord abandonment and municipal austerity, was in fact implemented through a process of reform from above, with no popular mobilization. The question, then, is how street-level self- organization was incorporated into a structure of state-organized domination, and what effects this distorted success has had and will have. We want to look first at how the state ‘opened up’ to self-help as a new public policy, and then how and why the neighbourhood movement ‘let’ this happen.

III Housing crisis, state crisis, policy innovation: the ‘opening’ to self-help

The collapse of the private market in slum housing completely disrupted the City of New York’s housing and property management structures, and led to its new policy and programme arrangement.

Between 1970 and 1980, the vacancy rate for rental housing in New York City hit an all-time postwar low, while an estimated 36000 adults and 20000 children had no shelter at all. It was not uncommon for poor tenants to pay more than 35% of their income as rent, especially as welfare rent grants remained frozen at 1972 prices while rents doubled during the decade. Landlords faced a doubling of operating costs, including a sevenfold increase in the cost of heating oil (Stegman, 1982).

Behind these painful statistics was a major shift in investment strategies by local savings banks and savings and loans associations - the key sources of mort- gage finance for slum housing. Beginning in the late 1960s, in response to attempts by the Federal Reserve system to manage inflation through interest rate and money supply manipulation, banks stopped providing mortgage finance for slum property. These properties were seen as increasingly unstable investment with unattractive rates of return relative to other investment opportunities whose income stream was not dependent upon poor people’s flat income. As their sources of mortgage finance dried up, landlords began abandoning their properties as soon as the short- term tax and depreciation benefits had been exhausted. This not only reinforced the short-term speculative nature of the housing market, but also led to landlord service cutbacks and outright illegal profit taking through ‘arson for profit’ and fraud (see Stone, 1978; Hartmann et al., 1981; Homefront, 1977).

The end result was the destruction of over 312000 dwelling units between 1970 and 1980 in the City of New York - 11% of the total municipal housing stock (Stegman, 1982, 162). Furthermore, approximately 10000 residential buildings were seized by the City of New York for non-payment of taxes from abandoning landlords. Of these, about 4500 buildings were occupied by about 100 000 tenants.

The City of New York, however, was completely unprepared for such a responsibility. In 1977, the city council passed a local law speeding up the process by which the municipal Department of Real Property (DRP) could initiate so- called 'In Rem actions' against landlords in tax arrears. Their hope was that a quicker and more punitive process would force landlords to pay off their back taxes. Instead, exactly the opposite occurred (as might have been expected), as landlords stayed away in droves, dumping their unprofitable properties onto the city (In Rem, 1979,2).

The Department of Real Property – which had responsibility for the management and eventual resale of tax-seized properties back to the private sector - was on the verge of collapse as a result of this massive increase in housing load. DRP's public auction process - the main system designed to return properties to private ownership - was in a state of chaos. One in-house study reported that 9W of a sample of auctioned buildings was delinquent in tax or mortgage payments within one year of sale (In Rem, 1979, 6). In 1978, reports of criminal collusion between DRP officials and speculator landlords forced the suspension of the auction process altogether, until late 1980. Finally, DRP's rent collection rate from tenants was abysmal: only 33 cents out of every potential dollar was actually being collected.

Through much of 1977 and 1978, an intense bureaucratic battle developed between DRP and the city's department of Housing Preservation and Development over which agency would be responsible for the management of this enormous housing load. HPD - faced with the breakdown of its own housing development programmes as a result of changes in federal funding priorities - was keenly interested in taking over the In Rem programme. HPD officials argued before the mayor that their agency was better positioned to handle this problem since, unlike DRP, it had experience not only in property sales, but also in dealing with tenants. HPD also argued that it was in a far better position than DRP to secure federal funds for the In Rem housing management programme, and hence that it would be able to run the programme with less of a drain on local revenues. By mid-1978, the city council and newly-elected mayor Edward Koch approved the transfer of responsibility from DRP to HPD.

The underlying goal of HPD's In Rem housing management strategy was not markedly different from DRP's, despite this bureaucratic shift. Expenditures were to be kept at a minimum, while tax, rent and sales revenues were to be pushed *to* the maximum. The overriding objective was to return as many In Rem buildings to private ownership as quickly as possible, but in such a way as to ensure that they remained privately owned and capable of producing a steady stream of tax revenues to the public treasury.

Table 4 In Rem rent collection (millions of dollars) 1979-81

	1979	1980	1981
Total rent collected	$19.2m	$32.1m	$38.7m
Central management	12.4	15.6	16.1
Alternative management	3.3	13.3	19.6
Other	3.5	3.2	3.0
Percentage rent collected	46.3%	59.8%	74.5%
Central management	36.9	45.4	62.5
Alternative management	83.3	87.2	86.6
Other	89.0	79.4	83.7

Source: Table 5, In Rem Housing Program, Third Annual Report, 1981

The difference, however, was HPD's recognition that besides being a *property* management problem, successful control of the In Rem housing stock was also a matter of *tenant* management, whether that took the form of effective HPD management over tenants through the Office of Central Property Management, or effective tenant self-management through the Division of Alternative Management Programs.

Certainly in terms of rent-collection ability, self-help housing made quite good sense. As Table 4 indicates, community and tenant-based self-management programmes have shown rent collection rates exceeding 80% from the beginning. By 1981, on the other hand, centrally-managed properties had yet to go above 63%. The question of ownership was a little more complicated. Tenant or community ownership made sense in areas of the city like the South Bronx where the speculative market was stilll dead. The conflicts would come in areas of the city - for the most part in Manhattan and parts of Brooklyn - where tenants resisted municipal attempts to sell their buildings to private developers (as on the Lower East Side, where efforts by HPD to turn abandoned buildings into privately-developed 'artists' housing' to the tune of a purchase price of $50000 per apartment produced a wave of local protest) or where sales were used to 'economically integrate' (that is, gentrify) poor neighbourhoods bordering on wealthier ones (as is the case with the mid-West Side and lower Harlem). Where the private market was still active, HPD clearly saw that it could obtain both a bigger sales price and a more secure tax-generating property through a policy which encouraged sales to private developers at the expense of low-income tenant cooperatives. Self-help made sense for HPD, then, for certain kinds of buildings in certain kinds of neighbour- hoods. It was, as the late Bob Schur described it, a form of 'lemon socialism' for poor folks (Schur, 1980,42).

In any event, the 'logic' of self-help was given a practical boost from two directions. In order to take advantage of 'greater possibilities for disposition to private ownership', the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) encouraged HPD to increase the number of buildings placed in the various 'alternative management' programmes (HPD, June 1979). In turn, HUD provided New York with substantial funding for the In Rem programme: out of the $118.5 million budget for all In Rem programmes in the fiscal year 1979-80,

$79 million came from a special federal Community Development Block Grant set aside (In Rem, 1979, 11).

This federal interest in alternative forms of housing management and owner- ship - especially those using a neighbourhood self-help approach - was not unique. Rather, the Carter administration had responded to - and had attempted to shape - the national neighbourhood movement which had emerged during the 1970s through a number of organizational and fiscal interventions. Jimmy Carter's visit to the South Bronx in October 1977, with a stop at one of the most 'militant' neighbourhood self-help groups, People's Development Corporation, was not only an attempt to pay off debts to black voters who had given him overwhelming support in the 1976 election. It also symbolized his administration's recognition of the potential political and social significance of the national neighbourhood movement, as a source of new Democratic Party voters, and as the social basis for a new method of low-cost, high efficiency social service delivery.[5]

While Washington provided much of the funding and a strong dose of national legitimation for self-help, proposals worked up by the staff of the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB) and the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Design (PICCED)[6] for an informal working group called the Task Force on City-Owned Property provided a specific implementation mechanism. Composed of technical assistants and liberal city officials and politicians (including at least one 'democratic socialist', City Councilperson Ruth Messinger) the Task Force proposals include suggestions for a special self-help unit using the three community and tenant-based self-management programmes described earlier. HPD accepted these ideas after extensive discussion, and added the three additional programmes using private, for-profit management and the New York City Housing Authority. At no time were neighbourhood organizations or poor tenants mobilized to push for further reforms and programmatic changes. Indeed, the Task Force proposals were only informally discussed by local organization leaders. Below that level, no discussion occurred. With no pressure to the contrary, self-management became just one of several 'alternative' management strategies designed to relieve the central property management system of a portion of the housing load. In particular, the alternative programmes could be used to 'cream off the better organized buildings, those with a special relationship to a com- munity organization, and which were in better economic condition. The remaining In Rem buildings would be left in the central property system, with not even limited control over their building rents, new tenant selection and future sales.

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[5] Among other neighbourhood and self-help oriented actions, the Carter administration formed: the National Commission on Neighborhoods, which, by holding hearings on a nationwide basis, also effectively organized a national neighbourhood lobby; neighbourhood and self-help offices in the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Energy and Commerce; the domestic wing of the ACTION bureaucracy was almost completely devoted to this new constituency. Other financial linkages were established through the formation of the Community Development Credit Union programme in the National Credit Union Administration, and through the establishment of the National Consumer Cooperative Bank, especially in the Self-help Development Fund administered by the bank.

[6] The Urban Homesteading Assistance Board was formed in 1973 with the sponsorship of the new liberal Episcopal bishop of the Cathedral of St John the Divine in East Harlem. With initial organizing support from John Turner, a major worldwide proponent of self-help housing, UHAB recruited a small staff headed by young, white, liberal former employees of the Office of Cooperative Conversion in the then Housing Development Administration, and of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Design (PICCED), associated with the engineering school Pratt Institute in Brooklyn, provides architectural and planning students with direct practical experience through the provision of technical services to tenant and neighbourhood organizations. In addition, PICCED has consistently performed a major role in lobbying, advocating and publicizing the New York neighbourhood movement.

Besides splitting tenants facing similar circumstances into many different categories, neither the Task Force proposals nor the HPD plan as implemented included any notion that tenant self-management might extend beyond taking care of an individual building. Nor was there a sense that self-management might also mean substantive tenant control over the basic policy and budget decisions affecting their conditions of life. That is, the underlying question of power and democracy was left unposed, despite the fact that this was perhaps the key challenge posed by the previous decade of housing struggles in New York City.[7] The implementation of self-help represented a narrowing of the practical definition of 'self- help' from the multiple meanings which had been put into effect in dozens of neighbourhoods throughout the city.

The years-long effort to institutionalize tenant self-management inside the state had been successful, but at a price. Control over the structure and processes of policy formation and programme implementation was ceded to an administration which had already established itself as the most arrogantly antagonistic local regime to confront black and Puerto Rican neighbourhoods in decades (see Newfield and DeBrul, 1981). And, as could have been predicted at the time, as federal funding under the Reagan administration has been substantially reduced while landlord-developer competition for valuable urban space has intensified, the city has attempted to shape its housing policies and to balance its housing budget on the backs of poor tenants.

IV Restructuring the New York neighbourhood movement

In a sense, the thousands of tenants in city-owned buildings who refused to pay their rents were the core constituency for the New York neighbourhood movement. No doubt they would have benefited from a practical definition of self-help that was based on democratic tenant control over basic policy and budget matters. And while further documentation is needed, it is also the case that many tenants were constructing forms of direct self-help in their buildings independently of the formal establishment of municipal self-help programmes. The question remains as to why the organizations which attempted to speak on their behalf gained only a limited victory; why, that is, the New York neighbourhood movement 'allowed' a distorted form of self-management to be incorporated into public policy, and why it was unable to mobilize its constituency to push for more thorough-going reforms.

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[7] Precisely this issue was raised by a group of housing activists and academics called Homefront m their 1977 report, Housing abandonment in New York City. The issue was also publicly debated by representatives from Homefront and UHAB at meetings of the New York City branch of the Planners' Network.

To begin with, the New York neighbourhood movement was attempting to deal with problems of shelter need and neighbourhood transformation at perhaps the worst possible moment: for the most part, the 1970s was a decade of capital's political counterreaction, economic restructuring and geographical flight from New York City. In particular, the autocratic administration of municipal affairs through the bank-imposed Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB) virtually eliminated any vulnerability the local state had to pressure from below for several years. Neither the major public sector unions, nor the patronage-based machines which depended upon the steady flow of city monies for their strength could (or in some cases would) do anything to block the total freeze on city expenditures imposed by the EFCB in 1975. The much weaker neighbourhood movement was hardly in a position to do otherwise.[8]

Furthermore, neither the mayoral administration of Abraham Beame - dominated by the Democratic machines in Brooklyn and the Bronx - nor that of Edward Koch -as pure an instrument for the major banking and real estate interests in New York City as could be imagined - owed much if anything to black and Puerto Rican voters. Both regimes played the worst kind of racial politics, while the Koch administration - riding a short-term crest of economic boomtimes that had as much to do with the rising value of the dollar on the international money markets as anything else - garnered the highest level of support among whte voters since the depression years of Fiorello LaGuardia. It would not be until the elections of 1981 and 1982 that public sector unions and non-white communities would be able to mount credible electoral challenges to this state of affairs.[9]

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[8] For example, in 1974, before the EFCB was established, about 30 members of neighbourhood groups occupied the offices of Roger Starr, administrator of the then Housing and Development Administration, after Stan threatened to shut down a housing rehabilitation programme, the Municipal Loan Program. While the bulk of loans made under this programme went to private developers (and had been marked by cases of fraud and collusion) the Municipal Loan program was also the sole municipally financed programme for non-profit sweat equity urban home- steading during the mid-1970s. The occupation blocked Starr from going through on his threat, although several neighbourhood activists were arrested. However, a few months later, the newly-established EFCB froze a21 municipal loans, contracts and grants across the board.

[9] In the 1981 Democratic mayoral primary, public sector unions, community activists, the load left and sections of the black and Puerto Rican communities backed New York State Assemblyman Frank Barbaro against Ed Koch Despite poor financing, backing, and no real media campaign, Barbaro secured 36% of the primary vote, winning every black and Puerto Rican district in Manhattan, the Bronx and Brooklyn. In 1982, public sector unions backed the gubernatorial candidacy of Lieutenant Governor Mario Cumo against a Koch challenge, and beat the local Brooklyn machine, and gained representation at the state level.

At the same time, the imposition of austerity and the fiscal crisis which preceded it reinforced longstanding divisions between the trade unions and community-based organizations (see Cloward and Piven, 1972, 314ff). The decision by public sector union leadership to allow union pension funds to be used to underwrite the austerity measures imposed by the EFCB and the Municipal Assistance Corporation (Big MAC) tied the unions to the status quo, while layoffs disproportionately affected newly hired black and Puerto Rican workers (Tabb, 1982,30).[10]

Furthermore, those community-based organizations formed during the War on Poverty years and still reeling from the Nixon backlash had for the most part lost the capacity to organize their neighbourhoods. Given this situation, the emerging neighbourhood movement was attempting to operate under incredibly difficult circumstances. Indeed, resistance to austerity during the 1970s more and more took the form of criminalized hustling rather than traditionally organized political action. The 'blackout riots' of July 1977 represented an explosive free for all and culmination of the pressures induced by years of austerity.

Neighbourhood groups faced other problems besides these, however. The fact was that the tactics of tenant organizing which had been refined to a science during the 1960s made much less sense under conditions of landlord abandonment and municipal incoherence. Given the overwhelming level of basic need local groups faced, the pressure to get into the pipeline for state benefits was even more intense than in the past at the same time that the availability of those benefits was being relatively reduced. With the breakdown of the basic institutional structures for the provision of slum housing, neighbourhood groups also found themselves having to provide tenants with more and different kinds of support. It was no longer sufficient to organize tenants into a short-term rent strike, when the result was a landlord who walked away altogether. Now, tenants needed not only financial help, but also critical backup in actually running the building, paying the bills, making repairs, buying oil, establishing credit and a bank account, maintaining basic building security, and negotiating with creditor banks and municipal agencies - and all of this for months and years at a stretch.[11]

Given these circumstances, the neighbourhood movement was hardly in a position to control the timing and terms of their incorporation and entry into the state. Groups went for what they could get, because something seemed to be better than nothing at all.

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[10] There were exceptions to this prior to the Barbaro campaign. In particular, the union local representing health and hospital workers - District 1199 - joined with the Committee of Interns and Residents representing doctors and community organizations to fight against hospital closings in Brooklyn and Harlem.

[11] The alternative to this was followed by the main city-wide tenants' organization in New York City, the Metropolitan Council on Housing. Met. Council refused to become involved in this new situation, sticking to its traditional practice of organizing tenant rent strikes against private landlords. Its position was that tenants and local groups should not be placed in the position of doing what the welfare state was supposed to do. While abstractly correct, practically speaking Met. Council became virtually irrelevant to housing struggles in neighbourhoods suffering from widespread landlord abandonment and municipal cutbacks.

This tenuous state of affairs had several consequences for neighbourhood groups, and the movement as a whole. First, the number of buildings which neighbourhood groups were able to assist was severely limited. Between 1972 and 1978, for example, only 68 buildings were managed by about 20 neighbourhood organizations through the Community Management Program. Not one was converted to a low- income tenant cooperative as envisioned, and only a handful gained access to major rehabilitation financing. Similarly, only 526 apartments in 40 buildings were even considered - let alone completed - through sweat equity urban homesteading projects (Kolodny, 1981).

Second, groups suffered through major organizational conflicts and shifts which disrupted their operations, changed their relationships to local tenants, and limited their ability to mobilize their constituency. For example, contracts under the Community Management Program prohibited neighbourhood groups from sub-contracting even the simplest management and maintenance functions to building tenant associations, while they also required the groups to devote an enormous amount of labour time to book keeping and reporting. The contracts also stipulated a specific, bureaucratic division of labour for the contracting group, which often contradicted its existing form of organization and introduced a new structure of authority for which the group was unprepared. As a result, while the keystones of successful tenant self-management – active tenant associations - collapsed, the neighbourhood organizations were transformed into badly functioning real estate management companies, with the inevitable deterioration in their relation- ships with local tenants.[12] Neighbourhood groups which attempted to use sweat equity urban homesteading in their neighbourhoods suffered through virtually identical problems of overwork, underfinancing and bureaucratic reorganization, leading to increased distance between leadership and membership.[13]

These strains only seemed to worsen following relative increases in funding after Jimmy Carter's visit to the South Bronx. By the end of the decade, City Limits, the journal of the New York neighbourhood movement, reported that groups were experiencing a clear 'shift in organizational priorities, from advocacy and organizing the neighbourhood to program management and physical development'. Groups found themselves requiring 'new management skills' while attempting to cope with the "rise of bureaucracy' in their midst (*City Limits*, August and September 1979).

Some neighbourhood groups were negotiating, packaging and implementing terrifically complicated multimillion-dollar housing rehabilitation deals, complete with tax shelter benefit syndication, joint ventures with major private developers, and big inhouse management and construction components (City Limits, January 1981, 4). The importance of the neighbourhood movement's technical assistants increased with the importance of finding 'workable' technical solutions to what had previously been defined as political problems. However, the position of the technical assistants was a complex one, since they often acted as policy analysts and organizers of the movement as well. As mediating agents between the street and the state, technical assistant groups synthesized the practical experiences gained by local groups and formulated them into alternative public policies for local and federal administrations, in the process finding themselves both 'friend and policeman' to neighbourhood organizations (as one staff member from the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board put it). At the same time, local groups held only partial control over their technical assistants. As with most neighbourhood groups, these depended upon external sources of financing, mostly government contracts and foundation grants. The formal representation which local groups had on the boards of directors of some technical assistant groups was undermined by this ongoing dependency, as well as by the declining capacity of local groups to mobilize their constituencies in support of more thorough-going reform.

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[12] To the point that in 1981 on Manhattan's West Side, for example, tenants in Community Management programme buildings were organizing not against the city, but against their local community sponsor.

[13] Neither the City nor the federal government maintained a full programme for multifamily urban homesteading, despite the publicity it attracted. They refused, moreover, to take responsibility for postconstruction job placement for the urban homesteaders, or to systematically provide Section 8 rent subsidies. Welfare tenants in particular were faced with the fact that until the early 19805, the welfare department considered a tenant-owned coop as personal property, in violation of departmental guidelines.

While an increased level of technical, financial and managerial competence seemed to give neighbourhood organizations a bit more independence from the political vagaries of federal and local funding cycles, the other side of this process was worsening intraorganizational relationships, growing strains between groups and local residents, and the displacement of organizational and movement goals. Adopt-a-Building, on the Lower East Side, found itself the object of a strike threat by its sweat equity workers in the mid-1970s over the failure to provide educational benefits, and had virtually collapsed by 1980. Manhattan Valley Development Corporation, which for years had been a key actor in tenant organizing and self- management in upper Manhattan, faced a 'mini-riot' in 1981 when 2000 people turned out to fill out 126 applications for subsidized housing being developed by the group (New York Times, 15 October 1981, Bl). People's Development Corporation saw its offices destroyed twice in six months by arson, following the failure to maintain internal cohesion and community support during a period of rapid growth and organizational change (Katz, 1983). Los Sures, based in the Southside neighbourhood in Brooklyn, found itself more and more separated from the 'hope of the people of the Southside' as the 'bureaucratic form which it assumed in order to achieve its objectives sapped the strength' of its grassroots linkages (Johnson, nd, 14).

As a result, by the end of the 1970s, the neighbourhood movement had been transformed into a constituency-demobilized interest group. It was therefore no surprise that the incorporation of self-help into the City of New York's In Rem housing management strategy did not come about with popular tenant mobilization by neighbourhood organizations, and that the years of tenant experiments in self-management were appropriated by the state as part of an attempt to solve its internal fiscal, policy and organizational troubles. In this process, self-help was transformed from an oppositional practice into a state-organized norm of organization and control.

V. ‘Rehab-squatting’ and self-help in West Berlin

In West Berlin, self-help arose out of a political struggle not just over material shelter need, but also over demands for self-controlled ways of living. Squatting in neighbourhoods such as Kreuzberg was, at its beginning in 1979, the last, desperate step in a 10-year long defensive community and tenant-organizing endeavour to stop the deterioration, forced vacancies and speculation carried on by private landlords and developers. However when a powerful youth and alternative movement emerged and coalesced with local community action, ‘squatting’ (*besetzen*) was transformed into ‘rehab-squatting’ (*instandbesetzen*): a form of self-help in which the squatters not only occupied vacant buildings, but also attempted to restore the properties into livable condition after years of physical deterioration. It was a form of self-help which, while it blatantly disrespected property norms, managed to attract the sympathy and support of broad sectors of the population alienated by the rotten building policies of the Berlin government or ‘Senat’ and by the disruptive effects of - and huge profits made by - massive housing development, real estate and tax shelter syndicating firms.

During the movement’s peak – when a wave of squatting hit cities throughout West Germany in 1981 - about 160 houses were ‘rehab-squatted’ in West Berlin, directly involving about 5000 people. As crucial as the actual ‘rehab-squatters’ however, were those who participated in street actions, actively supported the squatters, and attempted to mediate the squatters’ demands. All in all, some 15 000 people acted in this role of supporter and ‘godfather’: ministers, writers, unionists and journalists, who morally and practically attempted to defend ’their’ adopted building against police attacks and threats of eviction. Especially after the street-fighting and riots of December 1980. the movement experienced broad public support, tremendous publicity and politicization. Its radical and militant dimensions were responsible for focusing unprecedented public attention on the purposes and practices of the rehab-squatters, tenants and citizens initiatives (*Bürgerinitiativen*) which had been engaged in community and housing battles for years.

While the squatters invested a lot of their sweat and labour into making the houses livable, the properties were not, of course, expropriated from their owners. Rather, as the fruits of their self-help labour were repeatedly destroyed by evictions and demolitions, more and more of the squatters began to look towards establishing some kind of mediating agent to represent their interests to the local state. The most tangible outcome of this effort was the formation of an ‘alternative renewal agent’ or community development corporation (*Träger*) in April 1982 through the alternative self-help organization, Netzwerk. Netzwerk is the oldest

German alternative enterprise, which uses donations from its approximately 6000 members (many of them state workers, mostly teachers) to provide grants and subsidies to alternative projects, with the condition that these be democratically self-managed.

It took a while, however, for the movement to arrive at this result. Throughout 1980 and 1981, the main demand of the squatters remained the cancellation of all trials and police investigations, and the release of all arrested squatters and demonstrators. These efforts to ward off the intense criminalization of the movement by the state was a crucial part of the overall struggle (some squatters were being tried and convicted on terrorism charges for barricading their houses against eviction). At the same time, however, some squatters and support groups had begun to work up a variety of proposals for the transfer of squatted houses into public ownership, combined with 'legalized' self-management and long-term leaseholds, as well as an institutionalized thud-party mediator and manager between the houses and the state.

Pressure on the squatters to drop the position of non-negotiation with the state - which was imprisoning and criminalizing them - increased with the victory of the Christian Democrats in the May 1981 elections. The so-called 'constitutional' evictions of eight squatted buildings in September 198 1 (constitutional because they were announced beforehand rather than coming by surprise) in which one demonstrator was killed, further increased state pressure on the movement. As more solutions to ownership and management questions were developed, the Berlin Squatters Council decided to move away from the 'purist' line of 'either legalize all houses or none'. In January 1982, it voted to allow its members to negotiate contracts with individual owners on a house-by-house basis. At the same time, the council kept to its demand that all imprisoned squatters be released, and that the West Berlin Senat stop the evictions.

When some of the private owners - including the huge union-owned construction firm, Neue Heimat - indicated that they were interested in negotiating with the squatters, Netzwerk began aggressively pursuing its negotiations with the West Berlin authorities. By March 1982, a group of squatted buildings, along with Netzwerk, published their plan for the legalization of rehab-squatting. Under the plan, a receiver would be created by Netzwerk, to be called 'Netzbau', with a governing board composed of squatters (50%) as well as representatives from the Lutheran Church, Netzwerk and local community organizations. Netzbau would administer the buildings on behalf of the West Berlin government, which would purchase the buildings from their current private owners. While the buildings would be publicly owned, Netzbau would be legally responsible to the state for their management. Netzbau, in turn, would provide the squatters-tenants with long-term leaseholds to the property, including virtually complete self-management rights, within the legal framework and financial limitations of the receivership agreement.

The long process of founding this mediating institution was accompanied by ambivalences among the rehab-squatters. They feared that the Berlin Senat might use Netzbau as an instrument to divide the squatters into 'legitimate' and 'criminal' sections. They were also fearful that Netzbau might turn out to be a miniature version of profit-oriented, bureaucratically impersonal firms such as Neue Heimat. In spite of these concerns and the tensions around them within the movement, Netzbau was finally formally organized. A non-profit housing organization was established, which was cooperatively organized and was to be a means of maintain- ing affordable housing without becoming dependent on the CDUSenat or on the large construction companies.

The first reactions to the existence of Netzbau from the Berlin Senat were encouraging. Negotiations were carried on which provided for Netzbau to take on responsibility for 20 buildings, and that it be supported with DM300 000 from the Senat for its management and rehabilitation work. Senat members spoke in praise of 'alternatives in urban renewal', of 'tenant self-help' and of 'people-oriented, stock-savingmethods of rehabilitation'.

However, while the Construction Senator (Bausenator Rastemborski) nego- tiated with Netzbau and the squatters, the head of Internal Security, Senator Lummer, continued to threaten evictions, ordered police to search (and thereby vandalize) squatted buildings, and instigated campaigns in the media to criminal- ize the squatters. Under continuing pressure, and despite growing differentiation within the movement, it became more and more obvious that the Netzbau solution was crucial to the survival of the buildings.

The Netzbau project, however, collapsed in November 1982, just at the moment when it was about to be implemented. Senator Lummer ordered the eviction of two rehab-squatted houses on the pretext of their being public health hazards, just two days before the Senat was to sign a contract transferring responsibility for these – and 24 others – to Netzbau. Following this, the Senat also vetoed other prepared contracts. The squatters and their supporters in Netzbau, who saw no basis for continued negotiations, voted to dissolve the organization, even though this meant no more systematic support for the houses and no more organized access to rehab monies.

Despite this collapse, it was not the case that the Security Chief Lummer wanted to prevent and abolish self-help as such. Rather, he was attempting to create con- ditions under which a more conservative version of self-help could be built. As long as people whose 'integrative capacity is too low' dominated the squatting move- ment in Berlin (as Schsneberg Baustradtrat Kunkel argued in justification for the eviction of the two squatted buildings), the state could not encourage self-help and self-management. On the other hand, this movement was politically strong enough and had the relative 'freedom' to refuse negotiations under such statedefined con- ditions. The collapse of the mediating institution might mean the loss of access to welfare state benefits, but it also has meant that political activity and pressure is being reorganized in the buildings and neighbourhoods: the squatters once again search for support from their neighbours, rediscover their houses as places for collective forms of living and fighting.

VI A different kind of shelter crisis

In contrast to events in New York City, the incorporation of self-help into West Berlin's housing policy has thus far failed. The Christian Democrats have undermined their own negotiating stance with police state measures, while the squatters have refused to accept the terms of institutionalization offered by the Christian Democratic authorities. Underlying this is a different quality to the rehab-squatters' relationship to the state, and to the nature of the crisis tendencies it confronts. While quantitative demands for the satisfaction of basic shelter need are ever present, the qualitative demands put forth by the movement pose a much more intractable problem. It is this aspect to the struggle which has provided the movement with its internal dynamism and has produced a far more polarized situation between the movement and the state.

It is true, of course, that as in New York City, there is a quantitative level of basic housing need beyond the capacity of the existing state. As of 1982, some 70 000 people were registered on West Berlin's housing list, while 18000 of these were categorized as 'most urgent' (Muhlak, 1982). This problem is faced especially by the 238 000 foreign workers in West Berlin (making up 10.8% of the population), who are concentrated in districts such as Kreuzberg. A 1980 estimate figured that over a third of Kreuzberg's population, for example, was foreign-born or the children of foreign-born workers. While German '*Ausländerfeindlichkeit*' or hostility to foreigners has intensified as economic conditions have deteriorated, their weak status as noncitizens has limited organized action against the German state.

What exploded the problem of housing need into a political issue, rather, was the fact that in the midst of this unmet backlog of demand, reasonably decent housing was being kept off the market and held vacant by landlords and speculators, Vacant housing was far easier than occupied housing to rehabilitate into so-called '*Luxusmodernisierung*' flats, or to be torn down altogether for new construction. In 1982 alone, some 1100 buildings containing 9700 units were being held off the market and vacant (Muhlak, 1982). Furthermore, between 1972 and 1980, approximately 600000 existing units disappeared - either into luxury rehabilitation projects or into new construction.

While this process occurred in many West German cities, its impact was more pronounced in West Berlin, and the state was far more implicated. Because of West Berlin's unique ideological and strategic functions, the West German government has continued to provide deep subventions to the Berlin government – accounting for almost 50% of the city's total income - even though West Berlin has become economically dysfunctional.

One form of this federal subvention is through special housing rehabilitation loans and interest write downs, combined with especially lucrative tax shelter opportunities above and beyond that offered in the Federal Republic. This structure of special subsidy has intensified the already enormous competition for space in this city ringed by the Wall. Historically working-class districts such as Schöneberg, Wedding, Tiergarten and Kreuzberg have been particularly hard hit by deterioration and vacancy as well as overcrowding and harassment.

The irony is that the opposition to this process can also in part be explained by Berlin's impossible situation. For the past 15 years, the city has been a magnet for the 'discontented' youth from all over Germany, who have flocked there to escape the West German draft, to live in the centre of this most magical, culturally advanced, decadent and open German city. The material basis for this 'alternative scene' is in part based upon the 30 years of uninterrupted Social Democratic rule in the city, which gave the party an opportunity to experiment with innovative, advanced forms of dealing with 'discontents'. Even after the CDU victory in the May 1981 elections, this social welfare structure has been maintained.

This 'marginal strata' of the alternative scene constitutes a dense network of subcultures and alternative practices, encompassing about 200 000 people. (In the May 1981 election, for example, 90000 votes were cast for the two-year old Alternative List, making this parliamentary arm of sundry citizens' initiatives, leftwing groups and squatters the thud largest party fraction in the Berlin Senat.) The city - especially in its 'blighted' districts - provides the setting and infra- structure for a developed, if multifacetted and hence tension-ridden 'Second Society'.

Characterized by a defiance of bourgeois lifestyles as much as by the effects of the antiauthoritarian protest movement of the late 1960s, while also being materially dependent upon subventions from the state both directly and indirectly, this amalgam of movements impregnated its rehab-squatters and self-helpers with a desire for collective experiences of solidarity, and for new forms of living and collective work. In this respect - as well as in their awareness that it was possible both to resist the abuses of everyday life and to realize their own interests against state power - the squatters understood themselves as part of other political movements of the time, such as the anti-nuke movement, the peace movement, or the struggle for autonomous youth centres in Zurich and elsewhere.

Ex-chancellor Helmut Schmidt understood perfectly well that these squatters were not simply responding to a shelter crisis when he suggested that if they needed a place to live, they could stay with their parents at home. In fact, they were demanding a different kind of housing and an altogether different kind of living and working. They not only demanded it, but also began to build it. The old lofts and tenements of Kreuzberg, with yards and spaces for shops and stores in the rear, were perfectly suited for the living and working projects of the 'marginalized'. They seized the spaces, and were confronted by the structure of power and urban development in the city.

The Berlin squatters faced the German particularity, that not only political movements, but also tenant self-help groups, parent-child groups and autonomous youth centres had confronted. Looking for space of their own, and for resources from the state, they have been met by hard, impervious institutional, legal and bureaucratic obstacles. The encounters with the arrogance of the ruling system has often led to a politicization of heretofore naive citizens and to a tendency for self-help initiatives in Germany to define themselves as largely outside of the system as autonomously operating self-organizations. Self-help movements with such an alternative perspective tend to share a quality-oriented desire for new forms of solidaristic self-regulation, in contradiction to the organization and domination of society by the state.

The German State's problem in dealing with self-help movements has thus been a difficult one. Encouragement, legitimation and funding for self-help must also attempt to tie it to existing property and distribution relations. Insofar as most alternative self-help projects challenge these relations, and are defined as 'unintegratable', only a few progressive 'visionaries' and leftist politicians have dared propose that state subsidies be systematically provided for alternative projects. The obstacles for the realization of this approach have been enormous.

For example, four years ago, a progressive Berlin Senator first proposed that the Senat provide subsidies for tenant cooperatives, inspired by the example of New York City cooperatives housing movement. However, under extreme pressure from administrative heads, housing construction firms and real estate interests, the booklets which were printed to advertise the concept were retrieved and shredded (Hellweg and Neusüß, 1982).

The conditions for such an institutionalization seemed riper as the rehab-squatters and their supporters developed concrete models for community-based receiver- ships (cf. Schafer, 1982; and Hellweg and Wend, 1982). Netzbau and other community-based renewal agents offered their detailed and realistic schemes by which to combine the 'opportunity for self-help in housing with support for self- help in the social sphere, in order to stimulate and encourage the forces of self- reliance of affected citizens for the revitalization of their neighbourhoods' (Rahmenvertrag 'Exception and Rule', SPI, Art. 1, February 1981). It seemed as if a new phase in the relationship between the state and self-help was about to begin as Netzbau was formally recognized as a renewal agent under the provisions of the 1971 Urban Development Act. However, the political reality seemed incapable of allowing this legitimation and funding of such non-state forms of socialization and self-help.

VIl Redefinitions of self-help through the state

Despite this outcome, self-help is and will continue to be very much on the agenda in West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. Both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats have been engaged in extensive discussions over this issue, and it is worth considering their different views.

The beneficial effects of limited state funding for self-help activities in the social and health services have been discussed by the SPD throughout the Federal Republic, and have been most practically developed in West Berlin (Sund, 1978). Not only was self-help recognized as cheaper (Gretschmann, 1980) but it was also understood as a vehicle for social integration, standing 'closer' to the living situations of 'problem groups' while being non-bureaucratic, more flexible and hence better positioned to address specific needs (Kickbusch, 1981; and Kaufman, 1979).

The SPD's approach to the alternative and self-help movements is a contradictory one, however. Leftwing social democrats such as Peter Glotz have argued that the 'mainstream' or 'First Society' is socially and intellectually petrified, and so could benefit by absorbing the inspirations and innovations of the 'Second Society'. Glotz has called for an intensification of the 'dialogue' between the alter- natives and the SPD, rather than a policy of marginalization. In this analysis, however, he confirms the division in West Germany society between the relatively secure, high-tech, high-consumption 'core' and the insecure welfare populations of the margin. The SPD is presented as the mediating institution between the ruling and subordinate cultures, while innovations and concepts coming out of the movements will either be functionalized (in order to help the party, the state bureaucracies and trade unions to reestablish their competence over society) or else will be reserved only for the self-management of austerity by the marginalized strata themselves (see Glotz, 1982).

The core of the tension comes out in the 'Basic Values Commission' reports prepared for the SPD. The report concluded that the SPD should seek dialogue with the alternative movements and the Green Party, and should also encourage new forms of self-help (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2 February 1982, 3 February 1982; *die Tageszeitung*, 3 February 1982). This proposal is coupled with the demand for the reduction of economic growth, meaning fewer of the 'blessings' of industrial society, a lower level of welfare services, and a replacement of the consumerist ideology of entitlements with an ascetically Calvinist way of life. This 'leftwing' social democratic call for self-maintenance and self-discipline is paralleled by certain puritan tendencies for self-restriction in parts of the self- help and alternative scenes, especially within the ecological movement - hence its tactical attraction.

For the rightwing of the Party, though, this argument seems to implicitly reject the very foundations of social democratic politics - without explicitly accepting the consequences. The SPD's rightwing is more aware that no-growth in a market economy spells not only increased inequality, but also the collapse of the idea of welfare state as both the provider of social benefits and the engine of democratizing, equalitarian tendencies. Hence, Löwenthal's 1981 theses reject the importance of establishing a relationship between the SPD and the alternative movements, and argue that the key issue confronting the state and social democracy is how to restructure the technical and financial conditions of production while keeping state expenditures to a functional minimum.

The Christian Democrats, both in their hardline and neocorporatist wings, do offer a definition of self-help to the Berlin rehab-squatters and self-help groups nationally: a definition that is cleansed of all 'autonomist' pollutants.

In his first policy statement after the new CDU regime took power in late 1982, Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that 'family, neighbourhood, private initiative and action, self-help groups and social services can generate more civic spirit and citizen responsibility than a large anonymous institution ever could'. Even more to the point, the new Minister of Labour for the Bonn government, Norbet Blüm, wrote that, 'if there were more neighbourliness and voluntarism, we would need less welfare state and less bureaucracy' (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 October 1982). In the current wave of austerity and restructuring, the CDU regime is making the bureaucratization of the welfare state a pretext for its dismantling. Berlin's Security Chief Lummer himself advanced this position when he told journalists, 'I am very much for self-help. More self-reliance, less government: lord, you find a great protagonist in me for that demand!' (interview in *die Tageszeitung*, 23 June 1981).

For the conservatives, self-help has a long tradition, meaning, however, something quite different from the alternative movements: the self-organization of privileged interest groups to ward off the levelling effects of state bureaucratic measures, or the forced self-reliance of those who are already disadvantaged. In the current crisis of the welfare state, the 'return to the individual' (Schelsky, 1976) is heralded everywhere as a conservative strategy of reprivatization. Richard von Weizsäcker, the CDU mayor of West Berlin, called for state support for the self-activity of citizens in his inaugural address, and suggested in an interview that 'self-help and civic responsibility should be utilized against the managed corporate society' (*Tagesspiegel*, 2 February 198 1).

With respect to social and health services, Ulf Fink, Christian Democratic Senator in Berlin for social affairs, has stated that they had discovered 'many identical goals and motives' between the alternative groups and his party, among them 'the principles of self-management and self-responsibility, of decentralization, of rejecting the statification of all spheres of life, of the total welfare state, and of a merely consumer-oriented behaviour'. The alternative culture, as he explained it, emphasized 'creativity, self-initiative, communal values, and a unity of collective action and individualism through solidarity which is alien to socialism' (*Die Zeit*, 14 May 1982,20).

Fink proudly pointed out that the CDU-dominated Senat had earmarked over 50 million Deutschmarks for alternative self-help projects by the end of 1982. The only provisos attached to the funding, he continued, were that the groups must not be 'political', and that they should provide 'help for self-help' for groups such as drug addicts, juvenile delinquents, therapy groups, chronically ill people, and battered women. He failed, however, to mention that 33 million of this sum had in fact been appropriated and spent by the Social Democrats before May 1981, over the vehement objections of the then minority Christian Democrats.

A more punitive side to this policy is represented in actions by the CDU-controlled regions of the state of Hesse. There, funding for staff and services in youth centres has been either substantially reduced or eliminated altogether 'in order to stimulate new initiatives in broad sectors of the population - initiatives that remained asleep as long as regular checks kept arriving' (Landrat des Lahn- Dill Kreis, Hessen; cf. 9. Hafeneger, 1982).

Housing policy varies little from this approach. Self-help is understood as the 'liberation of private initiative from social impediments' through greater emphasis on the marketplace, hence higher rents and less social housing. For those groups who do not manage to survive on the market as national rent control laws are substantially weakened, targeted subsidies and 'housing vouchers' would ease the withdrawal of the state from the housing market. In this respect, self-help is seen as a matter of the fetishism of 'free choice' through the market (Evers, 1982). Another proposal, which has as yet not been implemented, envisions subsidies being provided to tenants for 'do it yourself self-improvements in their rental housing. However, these proposals contain no provision whereby increased tenant 'sweat equity' would translate into greater control over their homes. The effect would rather be an indirect subsidy for landlords (Hellweg, 1981,69).

Given this definition of self-help, the possibility that 'rehab-squatting' would be incorporated into public policy in Berlin was slim to begin with. The struggle over self-help in West Berlin was not merely one over a bunch of buildings. Rather, the struggle was over the power and control of space, and of the capacity to define alternative visions of life and the future. The distance between these different definitions of self-help was clearly captured in an appraisal by an association of Berlin self-help groups working in older buildings, the Arbeitskreis Berliner Selbsthilfegruppen im Altbau. After a year and a half of trying to hassle through the rules, regulations and restrictions in order to get access to state subsidies which were too low anyhow, the group observed that

> While for the Senat all self-help means is the mobilization of extra capital through sweat, and is to serve as compensation for insufficient public revenues or private capital, we associated other ideas with self-help. While state-initiated self-help is to secure order and domination, we had seen self-help coupled with self-control as a form of resistance against their housing policies (Netzbau, 1982,94).

VIII Conclusion

We have suggested that self-help represents a partial and contingent solution to problems confronting the state under conditions of capital restructuring. In particular, as Brecher and Horton suggest for New York City, self-help provides one way to 'draw upon the untapped potential of New Yorkers to behave differently', as well as a means for breaking the inflexibilities of 'highly resistent bureaucracies'. It can therefore represent a 'cheaper and more effective means of improving the city's basic services' than existing forms of service delivery (Brecher and Horton, 1981, 23-41; cf. Gretschmann, 1980; and Windhoff-Héritier, 1982). Both ideologically and practically, the New York and Berlin cases bear this out.

We have also suggested that the potential benefits of state-organized self-help extend beyond fiscal and organizational issues, to the underlying normative foundations of social life. Under changing conditions of capital accumulation and 'system integration', new forms of personality formation, need formation and satisfaction, and hence new forms of 'social integration' appear imperative. As Egan *et al.* argued in a recent American Enterprise Institute monograph, the 'mediating structures of family, neighbourhood, voluntary associations and church' can

can often define and satisfy ’the legitimate objectives’ of people better than ‘imper sonal megastructures’.

The underlying reason for this effectiveness is that the ‘real and substantial yearning’ for ‘shared meanings and understandings’ among voluntary groups of citizens can be satisfied by these institutions in ways the state cannot. That is, people put their meaningful social actions into institutions over which they have a sense of control, and where they are treated as something more than an object. Hence, the opportunity presents itself for the state to actively organize these low- level institutions and to use them ’within strict constitutional bounds’, to produce the social glue that keeps society from flying apart at the normative seams (Egan *et al*., 1981,6).

The New York case shows that neighbourhood and tenant-based self-help projects, appropriated and transformed by the state, can be made to function in this manner. Though not yet as successfully realized in national public policies, German social scientists and policy analysts have also argued that a reduction of state-produced social services need not mean the dismantling of the welfare state if self-help ‘organisms’ and intermediary structures are given their proper place and function (cf. Gross, 1982). In particular, the neighbourhood is suggested as the organizational frame in which political apathy can be transformed through a reintroduction of people’s own labour into municipal services (Gross, 1982, 44).

Such a perspective contrasts with others which interpret the emergence of these forms of social self-defence as autonomous forms of self-activity which provide the opportunity for the deprofessionalization and destatification of a rejuvenated, cooperative and community-focused civil society (see Gorz, 1980; Touraine, 1981; Rosanvallan, 1982). It is certainly the case that street-level self- organization and self-help movements have been attempts to recover a self- organized, empowering social life. At the same time it is also no coincidence, for example, that self-help labour and self-initiative are especially encouraged in areas of service delivery by the state which cannot be further rationalized and industrialized (such as certain health and social services, and the parts of the housing market we have described in this article). It is also no coincidence that social scientists and policy planners have been working on how the specific inter- organizational linkages between the state and self-help organizations could be designed, which would make use of property and the domination of the state (Windhoff-Héritier, 1982, 58 ; Japp and Olk, 1980).

Our examination of the Berlin and New York cases suggest that rather than looking at self-help as the precursor to ‘state-free’ enclaves inside a distinct ‘civil society’, new arenas of struggle over self-help are being created in a battle over the forms of socialization and survival. These arenas are no longer characterized by the traditional division between state and civil society; rather, the cleavages run across these traditional divisions. The state institutionalizes *selected* community and tenant-based self-help efforts in an effort to reshape citizen expectations away from the state, while retaining control over the conditions of reproduction. On the other hand, the movements struggle for more and better state resources in order to build the conditions for authentic social self-organization.

The outcomes of these struggles around self-help cannot, therefore, be a priori determined. Concrete results depend upon what could be summed up as the specific articulation of class relations - that is, the historically produced distribution of power among social agents struggling in and against the state. And since even state-organized self-help depends upon the self-activity of persons, it contains the permanent risk that state attempts to routinize, control and objectify people's labour will fail, and that a rediscovered social subjectivity will take its place. At that point - as already began to take shape in West Berlin and New York City - the issue becomes that of democratic control over the state.

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Dans cette étude. nous examinons le sens et l'utilisation des procédés d'autoconstruction en prenant deux exemples bien distincts, le mouvement réformiste autogestionnaire ti New York et le mouvement 'rénovation-squatting' Berlin-Ouest. A New York, le degré d'intégration de l'autogestion des locataires dans le programme municipal actuel de logements sociaux aurait 6t6 inimaginable il y a dix ans, et il touche plusieurs milliers de locataires pauvres. Le mouve- ment des squatters ouest-allemands retient également l'attention en République Fédérale et constitue le plus important noyau de la vague d'occupation des logements vides apparue dans tout 1'Allemagne en 1980. Si les perspectives d'institutionnalisation de l'autoconstruction à Berlin-Ouest ne sont pas très bonnes au moment où est écrit ce résumé (janvier 83), il n'en reste pas moins que le concept, la pratique et la faisabilité de l'autoconstruction en tant que solution reconnue font désormais partie des débats officiels.

Au delà de l'intérêt intrinsèque de ces deux exemples, nous abordons les donnés politiques de l'autoconstruction en tant qu'expression concrète d'une relation plus large entre I'Etat capitaliste et les nouveaux mouvements sociaux. Du point de vue des mouvements que lui ont donné naissance, non seulement l'autoconstruction représente un moyen de résoudre des problèmes matériels, mais elle contient aussi des principes d'autonomie, d'auto-organisation et de définition de ses propres besoins. Autrement dit, le fait de s'aider soi-même constitue une critique essentiellement démocratique de l'organisation étatique du marché du travail et une tendance de plus en plus forte à une marginalisation de couches Économiquement superflues et causes d'instabilité sociale. Cependant, du point de vue de l'Etat, l'autoconstruction constitue non seulement une solution partielle ti une certaine crise fiscale, en partie par l'emploi d'une main-dœuvre non marchande des clients de l'Etat, mais également une nouvelle structure pour réformer et discipliner les orientations normatives des citoyens. Autrement dit, l'autoconstruction est représentée comme une forme d'auto-entretien et d'auto-discipline de la societé. Elle pourrait également fournir un élément clé pour rendre politiquement légale une restructuration néocorporatiste des relations entre Etat et société par l'utilisation de cellules de voisinage auto-suffisantes en tant que structure intermédiaire entre Etat et citoyen. Autrement dit, l'entraide spontanée pourrait constituer une sorte de 'colle' organisationnelle et sociale qui fait défaut aux 'mégastructures' publiques et privées.

In diesem Bericht untersuchen wir die Bedeutung und den Gebrauch von Selbsthilfe-Praktiken im Wohnungssektor, indem wir zwei unterschiedliche Fälle, die Reform-Bewegung der Mieter für Selbstverwaltung in New Yo&, und die Wohnungsbesetzer-Bewegung in West-Berlin unter

die Lupe nehmen. In New York wurde die Mieter-Selbstverwaltung in das gegenwärtige Programm der örtlichen Städte-Wohnungsplanung aufgenommen. Dies ist eine Maßnahme, die vor 10 Jahren noch undenkbar war, und sie wirkt sich auf das Leben einiger Tausend ärmerer Mieter aus. Die westberliner Hausbesetzer-Bewegung hat ebenfalls nationales Interesse in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hervorgerufen, als eine der konzentriertesten und längsten Hausbesetzungen, die 1981 in ganz Deutschland stattfanden. Während die Aussichten für institutionalisierte Selbsthilfe auf dem Wohnungssektor zum Zeitpunkt dieses Reports (Jan. 1983) nicht gut sind, besteht jedoch kein Zweifel daran, dal3 die Selbsthilfe als Konzept, praktische Tatsche und Möglichkeit als Teil der öffentlichen Politik im Wohnungssektor fest auf der Tagesordnung steht.

Abgesehen von diesen beiden realen Situationen, betrachten wir die Selbstverwaltung auf dem Wohnungssektor als einen konkreten Ausdruck eines weiteren Zusammenhangs zwischen dem kapitalistischen Staat und den sozialen Bewegungen. Diese Bewegungen sehen die Selbsthilfe nicht nur als Losung für materielle Probleme, sondern auch als ein Gebiet f& Autonomie, Selbst-Organisation und Selbst-Definition von Bedürfnissen. Dies bedeutet, daß Selbsthilfe eine im wesentlichen demokratische Kritik an der Staatlichen Organisation der Arbeitskraft dar- stellt, welche in der Tendenz resultiert, ökonomisch überflüssige Gesellschaftsklassen an den Rand zu schieben. Vom Staat betrachtet, bedeuten diese Selbsthilfeorganisationen nicht nur eine teilweise Losung finanzieller Krisen, durch unbezahlte Arbeitskraft, sondern auch eine neue Struktur zum Neuformen und Disziplinieren der normativen Orientierung von Bürgern. Das bedeutet, daß Selbsthilfe eine Art soziale Selbsterhaltung und Selbstkontrolle darstellt. Demzufolge kann Selbsthilfe eine schlüsselpolitische Legitimierung für neokorporative Restrukturierung der Beziehung zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft, durch das Einsetzen von in der Nachbarschaft ansässigen Selbsthilfeorganisationen als Vermittler zwischen Staat und Bürger darstellen. Demzufolge konnte Selbsthilfe einen organisatorischen und sozialen Zusammenhalt bieten, den öffentliche und private Megastrukturen nicht bieten können.

En este ensayo examinamos el significado y los usos de la práctica de la vivienda por propio esfuerzo, examinando dos casos totalmente distintos: las actividades de autoadministración de 10s inquilinos en la Ciudad de Nueva York, y la ocupación ilícita en Berlín Occidental. En Nueva York, la autoadministración por parte de 10s inquilinos ha sido incorporada en la serie actual de programas de viviendas municipales, hasta un punto que jamás se hubiese imaginado hace diez años, afectando la vida de varios millares de inquilinos pobres. En Berlín Occidental, las actividades de los ocupantes ilegales ha recibido en toda la República Federal Alemana, siendo 10s residuos más concentrados de la gran ola de ocupación ilegal que ocurrió en toda Alemania en 1981. Si bien las perspectivas de la institucionalización del esfuerzo propio en el campo de la vivienda en Berlín Occidental no son buenas, en le fecha de este artículo (enero de 1983), el caso es que el concepto, la práctica y la viabilidad del esfuerzo propio en la vivienda como política pública, ha sido colocado en el orden de día alemán.

Más allá del interés intrínsico de estas dos situaciones, consideramos la política de la vivienda por propio esfuerzo como una expresión concreta de una relaci6n más amplia entre el estado capitalista y los ‘nuevos movimiento sociales’. Desde el punto de vista de los movimientos de los cuales surgid, el esfuerzo propio representa no sólo una forma de satisfacer necesidades materiales, sino que también contiene temas de autonomía, autoorganización y la auto-definición de las necesidades. O sea, el propio esfuerzo representa una crítica esencialmente democrática de la organización estatal de la mano de obra, su poder y las crecientes tendencias hada la marginalización de los estratos económicamente superfluos y socialmente disruptores. Desde el punto de vista del estado, sin embargo, el esfuerzo propio representa no solo una soluci6n parcial de las tendencias de crisis fiscal, en parte mediante el uso de la mano de obra no amonedada de 10s clientes del estado, sin0 tambi6n una nueva estructura para volver a formar y disciplinar las orientaciones normativas de 10s ciudadanos. Es decir, el esfuerzo propio está representado como una forma de automantenimiento y autovigilancia de la sociedad. Además, el propio esfuerzo puede proveer una legitimación política clave para una reestructuración neocorporativa de las relaciones entre el estado y la sociedad, a través del uso del esfuerzo propio basado en la vecindad como una ‘estructura mediadora’ entre el estado y el ciudadano. Por consiguiente, el esfuerzo propio puede proveer una ‘cola’ social y organizadora que las ‘megaestructuras’ privadas y públicas no pueden proveer.