

Michael Freedon

THE NEW LIBERALISM REVISITED

One of the most interesting developments within recent British scholarship concerning the study of late 19th and 20th century intellectual history and political thought has been the retrieval of progressivism from the domain of Labour historians and Labour history. I do not wish to suggest by this that labour history does not have major contributions to make to our understanding of modern Britain. But in the past much of it - and a typical example is the Fabian description of their own role in history - has exercised a near-monopoly on explanations given for the rise of welfare measures, the endorsement of state activity, and the implementation of collectivist or communitarian social theories. The past decade has witnessed a greater sophistication, in that ideological developments are now seen to be far more complex, as well as drawing from a wider base of ideas and the individuals who promoted them. This is also a minor victory against the over-prevalent British view that ideology counts for little in Britain, that history is a series of pragmatic, ad hoc reactions to exigencies, which can be dealt with in economic or administrative frameworks. This myth has had a deleterious effect on the maturing of the history of ideas as a discipline, and especially on the study of ideologies, in terms of their context, structure and evolution. The uncovering of the role and importance of

the new liberalism in British political thought is one example of this changing emphasis. When I first approached the subject, I had to convince myself as well as others that there was such a thing as the new liberalism. That is no longer called into question, but there are aspects of the new liberalism that remain either controversial or underexplored, and in revisiting this topic I would like to concentrate on two such aspects: Why is the new liberalism clearly a liberal ideology, and what can we learn through it about British notions concerning the state. In so doing, I will also attempt to indicate some of its strengths and weaknesses, its successes and failures.

Old Whigs as well as currently fashionable libertarians have queried the extent to which the new liberalism was distinguishable from socialism. To answer this one must first take into account that in Britain the term 'socialism' has always been one of considerable looseness, covering a range of varied positions, without - on the whole - adequate recognition being accorded to these differences. As an expression of the social nature of human beings, of the importance of community, and of the rights of the working classes and the dispossessed, socialism was compatible with the new liberalism. Inasmuch as it related to the communal ownership of all property, centralization and heavy reliance on the state, or the advocacy of class struggle, socialism was outside the new liberal orbit. Indeed, new liberals became increasingly concerned about the co-optation of the concept of socialism by the emerging Labour Party, and consequently reacted against the term by attempting to create a hard-and-fast ideological border where none existed, in much the same way as the Fabians did from the other side of the fence<1>.

It is still common among scholars to single out two

attributes of liberalism as central features of that ideology^{<2>} : First, a concept of liberty that emphasizes lack of intervention in an area of individual autonomy, and consequently stresses individual rights against any external social body, including the community as a whole, and minimal state interference. Secondly, a notion of the expression of wants, rather than needs, that is harnessed to what may be optimistically called a pluralist, or pessimistically a conflict, version of social behaviour, and consequently does not express any preference among different ideas of the good life^{<3>}. If one accepts that model of liberalism, then the new liberalism is indeed a deviation from liberalism proper. But the connection between liberalism and political minimalism is an accidental, not an essential, relationship, nurtured in the soil of early 19th century political economy and Benthamite Utilitarianism, with their atomistic and monadist assumptions. In Locke, for example, there is no presumption against strong government in areas where it is thought useful and morally right for government to be strong^{<4>} - precisely what the new liberals were arguing. Neither did liberals such as Locke or Mill conceive of human nature as want-satisfying or want-maximizing,^{<5>} but rather - as did the new liberals - as unfolding and fulfilling moral and intellectual capabilities^{<6>}. It is also undeniable that liberalism, like any ideology, insists on its adherents subscribing to certain values and beliefs on which no compromise is possible. It therefore does have an idea of the good life, one that encompasses the expression of human rationality and the encouragement of human perfectibility; the importance of liberty for both individual and social development; consent to rule and the responsible exercise of limited power. These are moral as well as political assertions and they demand

agreement.

What the historian of ideas must account for, then, is the changing nature of liberal thought within these confining limits. Rather than impose a static framework on liberalism that would tie it to a libertarian, minimalist model, it is important to accept that the core concepts of liberalism may appear within different idea-environments, and those environments will influence the actual understanding of liberalism at a particular time and in particular place. The new liberalism was the product of an immense transformation in prevailing ideas about human nature and social structure. True to the liberal tradition, it retained the notion of the free individual, but transposed this on to a conception of community without which the individual could not realize him- or herself. The moment one places a rational conception of human nature, and the idea of liberty as rational self-development, within a theory of social structure that is communitarian, based on the organic theories that dominated the cultural scene of late-Victorian Britain, and further augmented by a move away from the self-seeking individual unit in economic theory, liberal ideology will of necessity change. Liberty, rationality and perfectibility will themselves alter their meaning as a reflection of the new setting of ideas in which they are to be found. They will now be seen to be enhanced through giving full expression to a natural mutual interdependence, by means of social regulation, the pursuit of welfare and the encouragement of political participation and democratic decision-making. Whether this is a better or a worse liberalism is another matter. But it has as much claim to be called liberalism as other variants, as long as it can successfully pass two tests: a theoretical one which demonstrates that it contains all the core and long-

standing components of liberal ideology; and a practical one that demonstrates that the proponents of the new liberalism regarded themselves as liberals, and that they clearly distinguished their brand of collectivism from a socialist one.

The new liberalism retained the features of liberalism because it still insisted on individual human development, on variety and incentive, on areas that are predominantly private, on the institutionalization of private initiative, property and incentives as part of general social arrangements. More light has recently been shed on the origins of the new liberalism and on the connecting and dividing themes in relation to varieties of socialism with the re-emergence of the Rainbow Circle minutes. The Rainbow Circle was a lecturing and debating society that met once a month from 1894 to 1932, and in its early years counted among its small membership people such as the social theorist and economist J.A. Hobson, the Liberal politician Samuel, and the leader of the Labour Party Ramsay MacDonald. Its existence is an interesting pointer to the sources of new liberal ideology. The fundamental trends of an emerging social policy and philosophy are not, as many historians of Britain still maintain, formed by Cabinets, or Parliaments, or even Parties, but by small groups of highly literate members of the 'intelligentsia' - a term familiar on the Continent but virtually unused in Britain. One of the strengths of the new liberalism lay in its ties, perhaps even origins, in the world of journalism, not only because of the disseminating forum it automatically had access to, but because of the special role the quality Press, in particular the weeklies and monthlies, played in British cultural life before the war. They served as a meeting ground for the intellects of the nation and as an

influential link between the worlds of philosophy and academe and the world of politics, which is nowhere better symbolized than by the liberal theorist L.T. Hobhouse's dual role as Professor at the London School of Economics and as leader writer for the Manchester Guardian for over twenty years. The Press had a crucial role in formulating and spreading radical ideologies, and the new liberals occupied key positions in the radical Press. This can help account both for their disproportionate influence and the intellectually happy mix between liberal principles and an operational social reform policy. At the turn of this century the new liberals were, though less ostentatiously, at least as successful as the Fabians claimed to be in permeating British political thinking and action.

There is a strong case for considering the Rainbow Circle as a major melting pot of the British progressive mainstream, and it reinforces the contention that new liberal thought was not only a distinct, innovative body of political thinking, coherent and widely-accepted by intellectuals, but that it was clearly liberal. Take for example Samuel's paper on the new liberalism read in 1895: "The Liberalism based upon Bentham's philosophy and Adam Smith's economics is sapped and riddled and its most successful opponents have been the Socialists. And yet the S(ocial) D(emocratic) F(ederation) can only command a limited amount of intelligent support and the Fabians have no complete and self-sufficing theory of government. There seems to be the possibility of a third social philosophy independent of the others and towards its discovery the New Liberalism moves, its root idea must be the unity of society - complex in its economic co-operative, ethical and emotional bond"<7>. Samuel went on to argue that it was necessary to guard against the error that the state was the only medium of

progressive effort, though its exact role in industrial organization was entitled to very careful examination. For Samuel as for other liberals, the new liberalism was the working out of a position that combined moral and empirical observations with the liberal tradition.

Of especial interest is a debate that took place just a short while before the launching of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 and which considered the formation of a progressive party. Samuel and Hobson both read papers⁸. It is ironic that Samuel, who in later years was to drop out of the forefront of progressive liberals and take an increasingly hard line against co-operation with the Labour Party, was far more positive in pursuing the idea than Hobson who, more than any other theorist, helped create throughout his life a middle ground on which genuine radicals could unite. Samuel believed that the plight of the working classes had forged a sensitive public conscience that could be a basis for a united political approach. Socialists, he argued, were too visionary and too intolerant of employers, whose good will would have to be secured. The ensuing debate demonstrated that the case for a united progressive party rested precisely on current disillusionment with the Liberal party. One participant stated "that the progressive values upon which Liberalism rested was exhausted and ... that consequently one of the greatest impediments in the way of reform was the attempt made to keep the Liberal party together." This was an astute remark, implying as it did the importance of disengaging ideology from ossifying party frameworks, and prophetic in that it identified the ultimate failure of the Liberal party to shed its cautions, middle class image.

Hobson, whose outlook at the time had been heavily

coloured by the Boer War, was more pessimistic about the chances of forming "a robust progressive party" when "the public morality is being degraded by crooked appeals to false ideals of right and wrong", but he made an important analytical observation. The principles of progressivism, he claimed, "are already in existence in the form of widely held intellectual affinities which as a matter of fact place the leaders of the radical, the Socialist and the Labour groups much nearer to each other than their followers imagine. The issue of intellectual affinity in political cooperation depends upon the application of the principles of that affinity to democratic government, social reform and imperial affairs." The crux of the contribution of groups such as the Rainbow Circle to modern British ideology lay in destroying the one-to-one relationship between party and ideology that had been thought to obtain between liberalism and the Liberal party. The new liberalism carved out a new area between traditional liberalism and socialism, an area upon which significant groups and ideas within the Labour movement itself were also converging. The other part of the story cannot be told now for lack of space. But the impact of the new liberals upon socialists such as MacDonald, Laski and Tawney was to ensure that vital components of liberalism were preserved in the Labour Party. Far from the new liberalism becoming socialistic, British so-called 'socialism' retained strong affinities and overlap with a left, socially-oriented liberalism. For example, new liberals and moderate socialists shared the belief in the legitimacy of some degree of private ownership, while at the same time recognizing that economic values could be socially created. The winning progressive combination in Britain this century came to the practical conclusion that inheritance tax, and steeply graduated and differentiated income tax were reasonable

social demands. It did not adhere to an individualistic capitalist system nor, alternatively, opt for widescale nationalization. Rather, the ideology at the root of the welfare state accepted the new liberal location of individual needs side by side with social ones. This was not an eclectic compromise between liberalism and socialism, but a logically thought-out and completely distinct position that arose from a new but complex understanding of human nature and social structure as involving both the individual and society in sustaining and complementary roles. I am not, however, trying to promote an equally extreme interpretation of British socialism as nothing more than the new liberalism in disguise. There existed important differences in the relative priority that new liberals and socialists accorded the principles that both accepted. To return to the example of taxation: for socialists it was a stepping-stone in the struggle for greater human equality, it was also set in an idea-environment that clearly regarded the community as superior to the individual, and hence taxation was a means of retrieving for the community as much as was possible under present circumstances. For the new liberals, the idea-environment of taxation was closer to a redistribution of life chances, in order to express individual talent justly and adequately. It was an ethical and material end in itself.

At the same time there were conservative undertones even to this reformist new liberalism. Indeed, critics from the left did not always make the effort to distinguish among different types of liberalism when they branded the new liberalism as a device to preserve the existing system from radical change. I believe, though, that within the British context the new liberalism was a genuine and unselfish attempt to suggest new attitudes

and a constrictive reorganization of social relationships, though it adapted the methods for arriving at those ends to the timehonoured gradualist rhythm of British politics. It cannot really be surprising to find conservative tendencies in any reformist system of thought that operates within the constraints of existing social and political institutions. The new liberalism was after all at pains to establish its continuity with the 19th century liberal tradition. One minor conservative undertone was the viewing of social reform as a strategy to forestall revolutionary inclinations. On the whole this was more likely to feature in Conservative Party thinking, but a number of liberals were arguing that "to keep a people peaceful you must keep it interested in projects for the advancement of its own welfare"<9>. Even left-wing liberals warned that without the securing of minima of health and possessions" to each individual we have no right to expect from those excluded any respect for our conventions or laws of property and order at all"<10>.

The second undertone was a more general one that saw the conservative component in liberalism as that working towards a stable and content society. Samuel explained: "Liberalism is not only a policy of change. It has in it an element of conservatism also ... it seeks indeed to combine the two principles which the Comtists tell us are at work in every society, the principle of permanence and the principle of progression"<11>. The Nation elaborated on this dualism: "The strictly conservative element in the new liberalism consists in a policy for securing a minimum standard of life and work for all effective members of the nation, with educative and humane consideration for all defective members. Thus Liberalism strengthens the foundation of modern society. But to this conservative policy a creative or

progressive policy is organically related, aiming to discover and develop the potential resources of the nation, those properties of her land and labour which private enterprise is not fully adapted to evoke and utilise"<12>. Hobson analyzed the theoretical and moral basis of this positive 'conservatism' or stability as an issue of social justice, based on a psychological satisfaction with one's individual and social situation: "this sense of getting and giving his due must be regarded as the subjective basis of modern social morality, involving a recognition of economic order". <13> Hobson has alighted on the inevitable paradox of a reformist ideology - its very success would propel it towards preservation of its new attainments. Yet this was by no means the viewpoint of a contented bourgeoisie. To claim that the new liberalism attempted to safeguard the interests and values of the middle class is to ignore the considerable vagueness of the term and its disparate components: the business capitalist sector had little in common with the lower middle class, and even less with the professional groups from which the new liberalism emanated. In fact, the first two sub-groups perceived themselves as directly threatened by new liberal ideology, as can be seen for example in "The Bitter Cry of the Middle Classes" published in 1906<14>.

I now turn to the curious role that new liberals played in the rise and fall of the notion of the state in Britain. It is of course well-known that the term 'state' and the idea of the state have never been major concerns of British political thinking. The British political entity has usually been referred to as the country, the nation, or in the past the realm, the commonwealth. Important continental derivatives such as etatisme translate badly. British political theorists have preferred to discuss Leviathans, rulers,

authorities, thus reducing the idea of the state to one of government and the office holders who exercise power. Government is generally understood as a body imposed on individuals, over and against their natural inclinations. In the period which stretches roughly from 1880 to 1920, however, the term 'state' came to be used frequently and ubiquitously. Within the span of one generation the idea of the state was harnessed to one of the most imaginative and important bursts of social legislation that Britain has ever experienced, and was then found wanting in a post-war world groping for intellectual solutions to increasingly intractable practical problems. Until the 1880s the legacy of Victorian thought generated hostility towards the state, and Herbert Spencer epitomized that attitude in his book Man vs. the State. As Hobson remarked a generation later, "the traditions and the needs of Britain have never favoured close theorizing upon the nature of the state or upon any political foundations, nor have the social and economic interests of the ruling classes hitherto supported the practical development of a strong, highly centralized state"¹⁵. All this began to change when the notion of community was rediscovered in late nineteenth-century Britain, sustained by evolutionary theory, practical reform movements that engaged centralized bureaucracy in their aid, the emergence of a social ethics within some Christian circles, and developments in political thought among Idealists and liberals in particular. It is, I believe, futile to pose the question: among which of these factors did the more collectivist policies of twentieth-century Britain originate? There was clearly a simultaneous convergence on collectivist ideas in which no single element played a decisive role. From our point of view it is illuminating to discover that the notion of the state and the collectivist organization of

society was assimilated into specifically liberal modes of thought. In that crucial sense, the new liberalism became a dominant influence in that development once it had been set into motion.

The conventional conceptions of the state as wielder of power, as locus of sovereignty, as symbol and source of authority, did not disappear, of course, but they were significantly reduced in importance. Instead, a new image of the state emerged, as benevolent, active, pursuing communal ethical ends while remaining ostensibly neutral among sectional interests, in the sense that it did not allow any particular interest to control national policy. As Hobhouse saw it, the action of the state "in certain capacities may be one way, and possibly the best way, of expressing the moral and spiritual interests of its members." The more homogenous the society, maintained Hobhouse, the easier it would be for the state to extend its functions and diminish its role as enforcer of rules<16>. On the surface this was not an argument that seemed to acknowledge the plurality of a liberal society. On reflection, however, this was precisely the incarnation of the liberal belief in harmony that did away with social conflict and permitted the emergence of a unified, ethical community with the state as its agency. For as Hobhouse never failed to emphasize, the "antithesis between the rights of the individual and the welfare of the state, between liberty as such and restraint as such, appears to be a false antithesis"<17>. This was no mere Idealist statement in the Hegelian mould. The British liberal tradition had subtly reformulated Idealism for the consumption of its own political and academic publics. Rather than positing the complete realization of the individual in his capacity as member of a state, the liberal variant of British Idealism had been nourished by Aristotelian and

utilitarian teachings that had been a mainstay of the nineteenth-century academic curriculum. D.G. Ritchie was the most representative exponent of this new liberal Idealist stream, more so than T.H. Green because he was prepared to link his Idealism with a greater respect for communitarian theories. In his Principles of State Interference Ritchie dismissed not only Spencer, but severely criticized that pillar of liberalism, J.S. Mill, for his abstract way "of regarding society as an aggregate of individuals, and of looking on government as a power whose influence is necessarily antagonistic to individual freedom"<18>. Ritchie remained firmly within the liberal tradition himself by insisting that "there is a sphere of individual action into which we have come, or are coming, to see that other individuals ought not in a well regulated society to intrude". But he then immediately added the important rider: "this sphere is not, however, something fixed and known beforehand, but an ideal differing at different times, always more or less vague, and to be permanently secured only by a strong, and vigorous, and enlightened State." In a curious but not untypical fashion, his liberalism was further highlighted by a view of the state as a means as well as an end into itself. It was a means to the realization of the best life by the individual, but that life could only be achieved in an organized society, which was no other than the state itself. While extolling the state, Ritchie preserved the sanctity of the individual, and he did so, as can be seen from his argument, both by employing the Aristotelian conception of the state as the embodiment of the good life, and by interpreting the good life through a qualitative utilitarianism as the greater well-being or health - physical, intellectual and moral - of society<19>. Such a society was composed of individuals, but individuals with a social orientation. Ritchie accepted the scope

that Green had "given to the individual for exercising all his capacities of self-development, all true self-development implying, however, the well-being of a community; for man, as we often repeat without fully understanding what we say, is essentially 'a social animal'". Hence, an ethical system like Green's is really, on its practical side, J.S. Mill's Utilitarianism with a securer basis and a criterion provided, which Mill cannot logically provide, for distinguishing the different qualities of pleasures<20>. There is no doubt that Ritchie's writings were infused throughout by liberal assumptions. This variant of British Idealism was developed as part of the liberal utilitarian tradition, while concurrently contributing towards its more positive attitude to the state.

Before the war, then, new liberals had invested a great amount of trust and hope in the state as instrument of concerted action<21>. Hobson, while demanding of the state to justify itself as an enlargement of individual liberty, was equally insistent that "there need remain in Liberalism no relics of that positive hostility to public methods of co-operation which crippled the old Radicalism"<22>. The value of state control was seen to lie in an innovative line of liberal argument: its further development, claimed his colleague Hobhouse, lay "in such an extension of public control as makes for the fuller liberty of the life of the mind." Worth noting is the new liberal assumption that, in Samuels words: "From time to time the State undertakes fresh duties. As new wants arise, and as government becomes more efficient, the province of State action is gradually enlarged"<23>. The reasonable expansion of the state was considered both inevitable and desirable. Worth noting also is Hobhouse's confidence in the contribution of the state

to the development of that most precious asset of individual liberty - the mind. Indeed, his sense of priorities was stated clearly when he wrote in a revealing passage: "the conscience of the community has its rights just as much as the conscience of the individual ... when all has been done that can be done to save the individual conscience the common conviction of the common good must have its way. In the end the external order belongs to the community, and the right of protest to the individual"²⁴. So deep ran his faith in the fairness and benevolence of the organized arm of a harmonious community. But how these words were to turn sour five years later!

I can only indicate briefly the extraordinary reversal in the fortunes of the idea of the state among these very liberals who had supported it so enthusiastically.²⁵ Hobhouse will suffice as the most interesting and perhaps the most dramatic example. On the question of individual conscience he now effected a remarkable turn-about, against the backdrop of the Defence of the Realm Act, censorship and restrictions on the rights of trade unions. The treatment of conscientious objectors rankled especially, and he now regarded the issue as "the final crux of political theory and practice", one that struck at the authority of conscience and the moral autonomy of the individual.²⁶ The reason for this sudden abandonment of the state lay in its behaviour as "an instrument of destruction and oppression"²⁷, propelled - as he and other liberals saw it - by the introduction of the spirit of Prussianism into the British state. It was further clouded by Hobhouse's renewed antagonism to some versions of Hegelianism, as in his famous remark: "In bombing of London I had just witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine, the

foundations of which lay, as I believe, in the book (by Hegel) before me" <28>. He elaborated on this elsewhere, reflecting that "after a prolonged course of Fabian economics and Hegelian metaphysics one departs wishing that one could never hear the word 'State' again. But I think we ought to control the sense of nausea due to repletion for the sake of the many who use the term 'State' in all innocence for the supreme legal authority" <29>. In other words, the state was confined once again to a traditional and far more restricted role. And the same Hobhouse who before the war has dismissed out of hand the atomistic individualism of Herbert Spencer, was moved to write in 1920 on the occasion of Spencer's centenary: "after a laps of years, the strange turn of events is giving Spencer his revenge. For the 'State' to wish his opponents unceasingly appealed is rapidly becoming almost as unpopular with them as it was from the first with him, and it is well within the bounds of possibility that the reaction from was politics will ultimately produce a new liberty movement, a revised twentieth-century Cobdenism which may look back to Spencer as one of its progenitors" <30>.

In examining the legacy of the new liberalism, the post-war period serves as a suitable testing ground for both its strengths and weaknesses. If the new liberalism had one major flaw, it was this: it was both unable and unwilling to conceive of social structures and relationships in terms of power or class. Admirable as this ethical perspective may be thought to be, it alienated new liberal ideology from the political realities any ideology, no matter how intellectually attractive, has to work with. For too long, the new liberals believed that problems of political power could be eliminated first by granting members of a society

equal access to the political process, and secondly and more essentially, through the use of reason as harmonious means of transcending, not merely resolving, conflict. The war brought home in the crudest possible way the realization that the state was still an instrument of law, force and compulsion, that it could act over and against individual rights, that it had particular rather than impartial interests. The overriding liberal fear of concentrated and irresponsible power combined with deep suspicion of the aims of sectional groups - of which the state at its worst was one. The new liberals could only accept the state because they largely dissociated it from power and, if they did accept compulsion, it was only as a rational, organized act to protect the individual from arbitrary power and to ensure his own development. Before the war, the new liberals were also too sanguine about the ability of political reform to affect immediately the humanization and democratization of the industrial and economic spheres, and after 1918 they urgently had to turn their attention to those areas directly. Post-war liberals were left to defray the costs of the new liberalism. Apart from the relative lack of concern about compulsion and misunderstanding of the nature of power, these costs were: a too optimistic faith in inevitable progress towards harmony, an overenthusiasm for centralization, an underestimation of the appeal of voluntarism and of the co-operative and group nature of social relations.

The pendulum did not swing back all the way, however. Though the state lost its hyperactive and positive ethical content, it was still deemed capable of an impartial and neutral brokerage role among various social groups, especially within the industrial and economic sector upon which a growing interest now

focused. Its interventionist role was limited, stress being laid on indirect control and on a "first among equals" status, but there were few areas now considered immune in principle to communal regulation. But the notion of the public assuming responsibility for a distinct range of human interests which, if necessary, could override private wants was there to stay, as was the crucial one of the establishment of social welfare was a prime communal goal, one in complete accord with individual self-development. While the new liberalism was, for a short period, the dominant stream within British liberalism, it shifted that ideology notably leftwards. But even beyond its heyday, it injected British political thought and practice with a set of principles that could no longer ignore the close mutual dependence between individual and community and that created a pool of ideas from which future generations were to draw heavily.

Notes

- 1 See M. Freedman, *The New Liberalism* (Oxford, 1978), p. 150 ff.
- 2 E.g. S. Collini, *Liberalism and Sociology. L.T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England 1880-1914* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 70, 122-4.
- 3 See R. Dworkin, 'Liberalism' in S. Hampshire (ed.), *Public and Private Morality* (Cambridge, 1978), p. 127.
- 4 See e.g. M. Seliger, *The Liberal Politics of John Locke* (London, 1968), pp. 18, 324; G. Parry, *John Locke* (London, 1978), pp. 129-39.
- 5 The identification of want-maximization with the liberal tradition is of course an argument diffused by C.B. Macpherson (see e.g. *Democratic Theory. Essays in Retrieval* (Oxford, 1973), chap. 2).
- 6 Parry, *John Locke*, pp. 39 - 42; J.S. Mill, *On Liberty* (Dent, London 1910), pp. 74, 114-18.
- 7 *Rainbow Circle Minutes*, 6.11.1895, British Library of Political and Economic Science.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 3.5.1899.
- 9 'How the State Can Help Commerce', *Speaker*, 5.12.1903.
- 10 B. Villiers, *Modern Democracy. A Study in Tendencies*

- (London, 1912), p. 41.
- 11 H. Samuel, *Liberalism. Its Principals and Proposals* (London, 1902), p. 171.
 - 12 'The Social Policy of Liberalism', *Nation*, 27.11.1909.
 - 13 J.A. Hobson, 'Character and Society', in P.L. Parker (ed.), *Character and Life* (London, 1912), pp. 65-6.
 - 14 A series of articles published in the *Tribune* by G. Sims during the summer of 1906.
 - 15 J.A. Hobson, *Democracy After the War*, p. 116.
 - 16 L.T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (New York, 1911), p. 188.
 - 17 *Ibid.*, p. 189.
 - 18 Ritchie, *Principles of State Interference* (London, 1891), p. 83.
 - 19 *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 102-3, 108.
 - 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 144-5.
 - 21 Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 195.
 - 22 J.A. Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism* (London, 1909), pp. 94-5.
 - 23 Samuel, *Liberalism*, p. 31.

- 24 L.T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (New York, 1964, 1st edn. 1911), p. 79.
- 25 I have treated this separately in my *Liberalism Divided: A study in British Political Thought 1914 - 1939* (Oxford, 1986).
- 26 (L.T. Hobhouse), 'Compulsion', *Manchester Guardian* 12.6.1915.
- 27 (L.T. Hobhouse), 'The Recovery of Liberty', *Manchester Guardian*, 29.12.1917.
- 28 L.T. Hobhouse, *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (London, 1918), p. 6.
- 29 (L.T. Hobhouse), 'The New Democracy', *Manchester Guardian*, 19.4.1920.
- 30 (L.T. Hobhouse), 'Herbert Spencer', *Manchester Guardian*, 1.5.1920.