Despite the frequent use of the term “trust” in the security community literature, it has rarely explored the role and concrete processes of trust-based interactions. This article investigates trust interactions within the transatlantic security community, and US–German relations in particular, during the crisis following the construction of the Berlin Wall (1961–1963). In theoretical perspective, I argue that the production and repair as well as the corrosion of trust are constituted by symbolic policies, discursive actions, the use of institutions, and material reassurance measures. Based on this analytical framework, the article illustrates how President Kennedy rebuilt trust in the leadership role of the US by delivering symbolic policies and discursive actions on a societal level and by proposing multilateral, institutionalized policies. Kennedy’s measures restored confidence in the ability and willingness of the US to defend Europe while maintaining a leadership role in crucial questions of alliance policy, such as détente on the one hand and nuclear strategy and arms control on the other. Despite continuing divergence of interests among allies, restored trust helped to overcome this first severe crisis of the security community.