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*with comment by
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Preface

THIS PUBLICATION presents the results of a symposium held at the German Historical Institute on February 5, 1993. The decision to organize a symposium on the topic of current aggressive nationalism and xenophobic attitudes in Germany was a response to the events of the summer and fall of 1992. During this time, the newly unified country was shaken by an unexpected and extensive wave of violence directed at foreigners—particularly asylum seekers—and minorities, accompanied by an increasing number of anti-Semitic incidents, such as the desecration of Jewish cemeteries and the use of Nazi symbols in graffiti. The newspapers had to report, on a daily basis, right-wing extremist hate crimes that occurred throughout the country. Even while the international community perceived events at Rostock, Hoyerswerda, and Mölln as indicative of the resurgence of neo-Nazism, neither German politicians nor the police effectively brought an end to these excesses. However, in many German towns and cities, a determined citizenry staged mass grassroots demonstrations against xenophobia, hatred, and violence in an effort to contain the attempts to undermine the democratic and human rights traditions.

Although we felt strongly about the necessity to take a stand against the violence in Germany's streets, as well as the lax official responses to it, it was not easy to find a way in which we, as historians, could contribute to a better understanding of a situation that obviously strained the capacity of the political problem-solving process. We finally decided on a program that would examine the legal, social, motivational, and quantitative aspects of migration into Germany as they relate to aggressive nationalism, immigration policy, and asylum legislation, and would also place these issues in a broader cultural and historical context.

Jürgen Fijalkowski, professor of political science at the Free University of Berlin, bases his paper on an impressive body of empirical data on migration movements. Using these data, he analyzes, from a perspective of the sociology of ethnocentrism and

prejudice, migration policy and the social roots of xenophobia and aggressive nationalism. Fijalkowski finds that there is little, if any, correlation between immigration pressure and nationalist aggressiveness. He concludes that taking the appropriate measures to lower the number of immigrants will not serve to curtail right-wing violence. Therefore, rather than focusing the political discourse primarily on the ways in which to limit access to Germany, one should instead turn to a discussion of deficits in the process of social integration and the factors that account for the precariousness of the German collective identity.

Commentator Jeffrey Peck, professor of German at Georgetown University's Center for German and European Studies, focuses on the history and culture of the German concept of nationality. In contrast to the Western European and North American tradition, he notes, the German understanding is based on language, kinship, and ethnicity rather than on a common political identification. Peck traces the German ethno-national mode of identification to the formative phase of German nationalism and the political romanticism of the nineteenth century. From a perspective of discourse theory and semantics, Peck underscores the tasks of modernizing the German self-concept and changing it structurally "from blood to territory."

Henry Friedlaender, professor of history in the Department of Judaic Studies at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, and Michael Lerner, editor of the magazine *Tikkun*, also offered comments at the symposium. Friedlaender dealt with the issue of the "German" nature of the current wave of xenophobic violence. Lerner emphasized the psychology behind the in-group/out-group distinction as well as the need for a positive foundation for a balanced, confident, and non-aggressive collective identity. Much to our regret, neither was able to submit his comment for this Occasional Paper.

We would particularly like to thank the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, which provided generous support for both the symposium and the publication.

Washington, D.C.
May 1993

Hartmut Keil
Dietmar Schirmer

Aggressive Nationalism, Immigration Pressure, and Asylum Policy Disputes in Contemporary Germany

Jürgen Fijalkowski

VIEWED FROM THE OUTSIDE, the recent wave of aggressive hostility against foreigners in Germany, a society of eighty million people in the center of Europe, must be very alarming. It must be of serious concern that the perpetrators, if they tried to justify their atrocities at all, did so with the slogan "Germany for Germans! Foreigners out!" One wonders whether this development is a reenactment of the systematic attacks on Jews by the Nazis that began in 1938.¹ As a German, one can only feel ashamed by these outrages and regard the spontaneous candlelight vigils against *Ausländerfeindlichkeit und Fremdenhaß* (aggression toward and hatred of foreigners) as welcome signs of good will, but no more than that.

However, it is true that the German constitutional proviso for asylum seekers, a reaction to the persecution under the Nazis, is unique in international law. Furthermore, not all asylum seekers in Germany are persecuted or have to fear for their lives and freedom in their countries of origin. It is also true that Germany, with 44 percent of the total, took in more asylum seekers than any other European country over the past decade.

Since the first targets of the ugly aggressions have been applicants for asylum and visible new immigrant minorities, the questions arise whether there is a causal relationship between in-migration pressure and aggressive nationalism, and, if so, what possible solutions to the ensuing tensions can be found. Within this discussion, one encounters the long-standing dispute over German asylum policies. The participants of that debate seem to be searching for the strategic instruments to address both problems. Some hope that, by relieving the pressure of immigration, they will fight the nationalists' aggressiveness by pulling the rug from under their feet; others think that

¹ Jeffrey M. Peck, "Rac(e)ing the Nation: Is There a German Home?" in *New Formations*, no. 17 (Summer 1992): 75.

restricting the flow of asylum seekers would mean to give in to the nationalists' argument and believe that their aggressiveness can be countered effectively only by an unlimited acceptance of immigrants.²

This paper will examine the content of the dispute over contemporary German asylum rights. It will discuss the question of a causal relationship between in-migration pressures and nationalistic aggression toward foreigners; review the extent of in-migration pressures; analyze the positive policies and political reorientation required to address the problem of aggressive nationalism; consider ways in which to deal with the increasing in-migration pressures; and comment upon whether the regulation of asylum rights and immigration restrictions are appropriate means to address this problem.

I.

For persons who did not receive German nationality from their parents, there are only four ways to gain regular access to unrestricted residency rights on German territory:

– Ethnic Germans with Eastern European citizenship, according to Article 116 of the German Constitution, are *a priori* entitled to full German citizenship through repatriation. The German people and their government feel a moral obligation to accept these resettlers; they are considered expellees of the immediate post-war years. Between 1950 and 1991, about 2.6 million ethnic Germans resettled in Germany. Another two million are probably waiting to come.

– The so-called guestworkers from Mediterranean countries, who were officially invited to Germany in the 1960s, have acquired long-term residency rights and may apply for naturalization. The period in which these guestworkers have become immigrants is considered

² These antagonistic concepts have recently been demonstrated by Friedbert Pflüger, a CDU member of the German Bundestag, and Herbert Leuninger, a representative of the so-called Pro-Asyl initiative, who confronted each other in a debate on "The Multicultural Society—End of a Vision," held at the Thomas Morus Academy in Bonn, Feb. 1993.

to be historically complete. About 3.8 million people of non-German origin have acquired long-term residency of this kind.

– As of 1993, citizens of the European Community (EC) countries have the rights of free movement and free settlement throughout the EC or will have this privilege in the near future. About 1.5 million inhabitants of the German territory fall into this category, but 1.1 million of them are part of the formerly invited guestworker population.

– People who need shelter from persecution in their home countries and who fear for their lives or freedom may apply for asylum, which is guaranteed by both the German Constitution and the Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951.

Representatives of foreign enterprises active in Germany or persons in particular professions, such as international artists and scholars, are also granted residency rights. In addition, those who are wealthy enough not to have to work for a living in Germany may reside in the country. These cases are few, however. In general, there is no other way to acquire long-term residency than the ones outlined above, because Germany officially refuses to declare itself an immigration country that accepts regular applications for residency like the other major immigration countries.

Although in-migration into Germany takes place under all four of these categories, the current dispute centers exclusively on persons seeking asylum. Since not all the applicants do, in fact, experience persecution in their home countries, they present a more problematic case than other, more or less accepted groups of in-migrants. With regard to asylum seekers, their admission is governed by two basic provisions: Article 16 of the German Constitution and the stipulations of the Geneva Convention. Article 16 states plainly and simply that politically persecuted persons will enjoy asylum in Germany. This offer came about as a direct result of the abuses under Nazi rule, when innocent human beings were officially persecuted merely because they were ethnically different or insisted on the protection of human rights, and some 800,000 refugees were rescued only by Germany's neighbors and other countries granting them asylum. The Geneva Convention has been ratified by nearly all European countries, and its articles are binding law in Germany. However, only after an official state authority has decided in a lengthy administrative procedure that an applicant's reasons are convincing may he

or she be treated as a politically persecuted person or as a refugee under the Geneva Convention.

The problem is that only between 4.5 and 6.9 percent of the applicants initially can convince the authorities that they are, indeed, persecuted or are refugees in the legally defined sense of the term. After appeals to administrative courts, that figure about doubles; some 16 to 20 percent of all cases are otherwise settled. On the whole, more than 75 percent of all applications are denied,³ although many of the rejected applicants do receive limited permission to stay out of humanitarian considerations. At least two thirds of all asylum seekers are judged to have come for economic or other private reasons; they are refused asylum and are required to leave Germany. However, only few of them actually are returned to their home countries. Many discarded their passports so that their nationality can no longer be determined, and the assumed country of origin often refuses to take its emigrants back. Roughly half of those rejected disappear into the unknown. Since, according to the so-called Schengen Agreement, all border controls within the European Community are supposed to be lifted, the "unknown" will include other EC member countries, which, as a result, are quite reluctant to implement the new border policy.

Moreover, the proceedings at both the German Office for the Recognition of Refugees and the Courts of Revision and Final Decision are lengthy and tiresome due to the complexity of the matter, the rapidly rising number of applicants, and overworked and understaffed authorities. It takes, on the average, about half a year to determine a case, but sometimes the process drags on for two years or more. In the meantime, applicants have the right of legal residency and a claim to shelter and nourishments; after some time, they may also look for a job. In 1992, there was a backlog of about 400,000 pending cases in addition to 450,000 new applications for asylum.

This situation provides the background to the demand by some politicians for a modification of German asylum regulations that would accelerate the decision-making process and exclude applicants arriving from a third country in which they were already safe or in

³ *Auszug aus der Geschäftsstatistik des Bundesamts für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge*, Zirndorf, Dec. 31, 1991, and Oct. 31, 1992.

which their application for asylum was previously rejected. These politicians call for a change in the asylum regulations, because they feel pressured by the Schengen Agreement⁴ and want to see the non-persecuted asylum seekers more effectively rejected. They expect an amendment of Article 16 to bring about an essential reduction of immigration pressures. They also hope that the restriction of asylum rights will help to take the wind out of the sails of the aggressive nationalists.

The opponents of a change argue that an amendment of Article 16 would be immoral. Like many outside observers, they believe that restricting the asylum seekers' access would be akin to giving in to the aggressive nationalists' claims that Germany must be for Germans first and that foreigners must leave. They are also convinced, furthermore, that an amendment would be ineffective in the light of de-facto movements of transnational migration.

II.

The existence of a causal relationship between in-migration pressures and nationalist aggressiveness against foreigners is implied in the theories of those who advocate modification of asylum rights regulations so as to alleviate immigration pressures and who hope that, in this way, they also can reduce nationalistic aggression toward foreigners and heterogeneous minorities. In their view, nationalistic aggression is simply a reaction to the perceived influence of foreigners. The problem with this theory is that it is not true and that it may easily be falsified. If there is a causal context between the two phenomena at all, it exists only in a very circumstantial manner. One may think of it in terms of the proverbial drop of water that makes a bucket run over, but one must not forget that the sewage and dirty water that filled the bucket in the first place was generated by the domestic life and internal activities of a society. Thus, a

⁴ Among other things, the agreement also prescribes to develop common visa policies among the Western European cosignatories and seeks to make sure that asylum seekers must not be accepted by one member state after they were already denied asylum in another.

decrease in immigration pressures has little or no effect upon enmity against foreigners, just as a swell of friendliness toward foreigners does not in itself imply an increase of interest in in-migration.

The sources of animosity toward foreigners and immigrants lie within the internal problems of a society that exist without, and have existed prior to, the presence of foreigners and irrespective of transnational migration processes. Its roots are found, in particular, in tendencies that mould a social structure into a "two-thirds society." This term characterizes a social structure in which two thirds of the population belongs to layers of society that are more or less profiting from the on-going processes of modernization and expanding welfare, while the remaining third is left behind, runs great risk of becoming marginalized, is set aside in spheres where there is no chance left to gain self-esteem.⁵

The aggression that seeks out the foreigner as scapegoat readily originates from resentments among those who are endangered by marginalization. Some simply envy the asylum seekers because they are given shelter and support. The connected ideologies of right-wing movements try to mobilize these resentments and profit from them. Marginalized people detest their own fate and find it symbolized in the outsider position of foreigners, whom they therefore despise. They claim their lack of solidarity publicly by shouting that Germany belongs to the Germans, or France to the French, and so on. In exerting the destructive force of aggression, they enjoy the last satisfaction that remains to the outsider who has no other power left.

But this frustration theory of aggression is not quite sufficient to explain the phenomena, since instigators of aggression also come from milieus in which people only occasionally, or not at all, are in danger of losing their jobs or not finding a place to live. Thus, an analysis of the sources of enmity against foreigners leads to more encompassing processes of societal disintegration. Some argue, for instance, that the roots of aggressiveness are at the core of our rapidly modernizing societies, in which traditional milieus are

⁵ The term "two-thirds society" overdramatizes the quantitative proportions and belongs to the rhetoric of political debates. See Ehrenfried Natter and Alois Riedlsperger, eds., *Zweidrittelgesellschaft* (Wien, 1988). But it characterizes real tendencies of marginalization or the threat of marginalization, which can be observed in the change of social structure. With regard to the German situation, see Rainer Geißler, *Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands* (Oplanden, 1992), 184ff.

dissolving, and a reckless preying upon others in order to "succeed" becomes the chief value and prime mode of behavior.⁶ Aggression against heterogeneous minorities is a reflection of the situation of anomy that accompanies rapid social change. This problem is further aggravated if, in addition, even those parts of society that are successful in climbing the social ladder are made to feel insecure by uncertainties and discontinuities in their collective social identity. For historical reasons, this is undoubtedly true for Germany.

Among the Germans, deficiencies and exaggerations of national identification have alternated throughout history, so that anxiety and bad conscience are close at hand. Relative to other European countries, Germany was slow in starting its historical development as a nation-state, and it became a constitutional democracy amidst a situation of military defeat at the end of World War I. It has to account for the Nazi ideology of a ruling race and its consequences; for the bureaucratically implemented extermination of millions of Jews; and for the Second World War, with its monstrous destruction in eastern Europe, above all. After the end of that war, Germany remained divided for more than a generation. In the meantime, two different societies developed on its diminished territory, which, within the context of global and European divisions into Eastern and Western blocs, grew apart not only in socioeconomic respects but also in their political cultures. The Western part developed into a constitutional democracy and slowly began living with heterogeneous minorities of former guestworker families, who formed their own communities as islands within German surroundings. The Eastern part, however, remained authoritarian and was restricted to the world of its bloc. Today, the two parts of Germany experience great difficulties in growing together again. The recently unified country faces a difficult task in restructuring the all but defunct East German economy. In addition, it is under pressure to come to terms with the implications of its own international position, which is fundamentally changing.

These burdens of the past and the present result in a particular confusion over the national identity, which lacks a clear notion of its historical goals. It is this uncertainty of the national identity that

⁶ Wilhelm Heitmayer et al., *Die Bielefelder Rechtsextremismus-Studie* (Weinheim-Munich, 1992).

contributed to making the reaction of the elite and the public to the right-wing provocations more delayed than wanted. In part, the hesitant reactions of the German authorities must also be explained by a simple underestimation of the extent of the problem and by the incompetence or inability of the police. Thus, the aggressive acts carried out by gangs against foreigners and heterogeneous minorities, as well as the accompanying nationalistic ideologies, cannot be explained by growing immigration pressures. Their roots lie in a lack of social integration and a deficient understanding of national identity and citizenship.⁷ Its implications will be discussed below.

III.

To what extent do immigration pressures actually exist in contemporary Germany? The answer to this question depends on the time frame selected. The longer the time frame, the more contingencies must be considered. There is indeed an observable increase of interest in transnational immigration into the German territories; but one has to take into account the various categories of migrants of

⁷ The empirical data show diverging developments. While the number of criminal assaults (reported by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz in a press conference of the Minister of the Interior on Feb. 6, 1993) committed by right-wing extremists and mostly young people rose by 50 percent in 1992 to 2,285, the results of public opinion surveys (reported by Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats von Berlin in a press release dated Feb. 5, 1993) show that the German public began to turn against the slogans of the xenophobes. In November 1992, before the crime in Mölln, where three Turkish people were burned to death by a Molotov cocktail thrown by two young Germans, only 43 percent rejected the slogans. After the crime, 69 percent did so; in Berlin, the figure was 89 percent. Germany's acceptance and rejection of foreigners does not differ much from the EC average of 1992. According to No. 37 of the "Eurobarometer," a yearly public opinion survey within the EC, the European average for the rejection of foreigners (103 points on a scale of 400) outweighs its acceptance (69 points). In western Germany, the averages are 135 and 55 points, respectively; in eastern Germany, 100 and 64 points, respectively. The figures for France and Great Britain are similar. The average for acceptance is greater than that for rejection only in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland—countries that have far fewer foreign residents.

which it is composed. It is misleading to concentrate exclusively on asylum seekers and on the alleged abuse of asylum regulations, without looking at the proportions of the different components of in-migration and out-migration movements, as well as at the balance of the two.

In 1988, the year before German unification, the balance of in- and out-migration of any kind in West Germany amounted to 550,000 persons.⁸ In 1989 and 1990, the figures doubled to nearly a million in-migrants due to the fact that the borders were opened and waves of citizens of the German Democratic Republic and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe were allowed into West Germany. In 1989, 344,000 Germans from the GDR and 377,000 ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe came to West Germany; in 1990, the figures were 197,000 and 397,000, respectively. Since 1991, the year of the official unification of Germany, the migration from the former GDR to West Germany no longer constituted transnational migration but became domestic in character and thus disappeared from the statistics of border-crossing movements.

The number of ethnic German resettlers from Eastern Europe was reduced again to about half in both 1991 and 1992 (220,000 people a year). As to the balance of in- and out-migration of officially invited guestworkers and their families and of citizens of the EC, the figure is at a similar level of less than 200,000. The asylum seekers thus constitute only one of several in-migrating categories, and they are but one group that needs housing, jobs, language training, etc. To be sure, local authorities, in particular, are confronted with immense difficulties in providing shelter and instituting measures for the integration of new in-migrants upon their arrival. However, these problems are caused by all kinds of new immigrants, not just by the asylum seekers.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that both the absolute figures and the proportion of asylum seekers among the total flow of border-crossing in-migrants are rising rapidly. In the past few years, they have increased from one-fifth to about one half of the total number.

In 1988, a total of 103,000 people applied for asylum in Germany. Over the next four years, the figure increased to 121,000,

⁸ All figures in this section derive from the Bundesamt für Statistik, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1992* and *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, no. 12 (1992).

193,000, 256,000, and 450,000, respectively. Applicants included both refugees and persecuted people, as well as migrants who left their home countries for economic or personal reasons. In addition, there is a growing number of people who are not actually persecuted but are eager to escape the severe disturbances brought on by the social and political transformations occurring along the peripheries of Eastern Europe. Not all of them may intend to emigrate permanently. Thus, while the emigration figure for the Soviet Union in 1990 (450,000) was seventy-five times higher than five years before (6,000), the number of short-term visits to Western countries also rose from 300,000 to 3.5 million.⁹ Short-term visits are often tempting enough, since they offer the chance to take advantage of the enormous gradations in the purchasing power of the different currencies.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow calculated in the beginning of 1993 that about four million people will apply for the new passport that allows them to travel abroad, once they have a visa from each country they wish to visit. People from Belorussia, the Ukraine, the Baltic states, Poland, the Balkans, and so on, who are also interested in traveling abroad, must be added to this number. We know from empirical studies and by interviewing visitors upon arrival that a large proportion of these people use their visits to investigate the chances for their short-term, mid-term, or long-term, legal or illegal participation in the labor and trade markets of the Western European capitalist economies.

Worse yet is the wave of some three million new expellees and refugees that has resulted from the ethno-national conflicts, ethnic cleansing measures, and civil war atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. Of these, 500,000 are currently outside the borders of the former Yugoslavia, with half of them having found formal refuge in Germany. No one knows to what extent similar developments may be avoided in the many complex multi-ethnic regions of the former Soviet empire. It is the huge social and economic disparities between their own societies and those of the West and the anomy that

⁹ Figures based on J. Salt, "Current and Future International Migration Trends Affecting Europe," a contribution to the Fourth Conference of European Ministers for Migration Affairs held in Luxembourg in 1991, Council of Europe MMG-4(91)1.

accompanies changes in the political culture that produce the migration potential in these countries. Of course, the latent East-West migration pressure is not directed exclusively toward Germany. But the more immediate neighbors of the Eastern nations feel this pressure first and more intensely than the others. While, in 1979, 6,282 Eastern European asylum seekers were registered in the EC member states, the annual figure had risen to 186,659 by 1991 and to a total of 689,549 for the entire twelve-year period. Some 63 percent of the twelve-year total had sought asylum in Germany; for 1991 alone, the figure stood at 76 percent.¹⁰

The migration potential of North Africa and the Middle East is similar, and its effects are felt mostly in the countries along the northern coast of the Mediterranean and particularly in France. In the long run, the migration pressure from the South could be even more lasting than that from Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Demographic pressures in this part of the world are far greater, since its population grows seventeen times more rapidly than that of the northwest European countries.¹¹ Thus, the way in which immigration pressures are perceived depends also on the time period under consideration.

The other side of the story is that, in some European countries, a long-term demand for immigration actually exists. For example, in the medium-range perspective, Germany, its current unemployment problem and housing shortage notwithstanding, needs at least 300,000 to 500,000 immigrants a year to compensate for its low birth rate.¹² Over the next twenty years, the number of Germans in the wage-earning age group will decrease by four million, resulting in a loss of about 10 percent of the work force. A decline in the social product, as well as in the resources to support the pension system, would follow if no in-migration were to compensate for this loss. However, in European comparison, a negative birth rate is of

¹⁰ Figures taken from Luise Drüke, "Asylum in a European Community without Internal Borders," delivered to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on Nov. 12, 1992; and H. Barabass, "Statistics of the UNHCR Regional Office for the European Institutions," Brussels, Oct. 1992.

¹¹ J. Salt, "Current and Future International Migration Trends."

¹² See Bernd Hof, "Arbeitskräftebedarf der Wirtschaft, Arbeitsmarktchancen für Zuwanderer," in *Zuwanderungspolitik der Zukunft*, ed. Friedrich-EbertStiftung. Reihe Gesprächskreis Arbeit und Soziales, no. 3 (Bonn, 1992), 7–22.

concern only to Germany, Italy, and Denmark, but presents no problem in, for instance, Great Britain, France, or Spain.

As to Germany, it is unclear whether the required in-migration should be generated by Eastern Europe's ethnic Germans; by citizens of other EC member states or EC-affiliated nations; or by people from the more distant regions of Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Balkans, or the Middle Eastern and North African peripheries. In fact, the potential for migration may not necessarily be realized, and the outcome depends on such conditions as the border control policies pursued by the various European governments. However, all indices show that the migration potential is rising, and that, in the long-term perspective, there is a growing disproportion between migration supply and in-migration demand. The number of potential migrants who hope for open borders in Europe and Germany is far greater than any demand that Germany and other European countries will ever have for demographic reasons. Thus, only in the long run can one speak of an increasing immigration pressure, but, ultimately, it will become a reality.

IV.

To return to our earlier analysis, in order to eradicate the social roots of aggressiveness against foreigners and its accompanying nationalistic ideology, a comprehensive policy of social integration needs to be implemented that would combat the tendency toward a two-thirds society. Programs to provide more jobs and housing, as well as more humane working conditions, are necessary to afford the marginal layers of the employed a better chance to gain greater self-esteem. Other measures should include social work among street youths and improved conditions of education and qualification programs. Community neighborhood initiatives are also very important. This list could easily go on. Compared to these urgent needs, a reduction in the number of in-migrants achieved by excluding non-persecuted refugees will have no effect whatsoever.

It is crucial, however, that those policies of social integration be kept free of ethno-national restrictions to which they are always susceptible. In the German case, such restrictions are implied in the distinctions that are made in the regulations for citizenship,

nationality, and naturalization. As a result of the dominant German tradition and in accordance with the *jus sanguinis* rule, the basis for the German citizenship law, a person is only considered a German if he or she has at least one German parent.¹³ Acquisition of German citizenship through naturalization, rather than by birth, is excluded in principle. It is possible, if at all, only in exceptional cases decided by the authorities of the German *Länder* (states), who examine whether the applicant was legally and continuously resident on German territories for at least ten years and whether he or she can prove a genuine devotion to the German culture and way of life. Access to citizenship for guestworkers, who were officially invited into the country, and their children has been made somewhat easier since 1991; but the distinction between them and the ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe remains in force.

The barriers to German citizenship are much higher for long-term residents of ethno-culturally heterogeneous origin, including the second generation, who were fully socialized in the dominant German culture, than for the ethnic Germans steeped in the non-German dominant cultures of Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union. Not the long-term residents, but the ethnic Germans are treated as "status Germans," or *denizens* in the sense of Article 116 of the Constitution. This provision was established shortly after the end of World War II, when millions of German expellees from former German territories in Eastern Europe required special legislation to be accepted into the newly constituted German state. But the law, as it functions now, is a privilege based on ethno-national considerations for ethnic Germans with ordinary Eastern European citizenship. Meanwhile, despite their long residence, the ethno-culturally heterogeneous families of former guestworkers, especially those from non-EC-member nations, are kept at a distance.

Keeping fast the ethno-national privileges and focusing only on asylum seekers as a means to relieve increasing immigration pressures is not an appropriate tool to fight aggressive nationalism. Instead, it unintentionally provides grist for the nationalists' mills. It also diverts the attention of the public away from the lack of social

¹³ See the introduction to Kay Hailbronner and Günter Renner, *Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht: Kommentar Teil I* (Munich, 1991).

integration, which is prevalent in German society regardless of transnational migration processes. Since ethnic Germans are privileged, non-German residents are kept at a distance, and non-persecuted asylum seekers are excluded, a policy of social integration that attempts to eradicate the roots of aggressive nationalism must be based on a new understanding of citizenship. Therefore, with regard to the principal questions, it is crucial for Germany to implement an all-encompassing immigration policy that has to be based on such a new understanding of citizenship.

Within the German debate on the modification of asylum rights, a new front has been established. It no longer revolves around the question of whether the asylum article of the German Constitution should be given up in favor of more restrictive regulations; rather, it focuses on whether there should be only a limited modification of the asylum regulations or a fundamentally new and more encompassing in-migration policy that treats the asylum seekers for what they are—just one group among several interested in in-migration. Indeed, it is preferable to institute a new, encompassing immigration policy, one that is based on a new concept of citizenship and divested of its traditional emphasis on ethno-national aspects.

The advocates of a positive change in the immigration policy do, as a matter of course, include ethno-culturally heterogeneous people in their conception of immigration and social integration. In the post-ethno-national, modern sense of citizenship, the concept of nationality in a pluralistic civil society rests on the assumption that people want to live together under a common government and common laws, with the implied provision of shelter for minorities, regardless of race, descent, language, gender, social class, religion, or political views. The advocates of a comprehensive immigration policy¹⁴ accordingly seek the gradual abolition of handed-down

¹⁴ The initiatives originated earlier mostly from various specialists and from the Green party. Meanwhile, they come from the wings of all the main German parties. In February 1993, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, member of the National Committee of the Social Democratic party, submitted a proposal for a comprehensive immigration law. Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen (Free Democratic party), the federal commissioner for the integration of foreigners, submitted a draft law making naturalization easier. Even Johannes Gerster, vice president of the Christian Democratic party in the Federal parliament, pleaded for a more ready acceptance of dual citizenship on February 13, 1993.

naturalization privileges for ethnic German Eastern Europeans and the broadening of the *jus sanguinis* rule to include elements of the *jus soli* principle, following either the French or the US examples. They work toward achieving a greater acceptance of dual citizenship, demand shortening the required length of residence for ethno-culturally heterogeneous denizens, and hope to do away with the need to proclaim devotion to the German culture as a precondition for acceptance as a fellow citizen. Thus, their stance is based on a modified, post-ethno-national understanding of common citizenship that replaces the traditional sense of nationhood.

According to this understanding, the nationality of a people does not result primarily from a common history and descent that led to a particular government and state organization based on the notion of kinship. In its new sense of "citizenship in a civil society," this post-ethno-national "nationality" is conceived mainly as a result of a continuous identification with a common *res publica*, whereby the idea of national citizenship rests on the conscious will of individuals and is directed toward the future, not determined by the past and dependent on ties of blood. In Europe, the concept of nation as the nation of will and intent is, above all, a Swiss tradition. But even in Prussian political thought, there are elements of this tradition, as exemplified in Friedrich Meinecke's emphasis on the distinction between the state-nation and the culture-nation. To divest the citizenship of the modern, pluralistic, self-governing civil society of its traditional ethno-national attachments also lies in the interests of Europe's on-going political integration and in the interests of the construction of its post-national federative institutions. Thus, not only Germany has to rid itself of the burdens of obsolete nation-state traditions that are centered on ethno-nationalism.

V.

The adoption of an encompassing immigration policy may be preferable to a mere modification of asylum rights as a means to combat the right-wing ideologies that legitimize aggressive acts against heterogeneous foreigners. But, in the long run, the problem of increasing immigration pressures remains. In the German debate, adherents of a rigorously egalitarian position claim that a consistent

fight against *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* is possible only by granting unrestricted access to foreigners and migrants of all sorts to German and European territories. The out-group/in-group distinction between foreigners and the indigenous population and the preference for in-group members, they argue, implies the exclusion of the out-group members—the very basis for hostility against those not part of the in-group solidarity. Thus, a strictly universalistic view of human behavior would deny the necessity of any borders, accept all migrants who would like to enter, and grant them full equality.¹⁵

However, a change toward an official immigration policy that would invite and accept in-migrants of all kinds on a quota basis does not mean that the borders can simply be thrown open. Even societies that have officially declared themselves societies of immigration—a step no European country has, up to now, been ready to take—are compelled to determine immigration quotas annually, decide upon appropriate selection criteria, and turn away many applicants.

The northwest European countries may have an interest in the immigration of more highly qualified people, since, in some regions, a shortage in the professional work force parallels a surplus of less qualified, unemployed people. However, this shortage will certainly be offset to a large extent by the free movement and settlement of citizens among the EC nations, a policy that has just been implemented for the benefit of the Common Market. Moreover, Eastern European, North African, and Middle Eastern countries will not be interested in losing only the better-qualified segments of their work force, although they may favor the out-migration of people who cannot find adequate employment at home and who are likely to send remittances from abroad.

Thus, there is an obvious disproportion between the demand for immigration into northwestern Europe and the supply of potential migrants from the former Eastern bloc and the North African and

¹⁵ For a comparison of this left-wing, rigorously egalitarian, political view to three other positions—the ethno-nationalist (right-wing), nation-state (conservative), and multiculturalist (liberal)—see Jürgen Fijalkowski, "Nationale Identität versus multikulturelle Gesellschaft. Entwicklungen der Problemlage und Alternativen der Orientierung in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik in den 80er Jahren," in *Die Bundesrepublik in den achtziger Jahren* (Opladen, 1991), 235–250.

Middle Eastern countries.¹⁶ If the doors to immigration as well as to asylum would be opened in Germany and all of Western Europe, the amount of asylum seekers would certainly be reduced, because not all of them are actually refugees. However, with respect to the overall in-migration possibilities, these doors would be very narrow, keeping more interested people on waiting lists and in waiting rooms than could ever be allowed to enter.

Thus, one can easily foresee that, as soon as the EC countries, not only Germany, adopt an official immigration policy, the problem of immigration restrictions would soon reappear under a new name. The first to apply for immigration would no longer be asylum seekers but, if not refugees, simply the backlog of people with a strong desire to migrate, particularly those who try to cross borders illegally or who misuse their three-month tourist visas. The phenomenon will remain the same; only its definition will have changed.

Neither modified asylum policies nor wider concepts of immigration policies can be used strategically to counteract the immigration pressures faced by Western Europe. If the West does not want to re-erect an iron curtain at the borders of the European Community members or at the eastern borders of other central and eastern European countries, then it will have to grow accustomed to the problem of unwanted, poorly regulated, more or less illegal immigration. Instead, it will have to concentrate on other fields of policy besides asylum and immigration. The only effective solution lies in a joint effort of the European governments to formulate long-term, realistic foreign policies that would promote cooperative development programs with their neighbors and gradually ease the conditions of associated membership in the EC. However, these are tasks of historical proportions that cannot be solved overnight but must be constantly worked at. Although some participants of the current disputes in Germany try to make the public believe otherwise, the attempt to counter such problems simply with asylum restrictions or new immigration policies is a pure illusion.

¹⁶ For a comparison, see Jürgen Fijalkowski, "Das Migrationsproblem in Europa," in *Gesamteuropa. Analysen, Probleme und Entwicklungsperspektiven* (Bonn, 1993).

The most optimistic scenario might envision a process similar to that of Western Europe's integration into the European Community, which took more than a generation to achieve. And the differences between the Western and Eastern European countries are much greater than those among the EC members ever were. Recent estimates have calculated that the per capita average of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania is only 13 percent of the EC average and three-fifths of the GDP of Portugal, the Community's poorest member.¹⁷ Only through intricate cooperation and strenuous and steady efforts will it be possible to work out the preconditions necessary for opening the borders completely to free movement and settlement. As long as these preconditions have not been met, it is impossible to refrain from regulating transnational migration processes through border controls. Since it is extremely difficult to control Europe's borders effectively, the West, if it wants to avoid putting up an iron curtain, has no alternative but to pursue a close cooperation with the EC's neighbors in regulating migration potentials and channeling the border crossings. In this context, it is very important that the Eastern European countries share a deep interest in regulating transnational migration flows. Otherwise, the so-called brain drain of better-educated, younger, more motivated, and better-off citizens who usually migrate for lack of opportunities would deprive these countries of a population segment that is crucial for their reconstruction and development.

Furthermore, it seems worthwhile to consider a more equitable distribution of the burdens of immigration pressure among all the Western European and EC countries. Germany presently houses about half of the 775,000 officially recognized refugees living in the European Community; during the last decade, it took in more than half of the two million immigrants who applied for asylum in Western Europe.¹⁸ This means that, in 1991, there were 3.1 asylum seekers per one thousand inhabitants who were permitted to stay at least temporarily. In Great Britain and France, the figures were 0.8 per one thousand; in the Netherlands, 1.4; in Belgium, 1.5;

¹⁷ See Drüke, "Asylum in a European Community."

¹⁸ Figures obtained from the UNHCR Regional Office for European Institutions, Brussels, Oct. 1992.

in Sweden, 3.1; in Austria, 3.6; and in Switzerland, 6.1.¹⁹ In 1992, there were about 5.7 asylum seekers per one thousand inhabitants in Germany.

Summary

1. In the current German political culture, it is much more urgent to cope with the problem of aggressiveness toward visible minorities, especially foreigners, and to protect them from persecution than to involve the public in disputes over asylum and immigration policies or so-called abuses of asylum rights. In the meantime, one can observe a growing opposition to the discrimination against foreigners, heterogeneous residents, and asylum seekers in German society in general as well as among its political leadership.
2. The disputes over asylum policies prominent in Germany today have two backgrounds. On the one hand is the constitutional guarantee of each human being's right to asylum in Germany if he or she is politically persecuted. Adopted as a consequence to the experience of refugees of Nazism, this provision is unique among the constitutions and regulations of European countries and worldwide. On the other hand is the growing number of asylum-seeking persons from abroad, which resulted in about 450,000 applications and about 400,000 pending cases in 1992. These cases included people not only displaced by European civil wars, such as the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The number of those who cannot be recognized as being persecuted or who are not actually refugees is increasing; they are people interested in gaining access to countries in which they expect better opportunities for themselves and their families than they can find at home.
3. In the current discussion on *Ausländerfeindlichkeit*, it is often suggested that there is a causal relationship between increasing immigration pressures and the growing aggressiveness of nationalism,

¹⁹ See Innenministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, ed., "Gemeinsames Asylrecht für Europa," Düsseldorf, Oct. 1992, Zusammenstellung aufgrund von Angaben ausländischer Regierungstellen und UNHCR-Vertretungen.

which is made out to be merely a defensive reaction. However, there is no correlation, or only a distant one, between the two phenomena. The main causes of aggressive nationalism are rooted, on the one hand, in internal aspects of the domestic society and the problems of deficient social integration; and, on the other hand, in an uncertain collective identity within the domestic society that remains unresolved irrespective of the immigration process.²⁰ Immigration may be the drop that makes the bucket run over, but that bucket was already filled by the dirty waters generated in society's own household.

4. Fighting aggressive nationalism requires consistent police action to thwart the activities of lawbreakers. It also requires a comprehensive policy of social integration so as to reduce the danger of marginalization in society, which is a by-product of the tendency toward a "two-thirds society" (from which the offenders originate and are recruited) in a time of rapid change and anomy. Social integration requires policies to help create more jobs and housing, as well as programs to enhance education and social work among young people. It is important that these policies be encompassing enough to include not only the indigenous population but also the heterogeneous population of recent immigrants. Without these attempts to promote integration, any effort to reduce the number of asylum seekers has no effect, since a lack of integration feeds aggressiveness against heterogeneous minorities. For the same reason, it is obvious that simply to facilitate the entry and access of people interested in regular, non-refugee immigration does not serve either to suppress aggressive nationalism.

However, the changeover to an official immigration policy would have the advantage that it would necessarily imply a modernized understanding of citizenship and nation. Such a new approach could be based only on the rejection of an ethno-national understanding of citizenship. It would represent a turn toward an understanding of nation as a self-governing society formed by heterogeneous citizens. The nation of common ethnic descent would be transformed into a post-national society characterized by the will of citizens to live

²⁰ See also Jürgen Fijalkowski, "Nationalismus und Ausländerpolitik in Westeuropa—Sechs Thesen," in *Europa gegen den Rest der Welt?* ed. Chr. Butterwegge and S. Jäger (1993).

together under the common law of constitutional democracy irrespective of race, gender, ethnicity, descent, origin, social group, religion, and political thinking, looking to the future rather than to the past.

5. In Germany, there is indeed a problem of increasing immigration pressures. However, in the current situation, brought about by the raising of the iron curtain and the dissolution of the Soviet empire, these pressures have been largely the result of domestic migration from the GDR to the Federal Republic (which is no longer counted as transnational); the repatriation of ethnic Germans from Eastern European countries; the ongoing family reunions of formerly invited guestworkers; and the new freedom of movement of citizens of EC countries.

The acute immigration pressure on Germany generated by the growing numbers of asylum seekers ranks only fifth in importance. Only when compared to other European countries and only in the long-term perspective is there a problem of immigration pressure from people of heterogenous backgrounds, not all of whom are refugees in the sense of being persecuted or living in fear for their lives and freedom in their home countries.

6. However, it is true that the European Community must eventually prepare to cope with an uncontrollable increase of interest in immigration from countries to its east and southeast and from the non-European southern and southeastern peripheries. Only realistic, long-term foreign policies—cooperative development programs with neighboring countries and a gradual extension of EC membership through treaties of associate membership can help. It is necessary to overcome the nationalist traditions in Europe and to develop a new post-national European identity based on the traditions of Roman law and the Enlightenment. A human right of free movement and settlement all over the world (which the migrants would like to see established and which is also the goal of the policy of extending EC associate membership) can only be the end, not the beginning or the means, of a process that aims to diminish the enormous differences between the more or less prosperous countries of Europe and its peripheries. The elites and the public have only just begun to learn the historical dimensions of this task.

Comment

Jeffrey M. Peck

Fijalkowski's essay is a singularly important contribution to the current discussion on foreigners, refugees, and asylum seekers in Germany and the aggression directed toward them. Fijalkowski presents a well-informed and balanced perspective that is grounded in empirical data and interpretive analysis. His arguments contradict the generalities and clichéd answers used to explain and often excuse the aggressive nationalism of right-wing groups and those who stand by and applaud such violence. This study, published in English by the German Historical Institute, should be of interest not only to Americans but also to Germans, whose spokespersons often resort to facile comparisons drawn between the events of today and those of 1938. The specificity of Fijalkowski's analysis based on scrupulously gathered data historicizes the two epochs. It reminds us that, while some links are obvious, rigorous research shows that injustice perpetrated against one group cannot be crassly compared to that committed against another. In short, the Turks are not necessarily the "new Jews."

I do not find it incidental that, as a paper published and presented at the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C., Fijalkowski's article begins by situating the events in Germany in the perspective of those outside. Journalists in American newspapers reported daily about attacks on foreigners and asylum seekers with a frequency unknown since German unification. Not surprisingly, Fijalkowski associates the "aggressiveness against foreigners and heterogeneous minorities" with nationalist ideologies and, more importantly, with "deficiencies of its understanding of national identity and citizenship." There is no question that German unification contributed to what Fijalkowski refers to as "ethno-nationalism," a concept of national identity based on blood rather than territory, *jus sanguinis* versus *jus soli*, which serves as the basis of German citizenship today.

Fijalkowski is right to the point when he targets the question of nationality and citizenship as central to the debate. His new

definition of "citizenship in a civil society" is what he terms "post-ethno-national 'nationality.'" It is "conceived mainly as a result of a continuous identification with a common *res publica*, whereby the idea of national citizenship rests on the conscious will of individuals and is directed toward the future, not determined by the past and dependent on ties of blood." This more Western European (and American) understanding of citizenship, as new as it might be for the Germans, is the basis for changing the structure of the traditional German notion of national identity. This question of identification, of what it means to "be German" and to belong to an ethno-national body politic, has not, in my opinion, been adequately addressed. Fijalkowski does not emphasize this aspect as much as I wish he might have.¹ However, he does acknowledge, in his presentation of proposed changes in the citizenship law, abandoning "the need to proclaim devotion to the German culture as a precondition for acceptance as a fellow citizen." In addition, he correctly criticizes what he calls the "rigorously egalitarian political view" that established an "out-group/in-group distinction between foreigners and the indigenous population." From my perspective, these two points are key to tackling the problems of German identity that have been neglected in the debate surrounding the issues of aggressive nationalism, immigration pressure, and asylum policy.

Briefly, I would like to propose some theses that merely point to a few aspects of this debate and extend Fijalkowski's arguments. Although many of these suggestions may, by now, seem quite obvious, there remains considerable resistance in Germany to some of them.

1. Defined in Germany as the *Ausländerproblem*, xenophobia, racism, and now, in some cases, anti-Semitism have misdirected attention onto the victims rather than the perpetrators. In short, the problem does not rest primarily with the foreigners but with the Germans themselves. The focus and terms of the debate must be changed.

¹ See my article, "Rac(e)ing the Nation: Is There a German Home?" *New Formations*, no. 17 (Summer 1992), 75–84. Many of the points I make in this response are elaborated in the article, such as discussions of terminology, e.g. *Ausländer*, the issue of racism, and the German notion of *Heimat*.

2. While there is no doubt, as Fijalkowski points out, that economic and social dissatisfaction provokes tensions between "Germans" and "non-Germans," the complexity of German identity vis-à-vis "minority" populations has been underestimated.

3. Exploring what it means to "be German," to belong to an ethno-national community, is not a new phenomenon. The desire for a unified national or cultural identity goes back at least to the eighteenth century and continues into the following decades. Johann Gottfried Herder dealt with this topic, as did the German Romantics and Jacob Grimm.² These men were influential thinkers who conceived of a *Kulturnation*, where the formation of a unified political entity had failed. Taken up by the Nazis, such an idea was despoiled in the Third Reich when the idea of a *Volksgemeinschaft* became equated with a German home(land) captured in the word *Heimat*. Today, some would like to rehabilitate this word and concept in order to create a more positive attitude toward being German. At the moment in Germany, a *Heimat* seems unattainable, and even a home is questionable for *Ausländer* of the lower ranks: certain groups of immigrants (Turks, formerly known as *Gastarbeiter*) and particular asylum seekers (Roma and Sinti).

4. In Germany today, the political left as well as the right are guilty of reifying notions of German and *Ausländer*. This tendency to construct absolutes of positive and negative, good foreigners and bad Germans, is played out in anti-racism and pro-foreigner demonstrations: for example, some German demonstrators proudly announce "*Ich bin ein Ausländer.*" The attempt to undermine personal identification with being German does not work. As well-intentioned as these demonstrations of solidarity with the oppressed may seem, they reinforce patronizing and paternalistic attitudes toward what are unfortunately known as the *ausländische Mitbürger* (foreign cohabitants). Such an outlook leaves Germans little ideological room to regard themselves as anything but either *ausländerfreundlich* or *ausländerfeindlich*. The latter group often then remains

² For a more detailed discussion of the influence of Jacob Grimm on nineteenth-century notions of German cultural identity, see my essay "'In the Beginning Was the Word': Germany and the Origins of German Studies," in *Medievalism and the Modernist Temper: On the Discipline of Medieval Studies*, ed. R. Howard Bloch and Stephen Nichols (forthcoming).

ghettoized as interesting exotics, worthy of undeserved (often unwanted) attention and good will, or as pitiful victims of misunderstanding and prejudice.

5. The issue of *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (a German word that captures the experience more profoundly than xenophobia) is more of a discursive problem than is often recognized. The word *Ausländer* objectifies and reduces individuals from over thirty countries into a faceless mass. Instrumentalizing human beings because of their political status is one strategy for controlling a potentially unruly group of people. Authority can indeed be established over these peoples. It is accomplished, on the one hand, by the rigorous categorizations and hierarchies used to define them (*Ausländer*, *Aussiedler*, *Übersiedler*, *Asylant*, *Flüchtling*, and so on) and, on the other hand, by the generalizing term that reduces their dissimilarity to what one critic calls a "monocultural paradigm."³

6. Since the deaths of "three Turks" in Mölln, the notion of *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* has been increasingly broadened to *Fremdenfeindlichkeit*. This shift reflects the growing intolerance of and violence toward all those who are different, not only because of their ethnicity, race, color, or religion, but also because of their sexual orientation (gays and lesbians) and physical disabilities (the handicapped).

7. Because of residual taboos from the Nazi period, the issue of racism also has not been adequately addressed. In fact, the extensive focus on xenophobia at the expense of race or color could be interpreted as a diversionary tactic. Once laws are changed to address the so-called "foreigner problem," and it is "removed" by legal and social recognition developed under more auspicious conditions for immigration, the link between racism and immigration in Germany (and other European countries) will be more evident.

8. It is important to recognize the links between *Ausländerfeindlichkeit*, racism, and anti-Semitism. It is also necessary to distinguish specific differences in the histories and the status of individual "foreign" groups in Germany, especially with regard to the ways in which each group has experienced hostility. While xenophobic, racist, and anti-Semitic tendencies exist in all European countries, as

³ Azade Seyhan, "Introduction," *New German Critique*. Special Issues on Minorities in German Culture, no. 46 (Winter 1989), 3.

well as in the United States, the fact that they are pervasive should not be used to excuse them in Germany. Particular manifestations, convergences, and divergences among racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism need to be acknowledged in each country in which they appear.

9. As important as particular terms are for mobilizing citizens to actively oppose violence toward foreigners, words laden with emotion, such as (neo-) Nazi, can be misleading when they become shorthand for complicated situations and promote false comparisons. Symbolism identified with Nazism is overdetermined and collapses complex issues into evocative, yet vague ideas. Such correlations can be exploited by different sides of the political spectrum: either to sensationalize or to underplay the seriousness of events taking place today. Americans in particular are still "fascinated by fascism," to invoke the critic Susan Sontag's words. It would be a step forward if we were to question our particular American preoccupation with fascism and Nazism.

10. Serious transformations in German society will not come from changing the asylum law nor from candlelight demonstrations, no matter how important the latter are for demonstrating that the Germans do indeed have civil courage (*Zivilcourage*). There is more at stake than just Germany's image abroad. The future of German society regarding "foreigners" will require structural change, a multi-tiered approach that will address long-term rather than only short-term goals, such as instituting immigration laws with quotas, changing the citizenship law from "blood to territory," granting dual citizenship and local voting rights, educating all citizens about difference, intolerance, and discrimination. With time, I would hope that the image (*Bild*) of the German body politic might be changed from exclusively white and Christian to brown, yellow, and black, Muslim and Jewish. In short, the conception of German identity must be transformed and become more porous, flexible, and inclusive.

11. The role and status of foreign peoples—multiculturalism, for lack of a better term—is affecting the entire Western world. Nevertheless, America, with its own history of immigration, even with its racial and ethnic problems that still exist today, may have something to offer Germany as it becomes more multi-ethnic and multi-racial. Officially, Germany "*ist kein Einwanderungsland*" and America is the "melting pot." In between these two fictions lie some

possibilities for the new Germany to find ways politically, socially, economically, and culturally to accommodate and integrate (not assimilate) heterogeneous populations. Somewhere in-between "Germans" and *Ausländer* is a new kind of German (citizen).

Jürgen Fijalkowski's essay is an important step toward clarifying misperceptions about the relationship between nationalism and immigration policy. Perhaps German institutions in foreign countries, such as the German Historical Institute, and "foreigners" (privileged as some of us are) who study Germany from a different vantage point than the Germans themselves can offer some alternative perspectives on a very complicated situation.